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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 In the United States, achieving and maintaining high population immunization rates for a 
number of vaccines has become a public health priority, and this has resulted in the 
implementation of a broad set of vaccination policies. In this dissertation I rigorously examine 
several such policies that have been widely implemented in the United States in the past few 
decades. Through the application of established empirical methodologies, I am able to estimate 
the causal effects of these policies on a range of outcomes, and my results have clear policy 
implications.  
 The first chapter, Effectiveness of Vaccination Recommendations versus Mandates: 
Evidence from the hepatitis A vaccine, provides novel evidence on the effectiveness of two 
vaccination policies targeted at infants and very young children– simple non-binding 
recommendations to vaccinate versus mandates requiring vaccination prior to childcare or 
kindergarten attendance– in the context of one of the only diseases whose institutional features 
permit a credible examination of both: hepatitis A.  Using a difference-in-differences strategy 
that allows me to take advantage of plausibly exogenous variation across states in the timing of 
the policy introductions, I find that recommendations significantly increased hepatitis A 
vaccination rates among young children by at least 20 percentage points, while mandates 
increased rates by another 8 percentage points.  These policies also significantly reduced 
population hepatitis A incidence. My results further highlight important differences in the 
dynamics of the effects of the recommendations compared to the mandates, and show that while 
recommendations increase only the probability of initiating the hepatitis A series, mandates 
significantly increase the probability of both initiation and completion of the series.   
 In the second chapter, Direct and Spillover Effects of Middle School Vaccination 
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Requirements (joint work with Christopher S. Carpenter), we estimate the effects of state 
laws that mandate receipt of the tetanus, diphtheria, and pertussis (Tdap) vaccine prior to 
middle school attendance.  A substantial literature has examined the effects of state laws 
requiring infants and children to be vaccinated against certain diseases prior to childcare and 
preschool entry, but there is far less work on the effects of similar requirements for middle 
school entry, despite the fact that 46 states have adopted such policies over the past decade.  
We fill this gap in the literature by examining the direct and indirect effects of such 
requirements in a quasi-experimental framework.   
In this work we find that state laws requiring youths to obtain a Tdap booster prior to 
middle school entry increased the likelihood that an adolescent received a Tdap booster between 
10 and 12 years of age by 13.5-13.7 percentage points.  We also find substantial reductions in 
pertussis (whooping cough) disease incidence as a result of the mandates, with the largest 
reduction observed primarily for adolescents, who were targeted by the mandates, and among 
infants, who are particularly vulnerable to pertussis. We also document that these vaccination 
requirements had important spillover effects to the uptake of non-mandated vaccines. 
Specifically, we find that Tdap booster policies significantly increased meningococcal 
vaccination rates by 2.2-2.9 percentage points, increased human papillomavirus (HPV) 
vaccination series initiation by 4.2-4.9 percentage points and HPV vaccination series completion 
by 2.5-3.3 percentage points.  Notably, these spillover effects are larger for youths from 
households with low socioeconomic status (SES).   
Finally, in the third chapter, Giving Teens a Boost? Effects of Meningococcal Disease 
Vaccination Policies, I again examine the effects of non-binding vaccination recommendations 
and school entry mandates, but this time in the context of a population that is substantially less 
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connected to the health care system relative to infants and pre-teens: high school-aged 
adolescents. In the past decade, vaccination policies targeting this age group have become 
increasingly common; in this chapter I focus particularly on policies pertaining to the 
meningococcal vaccine, which was recommended for 16 year olds in 2011, and for which 
fourteen states have implemented 11
th
 or 12
th
 grade school entry mandates.  My results show that 
both the recommendations and the mandates increased the probability that an individual receives 
a dose of the meningococcal vaccine at ages 16 or 17 by approximately 20 percentage points, 
and the evidence also suggests a resulting decrease in meningococcal disease incidence. 
Additional analyses show that the policy effects vary substantially across different demographic 
sub-groups, and in particular, the national recommendation appears to potentially exacerbate pre-
existing disparities in receipt of the vaccine.  
My results also suggest that the high school vaccination mandates significantly increased 
the probability of receiving additional preventive care: I find a robust 7 percentage point increase 
in the probability of having a check-up at age 16 or 17, as well as significant increases in the 
probability of receiving a dose of the HPV or Tdap vaccine at those same ages. These spillovers 
are larger than the spillovers documented in chapter 2, which is consistent with the fact that on 
average high school students have lower rates of contact with the health care system compared to 
middle school aged adolescents.  
Overall, these three chapters provide important new empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of vaccine recommendations and school entry mandates. My results document that 
these vaccination policies have substantially increased targeted vaccination rates, and have 
induced substantial improvements in child and population health. For middle and high school-
aged adolescents, I also find large spillovers of vaccination mandates to the receipt of other non-
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mandated preventive care. Additionally, my results suggest there is potentially large 
heterogeneity in the policy effects across different age groups, in a manner which is consistent 
with pre-existing differences in contact with the healthcare system.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
EFFECTIVENESS OF VACCINATION RECOMMENDATIONS VERSUS MANDATES: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE HEPATITIS A VACCINE
1
 
1.1 Introduction 
In the past century the widespread use of vaccines has resulted in dramatic decreases in 
the incidence of numerous diseases, and this achievement is lauded as one of the greatest 
successes in public health (CDC, 2014a).  In the United States, however, childhood vaccination 
rates for a number of diseases remain persistently below the goals set by the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services
2
 and outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases continue to occur 
due to undervaccination (see, for example, Gahr et al., 2014; CDC, 2009; or Parker et al., 2006). 
As a result, achieving and maintaining high population vaccination rates has become a public 
health priority, and a number of policies have been implemented at the state and national level. 
These policies include subsidized provision of vaccines, required insurance coverage, and 
mandates requiring that children receive certain immunizations prior to child care and/or school 
attendance.   
In this article I provide new evidence on the effectiveness of two separate disease-
specific vaccination policies: official recommendations for hepatitis A vaccination made by the 
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) and hepatitis A child care/kindergarten 
                                                   
1
 A version of this chapter has been previously published as “Effectiveness of Vaccination 
Recommendations Versus Mandates: Evidence from the hepatitis A vaccine” in Journal of Health 
Economics 52, 45-62 (2017).  It is reproduced here in accordance with the rights retained by the author.  
2
 The current childhood immunization goals, which were established in 2010 as part of the “Healthy 
People 2020” initiative, along with their associated baseline vaccination rates, are given in Appendix 
Table 1. Among the recommended childhood vaccines, over half were below their goal rate in the 
baseline year, and in particular, the hepatitis A vaccination rate was nearly 45 percentage points below the 
goal of 85 percent (U.S. Dept. HHS, 2015). These vaccination targets are broadly based on the goal of 
achieving vaccination rates that are sufficient for maintaining herd immunity. In the case of hepatitis A, 
since the baseline coverage rate is low relative to other recommended childhood vaccines, the goal rate is 
simply justified as being “an achievable target.” 
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mandates. I estimate the effects of these policies on both the vaccination rates of young children 
and on population disease incidence, using a difference-in-differences framework that allows me 
to take advantage of the considerable variation in the timing of the implementation of these 
policies across states. I supplement the standard difference-in-differences model with an event 
study style model, which allows me to test for dynamic policy effects.  
Theoretically, there is a strong argument for government intervention in the market for 
the hepatitis A vaccine. When an individual decides to vaccinate, they reduce both their own 
susceptibility to the disease and also the probability of person-to person disease transmission in 
the community. Since in the United States person-to-person contact is the primary means of 
transmission of hepatitis A (CDC, 2006), vaccination against it generates a significant positive 
externality. Due to this externality, individuals value vaccination comparatively less than a 
centralized planner would, and so, in the absence of intervention, vaccination rates will be below 
the socially optimal level.
3
   
Ex ante it is unclear the extent to which the particular interventions considered here,  
ACIP recommendations and child care/kindergarten mandates for hepatitis A vaccination, will 
increase vaccination rates and decrease disease incidence. The direct effect of the policies is 
straightforward: lowering a vaccine’s effective price4 or mandating its receipt should increase the 
demand for vaccination and decrease disease prevalence. If, however, vaccination demand is also 
a decreasing function of disease prevalence, then each of these policies further has the indirect 
                                                   
3
 Additionally, the difference between the private benefits and the public benefits of vaccinating young 
children against hepatitis A is potentially large, as children typically experience asymptomatic infections 
while serving as a significant source of infection for others. 
4
 For simplicity in exposition, I consider  the ACIP recommendation to lower the effective price of a 
vaccine. The justification for this is twofold: First, the recommendation reduces an individual’s 
information cost regarding the safety and efficacy of a vaccine, and second, ACIP recommendations are 
closely tied to a number of other policies which directly subsidize the cost of vaccines, which is discussed 
in more detail in Section 2.2. 
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effect of reducing vaccination demand through the reduction in disease incidence (Philipson, 
2000).
5
 As a result, the net effect of these hepatitis A vaccination policies on vaccination rates 
and disease prevalence is an empirical question.  
Presently, consideration of the ACIP recommendations has been confined to the medical 
and public health literature, and the effects of this policy have not yet been estimated within a 
rigorous causal framework. Using different policy settings, there are several articles in the 
economics literature that consider the effects of vaccine mandates (Abrevaya and Mulligan, 
2011; Ward, 2011; Luca, 2014).
6
 Due to data availability, however, those authors have been 
limited in their ability to simultaneously estimate the effects of vaccine mandates on both 
vaccination rates and disease incidence.  
I am able to identify the effects of the ACIP recommendations and the mandates on both 
vaccination rates and population disease incidence due to two unique aspects of the hepatitis A 
policy variation and data availability. First, unlike other vaccines, the ACIP recommendations 
for hepatitis A vaccination were incrementally rolled out across states, instead of being 
implemented at the national level.
7
 There is also significant variation in the timing of mandate 
implementation across states. Second, hepatitis A has the empirical advantage that much of the 
identifying variation in policies occurs during a period in which hepatitis A is covered in a state-
representative immunization survey of young children, while also being a nationally notifiable 
disease.  As a result, there is adequate data available to identify the effects on both vaccination 
                                                   
5
 The magnitude of the indirect effect depends on how “prevalence-elastic” individuals are, which likely 
varies across diseases.  
6
 Other vaccination policies that have been empirically evaluated in the economics literature include 
insurance mandates (Chang, 2016; Lipton and Decker, 2015) and mass vaccination campaigns (Ward, 
2014). 
7
 It is noteworthy, however, that these recommendations were initially implemented based on historic 
state hepatitis A morbidity rates, and so are not exogenous with respect to morbidity. As a result, the 
estimated effects of the recommendations on morbidity rates should be interpreted cautiously. 
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rates among the targeted age group and disease incidence in the population.
8
  
Overall, I find both of the vaccination policies to be highly effective. ACIP 
recommendations and hepatitis A mandates each significantly increase hepatitis A vaccination 
rates and decrease the population disease incidence. Together, the mandates and the ACIP 
recommendations explain approximately half of the change in both hepatitis A vaccination rates 
and disease incidence over my sample period.  Analysis of policy dynamics indicates that 
individuals who are induced to vaccinate by the mandate respond immediately to the policy, 
while the ACIP recommendations have a more gradual effect that continues to increase for up to 
4 years following implementation.  This is consistent with the fact that the mandates are binding 
for children enrolled in child care or kindergarten, while the recommendations serve as a more 
general ‘nudge’ towards vaccination.  
In my analyses I also consider the potential for heterogeneous policy effects across 
different subpopulations. I find that, among very young children, the effects of the mandates on 
vaccination are driven almost entirely by those enrolled in child care. I otherwise find no 
heterogeneity in the effects of the mandate by ethnicity, mother’s education, or family income. I 
do, however, find some heterogeneity in the effects of the ACIP recommendations on 
vaccination. In particular, the policy effects are smallest for whites and for children whose 
households fall in the middle of the income and education distributions.  
The rest of the article will proceed as follows. In Section 1.2 I provide background 
information on hepatitis A and the relevant vaccination policies. I present my data sources and 
descriptive statistics in Section 1.3, and I outline my empirical strategy and baseline results in 
Section 1.4. Section 1.5 provides results for different subpopulations of interest and estimates of 
                                                   
8
 A limitation, however, is that since I observe vaccination rates only for young children, I am unable to 
capture the effects of the policies on overall population vaccination rates. 
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the effects of the policies on other vaccines and diseases. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.  
1.2. Background 
 To provide context to the analysis, in this section I present background information on 
hepatitis A and both of the vaccination policies I am analyzing - hepatitis A vaccination 
recommendations and kindergarten/child care vaccination mandates.  I first discuss the 
characteristics of hepatitis A infection and vaccination, and the implications this has for the 
expected degree of market failure. I next turn to the vaccination policies of interest, and present 
their relevant institutional and historical context.  Additionally, I briefly discuss the mechanisms 
through which these policies could feasibly affect an individual's decision to vaccinate. 
1.2.1 Hepatitis A 
Hepatitis A is a liver disease characterized by flu-like symptoms and jaundice. Illness 
typically lasts 2 months, with symptoms persisting for up to 6 months in approximately 15 
percent of cases (CDC, 2012). It is transmitted through the fecal-oral route, and is generally 
spread through person-to-person contact or by consumption of contaminated food or water. A 
defining characteristic of hepatitis A, and one that is particularly relevant in this context, is that 
both the probability and the severity of symptoms are increasing in age. Adults experience 
symptoms in over 70 percent of cases, and when they do experience symptoms, the 
consequences are significant: on average, they miss 27 work days per illness and are hospitalized 
in up to 22 percent of cases (CDC, 2012). Children under the age of 6, on the other hand, are 
typically asymptomatic.  
The first hepatitis A vaccines were approved by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) in 1995. Initially approved for use only in individuals 2 years of age or older, in 2005 
 10 
 
they were further approved for children as young as 12 months of age.  Each vaccine requires 
two doses, to be given 6 to 18 months apart, and they have been shown to be highly effective in 
clinical testing.
9
  Since the development of these vaccines there has been a steady decline in the 
hepatitis A incidence in the United States, and as of 2013, the national rate reached a historic low 
of 0.6 cases per 100,000 people (CDC, 2013). Prior to the development of the vaccine, acute 
hepatitis A cases occurred at an annual rate of between 9.0 and 14.5 per 100,000 people (CDC, 
2006). In some areas, however, this rate was much higher, as hepatitis A infection is 
characterized by community wide epidemics and has historically varied significantly between 
regions and across races/ethnicities.  
Although adults experience the most significant morbidity effects from hepatitis A, 
routine hepatitis A vaccination has been targeted towards young children. This is motivated by 
the fact that, because children infected with hepatitis A are usually asymptomatic, they serve as 
particularly good transmitters of hepatitis A (CDC, 2012). Consequently, vaccinating children is 
an efficient way from the epidemiological perspective to reduce disease transmission in the 
community, and therefore reduce incidence among individuals of all ages.
 10
 However, since the 
receipt of the vaccine is potentially costly in terms of money and time, and the potential infection 
that it is preventing would likely have been asymptomatic, the incentives for children to be 
vaccinated against hepatitis A are small. As a result, in the case of hepatitis A, we may expect 
particularly low vaccination rates in the absence of intervention and also relatively low 
responsiveness to policies that ‘nudge’ individuals towards vaccination.  Policies that require 
                                                   
9
 In clinical trials, over 95 percent of adults developed the protective antibody after one dose, and 
approximately 100 percent develop it after 2 doses. The rates are slightly higher for children, with over 97 
percent of children developing the antibody after 1 dose, and 100 percent after two (CDC, 2012). 
10
 Official recommendations explicitly argue that hepatitis A vaccination is important for young children 
because, in addition to reducing disease incidence among the targeted age group, it will also “indirectly 
protect older persons” (CDC, 1996) by “eliminating a major source of infection for others” (CDC, 2006).   
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vaccination, such as child care and school mandates, may then have room to induce a greater 
number of individuals to vaccinate. 
1.2.2 Vaccination Policies 
ACIP Recommendations  
In the United States, official immunization recommendations are made by the Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) and are then reviewed and approved by the CDC 
Director. The ACIP was established under the Public Health Service Act, and consists of 15 
voting members who are experts in medicine and public health. The initial ACIP statement on 
hepatitis A vaccination, released in 1996, generally recommended routine vaccination for 
particular high risk populations, such as children over the age of two in areas with high rates of 
hepatitis A infection, travelers to high-risk areas, men who have sex with men, and illegal-drug 
users (CDC, 1996).  Over the subsequent decade ACIP issued two updates to this initial 
recommendation in which they incrementally increased the target population for routine hepatitis 
A vaccination.  
The first update occurred in 1999. At this time ACIP recommended that routine 
vaccination of children 2 years of age and older be implemented in states with an average annual 
incidence of hepatitis A of more than 20 cases per 100,000 people between 1987-97 (i.e. over 
twice the national average for that time period) and that it be considered in states with between 
10 and 20 cases per 100,000 people (CDC, 1999).  Eleven states – Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington – fall 
into the first ‘high incidence’ category (>20 cases per 100,000 people) and received the ‘strong’ 
ACIP recommendation, and six states –  Arkansas, Colorado, Missouri, Montana, Texas, and 
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Wyoming– are in the second ‘medium incidence’ category (between 10 and 20 cases per 100,000 
people) and received the ‘weak’ ACIP recommendation (CDC, 2006). For notational simplicity, 
I refer to the states at or below average incidence (≤ 10 cases per 100,000 people), which 
received no ACIP recommendation for vaccination in 1999, as ‘low incidence’ states.  
In 2006, following the approval of the vaccines for children as young as 12 months, a 
second update was issued which extended the strong ACIP recommendation for routine hepatitis 
A vaccination to children in all states and recommended the first dose be given between 12 and 
23 months of age .The recommendation stipulates that all children that have not been vaccinated 
by the age of 2 should be vaccinated at their next doctor’s visit (CDC, 2006). As of 2016, this 
remains the current ACIP recommendation.  In Figure 1 I graphically present the timing of the 
vaccine approval and the ACIP vaccination recommendations, and how they vary across age 
groups and incidence categories.   
There are a number of potential mechanisms through which the ACIP recommendations 
may affect an individual’s decision to vaccinate.  This is because, in addition to providing 
information regarding best immunization practices, the recommendations of the ACIP play an 
important role in determining the relevant set of vaccines for a number of policies that subsidize 
their provision. A primary example of this is the federally-funded Vaccines for Children (VFC) 
program, which provides all ACIP-recommended vaccines to eligible children for free (CDC, 
2014b).
11
 Similarly, insurance mandates that require coverage of vaccines generally use ACIP 
                                                   
11
 Individuals are eligible if they are 18 years of age or younger, and are Medicaid- eligible, uninsured, 
American Indian or Alaskan Native, or are underinsured. Children can receive vaccines through the VFC 
program at any enrolled provider, which includes private doctors and hospitals, and public health clinics. 
In general, underinsured children are able to receive vaccines through VFC only at Federally Qualified 
Health Centers or Rural Health Clinics. Notably, although VFC is a federal program, some states choose 
to supplement the program with state funds and thus the generosity of the program varies substantially at 
the state level.  
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recommendations to determine the set of vaccines that must be covered.
12
  As a result of their 
role in these various policies, ACIP recommendations can affect an individual’s decision to 
vaccinate both by increasing their information regarding vaccination and by decreasing the 
monetary cost. A limitation of my results is that I am unable to disentangle the extent to which 
the effect of the policy is being driven by each of these channels. 
Within the medical and public health literature, there have been a number of studies that 
consider the effects of the ACIP recommendations. These studies find that the ACIP hepatitis A 
recommendations are associated with both increased vaccination rates (Bialek et al., 2004; Dorell 
et al., 2012) and decreased disease incidence (Bialek et al., 2004; Singleton et al., 2010; Wasley, 
Samandari, and Bell, 2005). Zhou et al. (2007) additionally find the recommendations to be 
associated with decreased hepatitis A-related ambulatory visits.  These papers are limited, 
however, in that the research designs implemented do not allow for a causal interpretation of 
their results. Several of the studies rely on a single cross-section of data (Bialek et al., 2004; 
Dorell et al., 2012) or compare mean outcomes among a single group before and after they 
received an ACIP recommendation (Bialek et al., 2004). These designs are respectively unable to 
disentangle the effects of the ACIP recommendations from time-invariant differences across 
states or from pre-existing trends in the outcome variable. Singleton et al. (2010), Wasley, 
Samandari, and Bell (2005), and Zhou et al. (2007) each obtain their primary results on the 
effects of the ACIP recommendations by comparing mean outcomes between groups that did and 
did not receive the recommendations, before and after the recommendation was issued. This 
design is similar to a standard difference-in-differences model, although since it is not 
                                                   
12
 Particularly, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) preventative care provision requires that, as of September 
23, 2010, all new insurance plans must provide all ACIP-recommended vaccines without cost-sharing 
(NCSL, 2015a). Under the ACA provision, newly recommended vaccines must be covered within one 
year of the recommendation. 
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implemented in a regression framework the authors are unable to control for time-varying 
observable differences across groups that may affect the outcomes of interest.
13
  To the best of 
my knowledge, I am the first to provide a rigorous empirical estimate of the effects of the ACIP 
vaccination recommendations on vaccination rates and disease incidence.  
Vaccination Mandates 
There is a long history in the U.S. of using school and child care mandatory vaccination 
laws as a tool to increase vaccination rates, with the first mandate being implemented in 
Massachusetts in 1853 (Luca, 2014).  Mandates are an appealing policy tool, as compulsory 
schooling laws provide an effective means for enforcement. An important limitation to the 
effectiveness of mandates, however, is the availability of individual exemptions. In all but two 
states exemptions may be obtained for individuals whose religious beliefs oppose vaccination, 
and 20 states additionally allow exemptions for personal/philosophical beliefs (NCSL, 2015a). 
All states grant exemptions for children who cannot be vaccinated due to medical reasons.   
The decision to legislate vaccination has been left to state governments, and so although 
all states presently mandate the receipt of some vaccines, there is considerable variation in the set 
required for school or child care attendance in each state (Malone and Hinman, 2003).
14
 In 
several states, such as Pennsylvania and West Virginia, child care and school mandates are 
automatically implemented for all ACIP recommended vaccinations, while most other states 
separately regulate each individual vaccine. Since the approval of the hepatitis A vaccine, 20 
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 Zhou et al. (2007) do estimate a regression model that includes a state group fixed effect (received 
ACIP recommendation in 1999 versus did not) and a [state group × year] interaction term, although they 
do not include year fixed effects. As a result, it would be difficult to interpret the coefficient on the 
interaction term as the effect of the ACIP recommendation. Their study is also limited in that the sample 
consists only of individuals with employer-provided insurance. 
14
 There have been school vaccine mandates implemented in all 50 states and Washington D.C. since 
1980, and by 1998 all states had requirements for child care centers as well.  
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states have implemented mandates requiring children to be vaccinated against hepatitis A prior to 
their enrollment in child care and/or kindergarten. 
Within the economics literature, there are several papers that examine the effects of 
vaccine mandates.
 
 Abrevaya and Mulligan (2011) consider the implementation of state varicella 
mandates and find significant effects on varicella vaccination rates, but they do not study 
morbidity effects. Ward (2011) and Luca (2014) both consider the implementation of the first 
modern school vaccination laws, which took place between 1963 and 1980 and mandated the 
receipt of several vaccines, including the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine, prior to 
school attendance. They find reductions in morbidity and mortality for the vaccine-targeted 
diseases but are unable to estimate the effects on vaccination rates due to lack of available data. 
They are able, however, to consider long-run effects of the mandates, and they find significant 
increases in educational attainment, labor force participation, and income, as well as 
improvements in later life health.  
1.3. Data 
Data on my primary outcomes are from two main sources. Individual-level vaccination 
data are from the National Immunization Survey (NIS), 2003-2013, and all data on state disease 
incidence rates are from the CDC’s National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS), 
1997-2013.   
The NIS is an annual state-representative survey conducted by the CDC that targets 
children aged 19-35 months. These data are well-suited for this application, as they contain 
household socio-demographic information as well as reliable provider-verified immunization 
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histories.
15
 A limitation, however, is that the survey does not begin covering hepatitis A 
vaccination until 2003, and so my analyses of policy effects on vaccination rates are restricted to 
2003-2013.  Due to the fact that the hepatitis A vaccine was not approved for 12-23 month olds 
until late 2005, I perform my analyses on two separate subsamples of the NIS survey population 
for this time period: 24-35 month olds for 2003 to 2013 and 19-35 month olds for 2007-2013. 
The CDC’s NNDSS data contain counts of cases of nationally notifiable diseases by state 
and year as voluntarily reported to the CDC by state health departments.  I use morbidity data 
from 1997 to 2013, as the hepatitis A morbidity data are not subject to the same availability 
constraints as the NIS data. This allows me to take full advantage of all variation in the timing of 
ACIP recommendations and state mandates.  Due to underreporting and asymptomatic 
infections, NNDSS data, while being the most comprehensive information available on U.S. 
national disease incidence, likely captures only a fraction of actual cases.  
Information on the dates of mandate introduction were obtained from the Immunization 
Action Coalition (IAC) and from the CDC’s ‘SchoolVaxView School Vaccination Requirements 
and Exemptions’ database.  In cases of discrepancy between these two sources, I examined 
primary sources, such as state Department of Health websites or state statutes, to identify the 
correct date.
16
 As of January 2015, 20 states have a hepatitis A vaccination mandate in place for 
either childcare, kindergarten, or both. The Arizona mandate, however, only applies to residents 
                                                   
15
 Unfortunately, the NIS does not contain information on the child’s current or previous enrollment in 
child care. Since for children this young the mandates are binding only if they are enrolled in child care, 
child care enrollment status would provide an additional dimension across which treatment status would 
vary. These data are also limited in that they do not include information indicating whether patients 
received provider recommendations for different immunizations. As a result, I am unable to disentangle 
the effect of the ACIP recommendations on patient versus provider behavior.  
16
 There were three cases of discrepancy between the IAC and CDC documents: Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, and Wyoming. I verify that Connecticut and Pennsylvania do have hepatitis A mandates 
and Wyoming does not. 
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of Maricopa County, and so I exclude Arizona from my analyses.
17
 Of the remaining 19 states, 
11 implemented their first mandate during the years for which NIS hepatitis A vaccination data 
are available.   
The specific years of implementation are given in Table 1. As is evident from this table, 
the implementation of a child care mandate is highly correlated with the implementation of a 
kindergarten mandate, and at present all states with kindergarten mandates also have childcare 
mandates in effect. Consequently I do not distinguish between the two types of mandates in my 
main analyses; I consider a state to have a hepatitis A mandate in effect if it has either a child 
care or kindergarten mandate.
18
 In Figure 2 I graphically present the timing of the mandate 
implementations, grouped by incidence category.  I find that, of the high incidence states that 
mandated, the majority did so prior to 2003. On the other hand, no low incidence state 
implemented a mandate prior to 2006, which coincides with the year ACIP extended their 
vaccination recommendation to include children in low incidence states.  
To account for broad state differences in vaccine policy and childhood access to 
healthcare, I supplement my main data sources with annual state-level data on other child care 
and school vaccine mandates,
19
 Vaccines For Children (VFC) provision policies, state Section 
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 As a robustness check I estimate the baseline model with Arizona included in the sample. Since 
Maricopa County contains over 60 percent of the residents of Arizona, I treat Arizona as if the mandate 
applied to the entire state. I find that my results are not sensitive to this inclusion.  
18
 Although this may appear to be a strong assumption given that the NIS sample population is between 
19 and 35 months of age, and therefore a child care mandate should bind more strongly than a 
kindergarten mandate, only in one state, Utah, was the kindergarten mandate enacted first.  To test the 
sensitivity of my results to this assumption, I estimate the baseline model using the year the child care 
mandate was implemented as the treatment year. I find that the estimated mandate effect is smaller but 
remains marginally significant at the 10% level. 
19
 Specifically, I include controls for childcare and school mandates for the hepatitis B, pneumococcal 
conjugate, varicella, influenza, Haemophilus Influenzae Type B, and rotavirus vaccines. To the best of 
my knowledge, these are the only other child care and school vaccine mandates that were implemented 
during my sample period. 
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317 funds,
20
  mandated insurance coverage of childhood vaccines and well-child visits, non-
medical exemption regulations, and Medicaid/SCHIP income eligibility thresholds, gathered 
from numerous sources.
21
 I additionally use CPS data to control for differences in state economic 
and demographic characteristics (King et al., 2015). Included in my analysis are variables that 
capture the state unemployment rate, poverty rate, ethnic composition, population education 
attainment rates, and insurance coverage rates. 
Descriptive statistics for the NIS sample are given in Tables 2a and 2b, and are presented 
separately by analysis subsample. For each subsample I further present the descriptive statistics 
both for the subset of individuals that had received at least one dose of the hepatitis A vaccine at 
the time of the survey and for those that had not. Individuals living in states with child care or 
kindergarten mandates are more likely to have initiated the hepatitis A vaccination series, as are 
those individuals living in states with historically higher incidence rates (and also therefore 
earlier ACIP recommendations for routine vaccination).  The rate of initiation of hepatitis A 
vaccination is significantly higher in the 12-35 month old, 2007-2013 sample (73.7%) than in the 
24-35 month old, 2003-2013 sample (55.0%), as is expected given that hepatitis A was 
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 Section 317 is a federal program that provides grant money to states to be used for purchasing of 
vaccines and implementing vaccine-related programs.  
21
 Information on date of insurance mandate implementation comes from Chang (2016) and independent 
review of state statutes.  I gather data on state VFC provision policies from the annual VFC Program 
Management Survey 2001-2010, which is collected by the CDC’s National Center for Immunization and 
Respiratory Diseases. These data contain self-reports of the state VFC supply policy, provided by each 
state VFC Program coordinator. Section 317 funding data are available only for 1995-2003 and 2007-
2013, and were graciously provided by Lenisa Chang and supplemented by data from IOM (2000) and 
CDC Congressional Justification Budget Request documents (retrieved from 
http://www.cdc.gov/budget/index.html). Historical information on non-medical exemption policies were 
gathered from Omer et al. (2006) and CDC and IAC publications. During my sample period, only two 
states, Arkansas and Texas, had substantive changes to their non-medical exemption policies. Both states 
added a personal belief exemption to their pre-existing religious exemption at the start of the 2003-2004 
school year. Medicaid/SCHIP income eligibility thresholds are from the Kaiser Family Foundation 
(2015), Rosenbach et al. (2003) and Rosenbach et al. (2007).   
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universally recommended for the entire span of 2007-2013, and given that a larger fraction of the 
sample live in states with mandates during that period. For both subsamples I find that Hispanics 
vaccinate at a higher rate than other ethnicities, and that vaccination is increasing in mother’s 
age. Interestingly, there is no monotonicity in vaccination rates for mother’s education or 
household income.  
1.4. Empirical Strategy & Results 
 In this section I describe each of the primary model specifications I estimate, and I 
present my main results. To estimate the effects of hepatitis A vaccine recommendations and 
mandates on vaccination rates and population disease incidence, I implement a difference-in-
differences strategy that allows me to take advantage of the variation in the timing of policy 
implementations across states. I supplement the standard difference-in-differences model with an 
event study style model to test for dynamic policy effects.  
1.4.1 Vaccination Baseline Results 
 First, using the individual-level vaccination data from the NIS, I estimate the effects of 
the ACIP recommendations and vaccine mandates on the probability of hepatitis A vaccination.  
In order to take advantage of the available household level socio-demographic information, the 
unit of analysis for this estimation is an individual. I estimate the following linear probability 
specification as my main equation: 
(1)        Pr(𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 1|𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡, 𝑠, 𝑡) =  𝛼𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 +
𝑍𝑠𝑡 +  𝛿𝑠 +  𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡, 
where 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑡 is an indicator for whether individual 𝑖 living in state 𝑠 at time 𝑡 has been vaccinated 
against hepatitis A, and the variables 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑠𝑡, and  𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑠𝑡 are the 
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treatment variables of interest.
22
 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡is a binary variable equal to one if the child lives in a 
state with a hepatitis A vaccination mandate in effect at time 𝑡, and 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑠𝑡, and  
𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑠𝑡 are each indicator variables describing whether the respective strong or weak ACIP 
recommendation is in effect at time 𝑡, with no ACIP recommendation as the omitted category. 
For all treatment variables the relevant policy changes are said to be in effect at the start of the 
calendar year following implementation.
23
 The vector 𝑍𝑠𝑡 contains state-level controls,
24
 and 
individual-level controls are captured by 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡; the complete set of individual controls consists of 
the child’s gender, age group, first-born status and race/ethnicity; mother’s age group, marital 
status, and education level; and the number of children in the household as well as an indicator 
for whether the household ever received WIC. Finally, 𝛿𝑠 and 𝛿𝑡 are state and year fixed effects, 
respectively, and 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a random error term. All specifications are estimated using NIS provider-
sample weights,
25
 and standard errors are clustered at the state level to correct for within-state 
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My primary outcome of interest is receipt of at least one dose of the hepatitis A vaccine (i.e. initiation of 
the hepatitis A vaccine series), although I also consider the effects of the policies on the receipt of two or 
more doses of the vaccine.  
23
 To test the sensitivity of the results to this timing assumption, I additionally consider the following 
policy timing assumptions:  (1) treat policy variables in effect for the entire calendar year in which they 
were implemented, (2) assign fractional treatment values in year of implementation, based on the number 
of months the policy was effective, and (3) omit observations from state-years that experienced a policy 
change. Given that there are two policies of interest - mandates and ACIP recommendations - I allow the 
timing assumption to differ across policy type and estimate the model for all combination of these timing 
assumptions.  I find that the sign and significance of the policy variables are robust to these timing 
assumptions for the baseline model. The magnitudes also remain comparable, although estimated effect 
sizes are consistently smallest when policies are considered in effect for the entirety of their 
implementation year, and are largest when policies are considered in effect at the start of the calendar year 
following implementation.  
24
 Included in all specifications are controls for state unemployment rate, poverty rate, ethnic composition, 
population education attainment rates, and insurance coverage rates. I additionally include a set of 
variables pertaining to state vaccine- and healthcare-related policies, which are discussed in more detail in 
what follows. 
25
In 2011 the NIS switched from exclusively using land-line telephones to including both land-line and 
cell phones in their sample. The 2011 dataset includes both ‘dual weights,’ which include both land lines 
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correlation in outcomes (Bertrand et al., 2004). 
The inclusion of state fixed effects allows me to control for time-invariant unobservable 
state characteristics which may affect outcomes, while year fixed effects absorb the effects of 
unobservable shocks that are common across states. Therefore, as is standard in difference-in-
differences models, identification relies on the ‘common trend assumption’ that in the absence of 
the policy, outcomes in the treated states would have evolved as in the untreated states.  More 
precisely, to achieve identification I am assuming any unobserved time-varying state 
characteristics that affect outcomes are uncorrelated with treatment.  
I do a number of things to provide support to this identification assumption. First, I 
control for a broad number of state vaccine- and healthcare-related policies that could feasibly 
affect vaccination rates and/or population disease incidence. Specifically, I control for other child 
care and school vaccine mandates, VFC provision policies, state Section 317 funding, childhood 
vaccine and well-child visit insurance coverage mandates, non-medical exemption laws, and 
Medicaid/SCHIP income eligibility thresholds.
26
  Second, I augment some specifications with 
state-specific linear time trends, as this allows me to additionally control for state-specific 
unobservables that vary linearly over time. Third, in the event study model, I include a full set of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and cell phones, and land-line only weights, designed to make the 2011 estimates more directly 
comparable to previous survey waves. All data sets from subsequent years include only dual weights.  For 
all reported estimates I use dual weights for 2012 and 2013, and land-line weights for all other years, 
although I verify that my baseline results are robust to using dual weights for 2011-2013 and land-line 
weights for 2003-2010 and also to not using weights.   
26
 Since data on state VFC policies are available for only a restricted time period (2001-2010), I do not 
control for these policies in my baseline model. To ensure my results are not sensitive to this omission, I 
additionally estimate the baseline model for the restricted time period of 2003 to 2010 and include a set of 
dummy variables controlling for VFC policies. I find that my results are robust to the inclusion of 
controls for state VFC policies. Similarly, state Section 317 funds, which are available only for 1995-
2003, 2007-2013, are not controlled for in my baseline specification. As a robustness check, I separately 
estimate the baseline model for the restricted years and include a 1-year lagged measure of total state 
Section 317 funds. My results are unaffected by the inclusion of this control.  
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policy leads, as this provides a test for potential policy endogeneity. Finally, as an additional test 
to see if my results are being driven by unobserved state differences that led to general increased 
uptake of vaccines or disease reduction, in Section 5.2 I estimate the effects of these policies on 
the vaccination rates and disease incidence of other diseases. 
 Results for the estimation of equation (1) are given in Table 3 and show the primary 
result that implementation of hepatitis A mandates and vaccine recommendations causes large 
and significant increases in the probability that young children are vaccinated against hepatitis A.  
The results from my preferred specification, presented in Panel A, Column 2, indicate that the 
strong and weak ACIP recommendations increase the probability of initiating the hepatitis A 
vaccine series by 27.3 and 19.3 percentage points, respectively, for the 24-35 month old, 2003-
2013 subsample. Subsequent implementation of a state child care or kindergarten mandate 
significantly increases the probability of vaccination by an additional 8.18 percentage points.   In 
Panel A, Column 1, I exclude individual and state-level controls, and these results suggest that 
although the sign and significance of the effects are unchanged when these controls are omitted,  
doing so may lead to the effects of the strong ACIP recommendation being overstated by nearly 
26 percent. Finally, in Panel A, Column 3, I augment the full model with state-specific linear 
time trends; the sign and significance of the estimated effects are robust to this inclusion.
27
   
Estimated effects of the hepatitis A mandate for the second subsample are given in Panel 
A, Columns 4 through 6,
28
 and are slightly smaller than the effects for the first subsample.  Given 
that these mandates are only binding if the child attends child care or kindergarten, and the 
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 Although not presented here, these results are also robust to the inclusion of higher order state-specific 
time trends.  
28
 ACIP recommendation effects are estimated only for the 24-35 month old, 2003-2013 sample, as there 
were no changes in the recommendation for the other subsample’s restricted time period (2007-2013), and 
thus the effects cannot be identified. 
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probability of ever having attended is likely increasing in age, then smaller effect sizes are 
expected for the sample that includes younger children, if all else is equal.  
Overall, the magnitudes of these policy effects on the probability of initiation of the 
hepatitis A series are large in both absolute and relative terms. Between 2003 and 2013, the 
fraction of the population of children aged 24 to 35 months that had initiated the hepatitis A 
vaccination series increased by 73.4 percentage points, from 9.5 percent to 82.9 percent. Since 
my results indicate the receipt of a strong ACIP recommendation together with the 
implementation of a mandate increases the probability of vaccination by 35.5 percentage points, 
I estimate that the implementation of these policies explains approximately half of the increase in 
initiation of the hepatitis A vaccine series over this time period. 
I next estimate the effects of the policies on the receipt of at least two doses of the 
hepatitis A vaccine. These results are presented in Table 3, Panel B. Given that two doses are the 
recommended number for the hepatitis A vaccine, using the receipt of at least two doses as the 
outcome variable may be a better measure of “full compliance” with vaccination 
recommendations and mandates.
29
  The baseline estimates for the first subsample, given in Panel 
B, column 8, indicates that implementation of the hepatitis A mandate increases the probability 
of having received at least two hepatitis A shots by 8.11 percentage points. This effect size is 
nearly identical to the estimated effect on initiation of the hepatitis A vaccine series, and 
indicates that mandates are effective at inducing both initiation and completion of the vaccine 
series.  
Unlike the estimates of the mandate effects, the estimates of the effects of the ACIP 
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 Ideally, my outcome variable would be a constructed measure of being up-to-date for the hepatitis A 
vaccine. This measure of vaccination would appropriately measure compliance to recommendations and 
mandates by taking into account that the 2
nd
 dose of hepatitis A should be administered 6-18 months after 
receipt of the first dose, and therefore some individuals who presently only had one dose may still be 
“fully compliant.” Unfortunately, the NIS does not include an up-to-date measure for hepatitis A. 
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recommendations on receipt of at least two hepatitis A shots vary significantly from the 
estimated effects on initiation of the vaccine series. Specifically, the ACIP recommendation 
effect estimates presented in Panel B, column 8 are negative, though insignificant; the addition of 
linear state time trends yields negative and significant estimates of the effects (column 9).  
It is important to note that since the second dose of the hepatitis A vaccine is to be administered 
between 6 and 18 months after the first, the lagged policy dummy variable specification 
implemented here is potentially inappropriate to capture the effects of these policies on receipt of 
two doses of the vaccine. To address this, I supplement this analysis with a more flexible event 
study style model, the results of which are presented graphically in Appendix Figure 2.
30
 The 
results from this estimation support the causal interpretation that the mandate significantly 
increases the probability of having received two doses of the vaccine, while the ACIP 
recommendations have no significant effects.   
The lack of significant effects of the ACIP recommendation in the main specification 
could be indicative that policy ‘nudges’ towards vaccination, such as the recommendations, are 
effective only at increasing initiation of a vaccination series, and do not increase the probability 
of completing the series.  Importantly, in the case of the hepatitis A vaccine, which results in 95 
to 97 percent of individuals developing the protective antibody after the first dose, we should still 
expect large morbidity effects from a policy that induces initiation but not completion of the 
vaccine series.  
1.4.2 Morbidity Baseline Results 
 Next, using surveillance data from the CDC National Notifiable Disease Surveillance 
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 Specifically, I estimate the model given in equation (3), which allows the effect of the policies to vary 
over time, with ‘receipt of 2+ doses’ as the outcome variable. 
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System, I estimate the effects of the hepatitis A vaccine policies on the rate of hepatitis A disease 
incidence in the population.  As in the previous analysis, I implement a difference-in-difference 
strategy.  Since all morbidity data are aggregated by state, however, these analyses are done at 
the state level. Specifically, I estimate the following equation: 
(2)     𝑅𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 +  𝛾1𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑠𝑡 + 𝑍𝑠𝑡 +  𝛿𝑠 +  𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡, 
where 𝑅𝑠𝑡 is the  rate of hepatitis A per 100,000 people in state  𝑠 at time 𝑡,  and all other 
variables are defined as in equation (1).  Specifications are estimated using relevant population 
weights, and standard errors are clustered at the state level. As with the individual-level 
regression, I include state-specific linear time trends in some specifications to increase the 
flexibility of the model. 
 Results from the estimation of equation (2) are presented in Table 4, and show that the 
ACIP hepatitis A recommendations and vaccine mandates had large and statistically significant 
effects on the incidence of hepatitis A in the entire population. These estimates suggest that 
omitting time-varying state-level controls (column 1) results in a substantial understatement of 
the effects of the strong ACIP recommendation, although the sign and significance of the result 
is unaffected and the estimated magnitudes of the other policy effects are largely unchanged. I 
also find that, as with the vaccination results, the estimated policy effects are generally robust to 
the addition of state-specific linear time trends (column 3). Given the large gains in explanatory 
power from the inclusion of state-specific linear time trends (𝑅2 increases from 0.73 in column 
2, to 0.85 in column 3), column 3 is my preferred specification. The estimates from this 
specification imply that the implementation of a hepatitis A child care or kindergarten mandate 
in a state reduced hepatitis A incidence in that state by approximately 1.5 cases per 100,000 
people, while the strong and weak ACIP recommendations reduced incidence by 4.3 and 3.3 
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cases per 100,000 people, respectively.
31
   
The effects of these policies on hepatitis A incidence are large in both absolute and 
relative magnitudes. Over this time period, the average annual incidence of acute hepatitis A per 
100,000 people declined from 10.5 cases in 1997 to .558 cases in 2013. Implementation of both a 
strong ACIP recommendation and a vaccination mandate is estimated to have reduced disease 
incidence by 5.8 cases per 100,000 people, which accounts for nearly 60 percent of the decline in 
the incidence of hepatitis A over this time period.
32
 When interpreting these results, it is 
important to note that although the timing and strength of the ACIP recommendations were 
determined at the federal level and relative to somewhat arbitrary thresholds, an endogeneity 
concern persists since implementation was based on historic state morbidity rates. As such, the 
estimated effects of the recommendations on morbidity should be interpreted with caution.  
1.4.3 Dynamic Policy Effects Model 
 Having shown that the ACIP recommendations and vaccine mandates have large and 
significant contemporaneous effects on both vaccination rates and disease incidence, I now 
explore the potential for dynamic policy effects. For this analysis, I estimate an event study type 
model, in which I replace each single policy indicator variable with a series of indicator variables 
                                                   
31
 To aid in comparison between the estimated vaccination effects and the morbidity effects, I estimate a 
model where the outcome variable is ln(HepA cases), the results of which are presented in Appendix 
Table 2. The results of this estimation imply that the implementation of both a mandate and a strong 
recommendation decrease disease incidence by between 30 and 36 percent, though the mandate effect is 
sensitive to the inclusion of linear time trends.  I additionally re-estimate the baseline morbidity model for 
the years 2003-2013, to match the time period of the vaccination results. The hepatitis A mandate effect 
remains negative and significant, and, when scaled by the change in disease incidence over the relevant 
time period, the relative magnitude of the coefficient is nearly identical. The effects of the ACIP 
recommendations, however, are statistically indistinguishable from zero for this restricted time period, 
although they are identified from very different sources of variation than in the full sample. 
32
 This result is broadly consistent with the effect size in Zhou et al. (2007), who find that an ACIP 
recommendation explains 72 percent of the decline in hepatitis A-related ambulatory care visits among an 
insured population between 1996 and 2004 (with an implied difference-in-difference coefficient of -8.8 
cases per 100,000 individuals), 
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representing the number of periods relative to policy implementation.  I additionally include in 
the specification a full set of policy leads, as this allows me to test whether the policies were 
endogenously implemented in response to previous trends in vaccination rates or disease 
incidence.  
Dynamic Policy Vaccination Results 
For the analysis of the policy effects on vaccination rates, in which the individual is the 
unit of analysis, I estimate the following linear probability model: 
 (3)          Pr(𝑉𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡, 𝑠, 𝑡)
=  ∑ 𝛼𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑘 +  ∑ 𝛾1𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾
𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑠𝑡
𝑘  +  ∑ 𝛾2𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾
𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑠𝑡
𝑘
+ 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝑍𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠 +  𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡,                 
in which 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑘  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the mandate has been implemented for 𝑘 
periods, 𝐾 = {< −5, −5, … , −1, 1, … 7, > 7}, and is zero otherwise, with the year of mandate 
implementation (𝑘 = 0) as the omitted category.  Similarly, 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑠𝑡
𝑘
 and 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑠𝑡
𝑘
 
are dummy variables equal to 1 if the recommendation has been effective for 𝑘 periods, and are 
zero otherwise.
33
 For all estimations of the dynamic policy model, I include the state vaccine-
related policy controls; all other variables are as defined in equation (1).  
The estimated dynamic policy effects of the ACIP recommendations and of the vaccine 
mandate on the probability of initiating the hepatitis A vaccine series are presented graphically in 
Figures 3a and 3b, respectively.
34
 In this model, each of the event study coefficients captures the 
                                                   
33
 Because vaccination data are not available prior to 2003, the strong ACIP recommendation coefficients 
are identified only for k =  -3, -2, -1,1, …7, >7, while the weak ACIP recommendation coefficients are 
identified only for k= 4, 5, 6, 7.  
34
 For the dynamic policy model, I provide estimation results only for the 2003-2013 sample of 24-35 
month olds, as it is unclear how to appropriately adjust the event study dummies for the 19-23 month old 
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effect of the policy relative to the year of implementation, and therefore should not to be 
interpreted as the per-period effects of the policy, but rather as the cumulative effect. 
Specifically, these coefficient estimates imply that the vaccination mandate increases the 
probability of initiating the vaccine series by 7.96 percentage points in the first year following 
implementation, and an additional year of the policy further increases the probability of initiating 
vaccination by 1.26 percentage points. Overall, however, the estimated mandate effects indicate 
that there are no additional sizable gains in the probability of initiating the vaccine series after 
the first period, and the total effect size is comparable in magnitude to the estimated effect from 
the baseline difference-in-differences model. Essentially, I find that the individuals who are 
induced by the mandate to initiate vaccination respond quickly to the policy. 
In contrast, this model indicates that the effects of the strong ACIP recommendation 
steadily increase for up to four years following implementation, and thus the baseline difference-
in-differences model understates the total effect of the strong recommendation. I find that there 
are additional gains to the probability of initiating the hepatitis A series of between 5.5 and 13.8 
percentage points per year in the first four years following implementation, after which the 
cumulative effect levels out at approximately 39 to 46 percentage points.  For the weak ACIP 
recommendation, it is difficult to accurately assess the extent to which dynamic policy effects are 
present as the coefficients are identified for only 4 to 7 years post implementation due to data 
limitations. These coefficients do indicate, however, that the total effect size is approximately 20 
percentage points, which is comparable in magnitude to the difference-in-difference estimate.  
Endogenous policy implementation – As a test for endogenous implementation of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
age group to account for mandates that were implemented prior to or shortly after the time the vaccine 
was approved for that age group.  Additionally, since the weak ACIP recommendation coefficients are 
only identified for periods 4 through 7 after implementation, I do not present these graphically in the main 
text of the paper, but I do present them in Appendix Figure 1.  
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hepatitis A vaccine mandates or strong ACIP recommendations, I consider the coefficients on the 
policy leads in Figure 3. Significant coefficients on the policy leads would indicate that the 
policies were implemented in response to pre-existing trends in vaccination rates, and this would 
limit the causal interpretation of my results.  I find that, relative to the coefficients on the policy 
lags, the coefficients on the leads are much smaller in magnitude and are generally insignificant. 
This serves as strong evidence that the hepatitis A vaccine mandates and strong ACIP 
recommendations were not endogenously implemented in response to particularly low (or high) 
vaccination rates, and this supports the causal interpretation of my vaccination results.  
Dynamic Policy Morbidity Results  
 To estimate the dynamic policy effects of vaccination mandates and ACIP 
recommendations on disease incidence, I modify equation (3) to account for the higher level of 
aggregation in the NNDSS data. Specifically, I estimate the following: 
 (4)       𝑅𝑠𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛼𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑘 + ∑ 𝛾1𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾
𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑠𝑡  
𝑘 +  ∑ 𝛾2𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾
𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑠𝑡
𝑘 + 𝑍𝑠𝑡
+  𝛿𝑠 +  𝛿𝑡  + 𝜀𝑠𝑡,  
where, as defined previously, 𝑅𝑠𝑡 is the rate of hepatitis A per 100,000 people in state 𝑠 at time 𝑡,  
and 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑘 , 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑠𝑡
𝑘
, and 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑠𝑡
𝑘
 are indicator variables equal to 1 if the 
policy has been implemented for 𝑘 periods, 𝐾 = {< −5, −5, … , −1, 1, … 7, > 7}, and are zero 
otherwise, with the year of implementation (𝑘 = 0) as the omitted category. All other variables 
are as in equation (3).  
 Results from the estimation of the event study model specified in equation (4) are 
presented graphically in Figure 4. The point estimates for the mandate effects indicate that the 
mandates reduce population hepatitis A incidence by 0.76 cases per 100,000 people after year 
one of implementation; after two years the cumulative effect increases in absolute magnitude to a 
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reduction of 1.62 cases per 100,000 people, and after 4 years mandates are estimated to reduce 
hepatitis A incidence by 1.93 cases per 100,000 people. Unfortunately, limited precision in the 
estimated mandate effects make it difficult to identify the extent to which the effects vary over 
time. 
 For the ACIP recommendations, the event study coefficients indicate dynamic policy 
effects on disease incidence. The effect of the strong recommendation is large and immediate, 
and generally increasing over time. Specifically, the strong ACIP recommendation reduces 
hepatitis A incidence by 2.37 cases per 100,000 people within one year of implementation, and 
by 7 years following implementation the estimated effect is a reduction of approximately 4.40 
cases per 100,000 people. On the other hand, the weak recommendation has a large effect within 
two years of implementation, but the effect size rapidly declines and is statistically not different 
from zero by 5 years following implementation.  
Endogenous policy implementation -  As in the previous section, I consider the 
coefficients on the policy leads as a test determine whether the mandates or ACIP 
recommendations were implemented in response to pre-existing trends in the outcome variable.  
For the mandates, coefficients on the policy leads are relatively small in magnitude and are 
insignificant, providing evidence that states did not implement the mandates in response to 
particularly high (or low) hepatitis A morbidity rates. For both the strong and weak ACIP 
recommendations, however, the coefficients for the pre-implementation dummies are large and 
positive, indicating the policies were implemented in states with particularly high morbidity 
rates. This result is not unexpected, as the 1999 ACIP recommendations were implemented 
based on the average state morbidity rate for 1987-1997, but it suggests that the magnitude of the 
ACIP recommendation effects on morbidity should be interpreted cautiously.   
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1.5. Additional Results 
In this section I explore potential heterogeneity in policy response across different 
subpopulations and estimate the effects of the hepatitis A-targeted policies on the vaccination 
and disease incidence rates of other diseases. I also introduce an additional data source that 
allows me to directly estimate how the effect of the vaccination mandate varies by child care 
enrollment status. These additional analyses allow for a more complete understanding of the 
effects of the policies, and also provide insight into the mechanism through which child care 
mandates increase vaccination rates in young children. 
1.5.1 Heterogeneous policy effects by subpopulation 
 Up to this point, my analysis has focused on identifying the average effects of the policies 
across the entire population of interest. While this is a useful metric for the overall effectiveness 
of a policy, it also has the potential to conceal substantial heterogeneity in the policy effects 
across different subpopulations. In the case of public health policies, heterogeneous policy 
responses can have important implications for the extent to which a policy affects the magnitude 
of existing health disparities across socioeconomic groups. This is a particularly relevant 
consideration for hepatitis A, as the disease has historically been endemic among otherwise 
disadvantaged populations, such as Hispanics, Native Americans, and Alaskan natives.  
To test for heterogeneous policy effects across subpopulations, I estimate the effects of 
the policies on the probability of initiating the hepatitis A vaccine series separately by 
race/ethnicity, mother’s education, and household income, using the baseline model given in 
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equation (1).
35
 I present the results from these estimations in Table 5, and, to aid in 
interpretation, I scale the estimates by the within-group change in hepatitis A vaccination rates 
over the sample period.  Overall, the results indicate that there is very little difference in the 
magnitude of the mandate effect across different races/ethnicities, levels of education, or family 
income groups. Across these subpopulations, the mandate consistently explains between 9.5 and 
13.1 percent of the total change in hepatitis A vaccination initiation rates that took place between 
2003 and 2013.   
For the ACIP recommendations, however, there is some evidence of a heterogeneous 
policy response. Across ethnic groups, the strong ACIP recommendation increased the 
probability of initiating hepatitis A vaccination by 26 percentage points for whites, as compared 
to increases of approximately 30 to 33 percentage points for the other ethnic groups. This policy 
also explains a much smaller fraction of the total increase in vaccination for whites than for the 
other groups. The analysis by mother’s education and family income indicates that the strong 
ACIP recommendation was most effective at increasing vaccination at the tails of these 
distributions. The estimates by education level show that the smallest effect is for children whose 
mothers have only a high school degree; the estimates by family income level show that the 
smallest effects are for households making between $30,000 and $50,000 a year. The effects of 
the weak ACIP recommendation follow a pattern similar to the strong ACIP recommendation for 
the estimations done separately by ethnicity and family income.  For mother’s education level, 
however, the effect of the weak ACIP recommendation is monotonically decreasing as education 
increases.  Unfortunately, given the number of mechanisms through which the ACIP 
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 For simplicity, I include the estimation results by subpopulation for only one of the NIS subsamples 
(2003-2013 subsample of 24-35 month olds). Results for the 2007-2013 sample of 19-35 month olds are 
qualitatively similar, but suffer from a lack of precision.   
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recommendations potentially affect the individual’s decision to vaccinate, without finer data it is 
difficult to determine what is driving the differential response to the ACIP recommendations.  
1.5.2 Effects on other vaccines and diseases 
I next estimate the effects of hepatitis A vaccination recommendations and mandates on 
receipt of other vaccines and the incidence of other diseases, as this allows me to identify the 
existence of spillover effects of hepatitis A vaccination policy, and also serves as a falsification 
test. First, I estimate the baseline model given in equation (1) with receipt of other recommended 
childhood vaccines as the dependent variable.  The results for this estimation are presented in 
Appendix Table 3; they indicate that there are no substantial spillovers of the hepatitis A vaccine 
policy on vaccination rates for other childhood vaccines.
36
 Second, as a falsification test for my 
morbidity results, I estimate the baseline model given in equation (2) with incidence rates for a 
number of other diseases as the dependent variable.
37
 These results are presented in Appendix 
Table 4 and suggest that the hepatitis A vaccine policies were not associated with significant 
reductions in the incidence of other diseases. Overall, these results provide strong evidence that 
the reductions in hepatitis A morbidity were driven by the hepatitis A-targeted vaccine policies 
and not by unobserved state characteristics that generally increased vaccination or reduced 
disease incidence.  
                                                   
36
 This result is expected, as all states had child care and school vaccination mandates implemented for at 
least some subset of the recommended childhood vaccines prior to the development of the hepatitis A 
vaccine. 
37
 Specifically, I consider the effects of the hepatitis A vaccine policies on the incidence of three diseases 
for which childhood vaccination is routinely recommended (hepatitis B, measles, and pertussis, selected 
from the full set of diseases with recommended childhood vaccines based on the fact that they were 
nationally notifiable diseases for the duration of my sample period), as well as the effects on several other 
diseases which are either not vaccine-preventable but have similar modes of transmission and risk factors 
as hepatitis A (giardia and salmonella), or are vaccine-preventable but not routinely recommended for 
young children (meningococcal disease and tuberculosis). 
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1.5.3. Mandate effects by child care attendance 
Since the hepatitis A vaccination mandates are binding for very young children only if 
they are enrolled in child care, my ex ante expectation is that the mandates are effective at 
inducing vaccination primarily among enrolled children. Since child care enrollment status is not 
available in the NIS data, to test this hypothesis I analyze a cross-section of data from the 
National Survey of Children’s Health (NSCH) which in 2003 contained questions on both child 
care attendance and hepatitis A vaccine receipt.
38
 Using these data, I estimate a difference-in-
differences model in which treatment varies by child care enrollment and state mandate status. 
Specifically, I estimate the following linear probability model: 
(5)        Pr(𝑉𝑖𝑠 = 1|𝑋𝑖𝑠, 𝑠)
=  𝛼1𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 +  𝛼2 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿[𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  × 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖]
+  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑠 + 𝑍𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠. 
Here,  𝑉𝑖𝑠 is an indicator specifying whether individual 𝑖 in state 𝑠 has been vaccinated against 
hepatitis A, 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 is an indicator specifying if the state had a child care mandate 
implemented as of 2003, and 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the child is 
enrolled in child care and is zero otherwise;
39
 the interaction term 
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  × 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 is the treatment variable of interest in this specification. I also 
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 This survey is conducted by the CDC and makes use of the NIS sampling frame to create state- and 
nationally-representative estimates of health measures for children aged 0-17 years. Hepatitis A questions 
were asked only in states that, at the time, had received an ACIP recommendation (i.e. high and medium 
hepatitis A incidence states), and were asked only to children over the age of 2, as the vaccine was not yet 
approved for younger children.   
39
 Based on the survey questions in these data, I define child care enrollment as “regular attendance in the 
past month at a child care center outside the home or at an early head start program.” 
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include a vector of household controls,𝑋𝑖𝑠,
40
 and a vector of state controls, 𝑍𝑠. I restrict my 
analysis to children between the ages of 2 and 4 years old, to ensure they are both old enough to 
receive the vaccine and too young to be enrolled in kindergarten. 
 Results from the estimation of equation (5) are presented in Table 6, and show that 
children enrolled in child care in mandating states are between 7 and 8 percentage points more 
likely to have initiated or completed the hepatitis A vaccine series relative to both (a) children in 
mandating states who are not enrolled in child care, and (b) children in non-mandating states 
who are enrolled in child care. These mandate-child care interaction effects are consistent with 
the mandate estimates obtained using NIS data and time-series variation, which suggested 
mandates causally increased the probability of vaccination by approximately 8 percentage points.  
A limitation of these results is that they cannot be interpreted as the causal effect of the mandate 
on vaccination rates, as this design and the cross-sectional nature of these data do not allow me 
to control for unobserved time-invariant differences across states. However, taken in context of 
the previous findings, these results are highly supportive of the hypothesis that mandates serve to 
primarily induce vaccination among individuals for whom the mandate is binding.  
1.6. Conclusion 
 In the United States, immunization rates are persistently low for numerous vaccines, and 
recently there have been multiple outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases resulting from 
undervaccination. In response, a number of policies have been implemented in an attempt to 
achieve and maintain high population vaccination rates and reduce disease incidence. In this 
                                                   
40
 These controls were chosen to be generally comparable to the individuals controls included in earlier 
specifications, and include measures of the number of adults in the household, highest education level in 
household, total number of children in household, whether the child is the first born, as well as child’s 
gender, ethnicity, age, and insurance status. 
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paper I showed that the implementation of ACIP recommendations and vaccination mandates has 
large and significant effects on both vaccination rates of young children and population disease 
incidence. Using variation across states in the timing of the policy introductions, I find that the 
strong ACIP recommendation and the hepatitis A vaccination mandate together explain 
approximately half of the change in vaccination rates and hepatitis A incidence over the sample 
periods. These results are robust to the inclusion of both a number of controls for state vaccine- 
and healthcare-related policies, and state-specific linear time trends. I also demonstrate that these 
results are not present for other vaccines and diseases, which is strong evidence that my findings 
are not being driven by unobserved state policies that generally increased vaccination or 
decreased disease incidence. 
This paper further provides evidence that the effects of the ACIP recommendations and 
the mandates differ along several important dimensions. First, my results indicate that the 
mandates are effective at inducing individuals to complete the vaccine series, while the ACIP 
recommendations only significantly increase the probability that individuals initiate the series. 
Second, when I allow policy effects to vary over time, I find that individuals who are induced to 
vaccinate by the mandate respond  rapidly to the policy, whereas the ACIP recommendations 
have a more gradual effect that continues to increase for several years following implementation. 
Finally, for the mandates I find no significant heterogeneity in the effects with respect to 
ethnicity, mother’s education, or family income, although there is some evidence of a 
heterogeneous policy response for the recommendations.  
This study has several limitations. Notably, the data sources I use do not allow me to 
disentangle the specific channels through which mandates and recommendations affect the 
decision to vaccinate. In order to better inform policy and understand the individual’s 
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vaccination decision, future research is needed to identify these mechanisms. A further limitation 
of this paper is that the results are specific to hepatitis A. If individuals make vaccination 
decisions based on disease-specific characteristics such as severity, prevalence, or vaccination 
cost, then it is difficult to extrapolate these results to other vaccines and diseases. In particular, 
we should expect the responsiveness of individuals to these policies to be different in the case of 
hepatitis A, where the population that is targeted for routine vaccination (young children) 
typically experiences asymptomatic infections, as compared to diseases such as measles and 
pertussis where there are more severe morbidity consequences for the targeted group.  
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Figure 1: Timeline of Hepatitis A Vaccine Approval and ACIP Recommendations, 1995-2013 
 
Notes: Figure created by author using information from CDC (1996, 1999, 2006, 2012). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of Mandates per Year, by Incidence Group 
 
 Notes: Figure created by author using information from IAC and CDC publications, and independent review of state 
statutes.  
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Figure 3: Initiation of vaccination results, event study coefficients 
(a) Mandate coefficients      (b) Strong ACIP rec. coefficients 
 
Notes: Each figure presents a subset of the estimated coefficients from a single regression done using data 
from the National Immunization Survey, where the outcome variable is receipt of at least one dose of the 
hepatitis A vaccine.  The sample is restricted to children 24-35 months of age, for 2003-2013. State and 
year fixed effects and a full set of individual and state-level controls are included in the regression, as 
specified in the empirical strategy. The regression is estimated using NIS-Provider weights; standard 
errors are clustered at the state level and coefficients are shown with 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 4: Morbidity results, event study coefficients 
(a) Mandate coefficients   (b) Strong ACIP rec. coefficients  
     
(c) Weak ACIP rec. coefficients 
 
Notes: Each figure presents a subset of the estimated coefficients from a single regression done using data 
from the CDC’s NNDSS, 1997-2013, where the outcome variable is number of reported hepatitis A cases 
per 100,000 people. State and year fixed effects and a full set of state-level controls are included in the 
regression, as specified in the empirical strategy. The regression is estimated using NIS-Provider weights; 
standard errors are clustered at the state level and coefficients are shown with 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 1: Year of Hepatitis A Mandate Implementation 
 
Year in effect 
 
Year in effect 
State Child care Kindergarten State Child care Kindergarten 
Alaska 2001 2001 New Mexico 2008  
Arizona 1999* 
 
North Dakota 2008  
Arkansas 2014 2014 Oklahoma 1998 1998 
Connecticut 2010 2011 Oregon 2008 2008 
Dist. of Columbia 2008 2008 Pennsylvania 2006  
Georgia 2007 2007 Rhode Island 2015  
Idaho 2011 2011 Tennessee 2010 2011 
Kansas 2008  Texas 1999 2009 
Minnesota 2014  Utah 2008 2002 
Nevada 2002 2002 West Virginia 2006  
Sources: Immunization Action Coalition, CDC, state Department of Health websites, and state statutes.  
Notes:  If a state is not listed that indicates it did not pass a mandate as of January 1, 2015.   
*Required in Maricopa County only 
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Table 2-A: Descriptive Statistics, National Immunization Survey 
 24-35 months old, 2003-2013 
  
Full Sample 
(mean) 
Vaccinated subsample 
(mean) 
Unvaccinated subsample 
(mean) 
Fraction 
vaccinated, 
HepA 
      
Child Characteristics: 
 
Vaccinated, HepA† 0.55 1 0 1 
Vaccinated, UTD 
4:3:1:3 
0.833 0.89 0.764 0.587 
Female 0.487 0.486 0.488 0.549 
Male 0.513 0.514 0.512 0.55 
Hispanic 0.253 0.306 0.188 0.666 
White 0.519 0.459 0.592 0.487 
Black 0.131 0.124 0.14 0.52 
Other ethnicity 0.097 0.111 0.081 0.626 
Age:19-23 mos 0 0 0 0 
Age: 24-29 mos 0.486 0.483 0.489 0.547 
Age: 30-25 mos 0.514 0.517 0.511 0.552 
 
     
State of Residence Characteristics: 
  
Effective mandate 0.204 0.291 0.099 0.782 
High incid. 0.22 0.294 0.129 0.736 
Medium incid. 0.146 0.173 0.114 0.649 
Low incid. 0.634 0.533 0.757 0.462 
   
   
Mother Characteristics:    
Age: <20 yrs 0.022 0.021 0.023 0.524 
Age: 20-29 yrs 0.395 0.382 0.411 0.532 
Age: 30+ yrs 0.583 0.597 0.566 0.563 
<High school 0.18 0.193 0.163 0.592 
High school 0.302 0.284 0.323 0.518 
Some college 0.201 0.201 0.202 0.548 
College grad 0.317 0.322 0.312 0.558 
Income: <$20K 0.278 0.297 0.255 0.587 
Income: $20-30K 0.130 0.129 0.132 0.544 
Income:$30-40K 0.0979 0.0896 0.108 0.503 
Income:$40-50K 0.0765 0.0684 0.0862 0.492 
Income: $50K+ 0.417 0.416 0.419 0.548 
Observations 127589 64942 62647   
Notes: Author’s calculations from NIS provider-sample data. UTD 4:3:1:3 is an indicator for if the child is up-to-date on a 
standard set of shots, which consists of 4+ doses of diphtheria and tetanus, 3+ doses of polio, 1+ dose of measles, and 3+ 
doses of Haemophilus Influenzae Type B vaccines. All estimates exclude Arizona, obtained using weights NIS-provider 
weights (landline only for 2003-2011, dual weights for 2012 and 2013).  † For the purposes of this table, a child is 
considered vaccinated against hepatitis A if they have initiated the hepatitis A vaccine series. 
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Table 2-B: Descriptive Statistics, National Immunization Survey  
  19-35 months, 2007-2013 
  
Full sample 
(mean) 
Vaccinated Subsample 
(mean) 
Unvaccinated subsample 
(mean) 
Fraction 
vaccinated, 
HepA 
  
 Child Characteristics: 
      
Vaccinated, HepA† 0.737 1 0 1 
Vaccinated, UTD 
4:3:1:3 
0.796 0.868 0.593 0.804 
Female 0.487 0.487 0.487 0.737 
Male 0.513 0.513 0.513 0.737 
Hispanic 0.26 0.285 0.19 0.808 
White 0.508 0.477 0.595 0.692 
Black 0.131 0.13 0.132 0.734 
Other ethnicity 0.102 0.109 0.083 0.786 
Age:19-23 mos 0.299 0.285 0.337 0.704 
Age: 24-29 mos 0.34 0.349 0.316 0.756 
Age: 30-25 mos 0.361 0.366 0.348 0.747 
 
    
State of Residence Characteristics: 
 
Effective mandate 0.246 0.282 0.146 0.844 
High incid. 0.222 0.247 0.151 0.821 
Medium incid. 0.149 0.159 0.12 0.788 
Low incid. 0.63 0.594 0.729 0.695 
 
    
Mother Characteristics:   
Age: <20 yrs 0.025 0.025 0.027 0.721 
Age: 20-29 yrs 0.383 0.38 0.391 0.731 
Age: 30+ yrs 0.592 0.595 0.582 0.741 
<High school 0.182 0.188 0.164 0.763 
High school 0.283 0.277 0.301 0.72 
Some college 0.207 0.203 0.217 0.724 
College grad 0.328 0.332 0.318 0.745 
Income: <$10K 0.281 0.293 0.247 0.769 
Income: $10-20K 0.123 0.124 0.122 0.740 
Income:$20-30K 0.0899 0.0879 0.0956 0.720 
Income:$30-50K 0.0714 0.0687 0.0790 0.709 
Income: $50K+ 0.435 0.427 0.457 0.723 
Observations 107608 78099 29509   
Notes: Author’s calculations from NIS provider-sample data. UTD 4:3:1:3 is an indicator for if the child is up-to-date 
on a standard set of shots, which consists of 4+ doses of diphtheria and tetanus, 3+ doses of polio, 1+ dose of 
measles, and 3+ doses of Haemophilus Influenzae Type B vaccines. All estimates exclude Arizona, obtained using 
weights NIS-provider weights (landline only for 2003-2011, dual weights for 2012 and 2013).  † For the purposes of 
this table, a child is considered vaccinated against hepatitis A if they have initiated the hepatitis A vaccine series. 
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Table 3: Effects of ACIP recommendations and vaccine mandate, baseline results 
Panel A: Initiation of HepA series 
  Subsample:  24-35 mos, 2003-2013 sample 
 
19-35 mos, 2007-2013 sample 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
HepA Mandate 0.0973*** 0.0818*** 0.0879** 
 
0.0729* 0.0564 0.0769** 
 
(0.0208) (0.0238) (0.0417) 
 
(0.0426) (0.0425) (0.0380) 
        Strong ACIP 0.340*** 0.273*** 0.120*** 
 
- - - 
 
(0.0229) (0.0275) (0.0192) 
    
        Weak ACIP 0.189*** 0.193*** 0.102*** 
 
- - - 
 
(0.0266) (0.0214) (0.0271) 
    
State and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time-varying controls No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
State-specific linear time trends No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
Observations 127589 127303 127303 
 
107608 107401 107401 
R-Squared 0.432 0.441 0.445 
 
0.101 0.117 0.124 
Mean of Dependent 0.550 0.550 0.550 
 
0.737 0.737 0.737 
Panel B:  Receipt of 2+ HepA doses 
    Subsample:  24-35 mos, 2003-2013 sample 
 
19-35 mos, 2007-2013 sample 
 
(7) (8) (9) 
 
(10) (11) (12) 
HepA Mandate 0.0846*** 0.0811*** 0.0596 
 
0.0603 0.0636 0.0644 
 
(0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0360) 
 
(0.0444) (0.0409) (0.0396) 
        Strong ACIP -0.0175 -0.0246 -0.0964*** - - - 
 
(0.0151) (0.0201) (0.0178) 
    
        Weak ACIP -0.0397 -0.0335 -0.0694* 
 
- - - 
 
(0.0387) (0.0342) (0.0375) 
    
State and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time-varying controls No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
State-specific linear time trends No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
Observations 127589 127303 127303 
 
107608 107401 107401 
R-Squared 0.330 0.338 0.340 
 
0.0730 0.145 0.146 
Mean of Dependent 0.351 0.351 0.351 
 
0.449 0.449 0.449 
Notes: Within each panel, each column reports coefficients from a separate regression estimated using 
data from the National Immunization Survey. The outcome variable for all regressions in Panel A is 
receipt of at least one dose of the hepatitis A vaccine; in Panel B the outcome variable is receipt of two or 
more doses of the hepatitis A vaccine. Regressions in columns  (1)-(3) and (7)-(9) are estimated using the 
subsample of individuals between 24 and 35 months of age, for 2003-2013; in columns (4)-(6) and (10)-
(12) all regressions are estimated using the subsample of 19-35 month olds, for 2007-2013. All 
regressions include state and year fixed effects and are estimated using NIS-Provider weights. Standard 
errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 50 
 
Table 4: Effects of ACIP Recommendation and Mandates on rate of HepA cases, 1997- 2013 
Dep. var:    
 HepA cases per 100,000 people (1) (2) (3) 
HepA Mandate -2.833 -2.108
**
 -1.466
*
 
 (1.929) (0.937) (0.849) 
    
Strong ACIP rec. -1.491
**
 -2.802
***
 -4.288
***
 
 (0.674) (0.477) (0.709) 
    
Weak ACIP rec. -1.347
*
 -1.676
**
 -3.273
***
 
 (0.730) (0.752) (1.014) 
 
State and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time-varying controls No Yes Yes 
State-specific linear time trends No No Yes 
Observations 848 848 848 
R-Squared 0.639 0.732 0.846 
Mean of Dependent 2.691 2.691 2.691 
Notes: Each column reports coefficients from a separate regression estimated using date from the CDC’s NNDSS. 
All regressions are weighted by state population and include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in 
parentheses and are clustered at the state level.
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
regressions are weighted by state population and include state-controls and state and year fixed effects. Standard 
errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level.
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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Table 5: Effects of ACIP Recommendation and Mandates on probability of vaccination - by subpopulations 
 
Panel A: By Race/Ethnicity 
       Mean Vacc. Rate Mandate 
 
Strong ACIP 
 
Weak ACIP 
 Δ (2013-2003)  Coef.   % explained  Coef.   % explained  Coef.   % explained 
          Hispanic  0.658  0.0800  12.16    0.305***  46.35    0.281***  42.71 
  
 (0.0417)  
 
   (0.0285)  
 
   (0.0186)  
 White  0.748 0.0840***  11.23    0.262***  35.03    0.133***  17.78 
  
 (0.0191)  
 
   (0.0279)  
 
   (0.0253)  
 Black  0.777  0.0858**  11.04    0.329***  42.34    0.204***  26.25 
  
 (0.0319)  
 
   (0.0438)  
 
   (0.0275)  
 Other  0.748  0.0819*  10.95    0.314***  41.98    0.147***  19.65 
  
 (0.0368)       (0.0245)  
 
   (0.0321)  
 
 
          
 
      
Panel B: By Mother's Education 
      Mean Vacc. Rate Mandate 
 
Strong ACIP 
 
Weak ACIP 
Δ (2013-2003)  Coef.   % explained  Coef.   % explained  Coef.   % explained 
<HS  0.670  0.0636  9.49    0.270***  40.3    0.201***  30.00 
  
 (0.0336)  
 
   (0.0285)  
 
   (0.0272)  
 HS grad  0.739  0.0961**  13.00    0.238***  32.21    0.202***  27.33 
  
 (0.0317)  
 
   (0.0337)  
 
   (0.0166)  
 Some college  0.725  0.0818*  11.28    0.272***  37.52    0.186***  25.66 
  
 (0.0346)  
 
   (0.0252)  
 
   (0.0290)  
 College+  0.775 0.0759***  9.79    0.305***  39.35    0.176**  22.71 
 
   (0.0196)  
 
   (0.0342)  
 
   (0.0607)  
 
Panel C: By Family Income 
       Mean Vacc. Rate Mandate 
 
Strong ACIP 
 
Weak ACIP 
 Δ (2013-2003)  Coef.   % explained  Coef.   % explained  Coef.   % explained 
<$20K  0.721  0.0753*  10.44    0.302***  41.89    0.231***  32.04 
  
 (0.0296)  
 
   (0.0233)  
 
   (0.0198)  
 $20-30K  0.713  0.0816  11.44    0.267***  37.45    0.210***  29.45 
  
 (0.0424)  
 
   (0.0351)  
 
   (0.0296)  
 $30-40K  0.733  0.0857*  11.69    0.236***  32.2    0.148***  20.19 
  
 (0.0392)  
 
   (0.0320)  
 
   (0.0221)  
 $40-50K  0.699 0.0913***  13.06    0.194***  27.75    0.111***  15.88 
  
 (0.0231) 
 
   (0.0356)  
 
  (0.0217)  
 $50K+  0.758  .0768***  10.13    0.273***  36.02    0.187**  24.67 
  
 
 (0.0185)       (0.0396)  
 
   (0.0541)  
 Notes:  The coefficients listed in each row are from a separate regression using a subsample of data from the National 
Immunization Survey, where the outcome variable is receipt of at least one dose of the hepatitis A vaccine. The sample is 
restricted to children 24-35 months old for 2003-2013, and a full set of individual and state-level controls are included in 
each regression as specified in the empirical strategy. The regression is estimated using NIS-Provider weights; standard 
errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table 6: Effects of ACIP recommendations and vaccine mandate, by child care attendance 
 
(1) (2) 
 
Any HepA shots 2+ HepA shots 
Child care attend 0.0300 0.0250 
 
(0.0232) (0.0286) 
   HepA child care mandate  0.699*** 0.382*** 
 
(0.0448) (0.0435) 
   Mandate × Child care attend  0.0700*** 0.0799** 
 
(0.0154) (0.0305) 
Observations 3636 3347 
R-Squared  0.142 0.146 
Mean of Dependent  0.588 0.292 
Notes: Each column reports coefficients from a separate regression estimated using data from the 2003 
National Survey of Children's Health. The outcome variable in column (1) is receipt of at least one dose 
of the hepatitis A vaccine; in column (2) the outcome variable is receipt of at least two doses of the 
hepatitis A vaccine. Child care attendance is defined as regular attendance in the past month at a child 
care center outside the home or an early head start program. In this specification, a state is considered to 
have a hepatitis A mandate in effect at the start of the calendar year following the implementation of a 
child care mandate. All regressions include individual and state controls, and are estimated using 
sample weights. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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1.8. Appendix 
Appendix Figure 1: Effects on initiation of vaccination, Weak ACIP event study coefficients 
 
Notes: This figure presents a subset of the estimated coefficients from a single regression done using data 
from the National Immunization Survey, where the outcome variable is receipt of at least one dose of the 
hepatitis A vaccine.  The sample is restricted to children 24-35 months of age, for 2003-2013. State and 
year fixed effects and a full set of individual and state-level controls are included in the regression, as 
specified in the empirical strategy. The regression is estimated using NIS-Provider weights; standard 
errors are clustered at the state level and coefficients are shown with 95% confidence intervals. 
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Appendix Figure 2: Effects on receipt of 2+ doses, Event study coefficients 
(a)  Mandate coefficients    (b) Strong ACIP rec. coefficient 
 
(c)  Weak ACIP rec. coefficients 
 
Notes: Each figure presents a subset of the estimated coefficients from a single regression done using data 
from the National Immunization Survey, where the outcome variable is receipt of at least two doses of the 
hepatitis A vaccine.  The sample is restricted to children 24-35 months of age, for 2003-2013. State and 
year fixed effects and a full set of individual and state-level controls are included in the regression, as 
specified in the empirical strategy. The regression is estimated using NIS-Provider weights; standard 
errors are clustered at the state level and coefficients are shown with 95% confidence intervals.  
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Appendix Table 1: Healthy People 2020 Immunization Goals, 19-
35 month olds 
Vaccine, doses Baseline Coverage (%) Goal (%) 
DTP, 4 84.6 90 
Hib, 3/4 54.8 90 
HepB, 3 93.5 90 
MMR 92.1 90 
Polio, 3 93.6 90 
Varicella 90.7 90 
PCV,4 80.1 90 
HepA, 2 40.4 85 
Rotavirus, 2/3 43.9 80 
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,  
http://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-objectives/topic/immunization-and-
infectious-diseases/objectives 
Notes: DTP, diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis vaccine; Hib, Haemophilus 
influenzae type b vaccine; HepB, hepatitis B vaccine; MMR, measles, mumps, 
and rubella vaccine; HepA, hepatitis A vaccine. The baseline year is 2008 for 
all vaccines except Rotavirus and Hib, which have 2009 as their baseline year.  
 
Appendix Table 2: Effects on ln(HepA cases), 1997-2013 
Dep. var.   
  ln(HepA cases) (1) (2) 
 
HepA Mandate 
 
-0.242
**
 
 
0.0244 
 (0.109) (0.121) 
   
Strong ACIP rec. -0.204
**
 -0.370
**
 
 (0.0894) (0.139) 
   
Weak ACIP rec. -0.127 -0.360
*
 
 (0.175) (0.202) 
 
State-specific linear time trends No Yes 
Observations 839 839 
R-Squared 0.936 0.952 
Mean of Dependent 4.846 4.846 
Notes: Each column reports coefficients from a separate regression estimated using data from the CDC’s NNDSS, 
where the outcome variable is ln(HepA cases).  All regressions include state and year fixed effects, and control for 
ln(population) in addition to the full set of state-level controls as discussed in Section 4.1. Regressions are weighted 
by state population; standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *p <0.10, **p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
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Appendix Table 3: Hepatitis A Vaccination Policies and Other Childhood Vaccines 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Hep A UTD HepB Varicella UTD Hib UTD MMR UTD PCV UTD Polio UTD DTP 
HepA Mandate 0.0818
***
 -0.00595 0.000841 -0.00451 0.000738 -0.00658 -0.00604 -0.00695
**
 
 (0.0238) (0.00516) (0.00508) (0.00734) (0.00525) (0.0129) (0.00379) (0.00321) 
         
Strong ACIP 0.273
***
 -0.0102
**
 -0.0105 -0.0102 -0.00917
*
 -0.0192 -0.00322 -0.00418 
 (0.0275) (0.00452) (0.00663) (0.00812) (0.00543) (0.0174) (0.00363) (0.00434) 
         
Weak ACIP. 0.193
***
 0.00648 -0.00884 -0.0104 -0.00873 -0.00945 0.0115
*
 0.00241 
 (0.0214) (0.00753) (0.00687) (0.0131) (0.00816) (0.0194) (0.00654) (0.00530) 
Observations 127303 127303 127303 127303 127303 127303 127303 127303 
R-Squared 0.441 0.0118 0.0199 0.0286 0.00858 0.0880 0.0131 0.0153 
Mean Rate 0.550 0.925 0.902 0.924 0.927 0.872 0.933 0.957 
Notes: Each column reports coefficients from a separate regression estimated using data from the National Immunization Survey, 2003-2013, for children 24-35 
months of age, where the outcome variable is receipt of the vaccine listed in the column header. Abbreviations used for vaccine names mean the following: HepB: 
hepatitis B vaccine; Hib: Haemophilus influenza type b vaccine; MMR: measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine; PCV: Pneumococcal conjugate; DTP: diphtheria, 
tetanus, and pertussis vaccine. All regressions include individual and state-level controls and state and year fixed effects,  and are estimated using NIS Provider 
weights. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 4:  Effects of ACIP Recommendations and Mandates on Incidence of Other Diseases 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 HepA HepB Measles Pertussis Giardia Salmonel Meningoc. TB 
HepA Mandate -2.108
**
 -0.385 -0.0161 0.0636 -0.643 -0.0437 0.0437 0.350 
 (0.937) (0.357) (0.0124) (0.908) (0.712) (0.787) (0.0534) (0.259) 
         
Strong ACIP rec. -2.802
***
 -0.481
*
 -0.00757 -1.352 -0.243 0.0704 -0.0220 -0.210 
 (0.477) (0.257) (0.0112) (0.958) (0.633) (0.451) (0.0306) (0.138) 
         
Weak ACIP rec. -1.676
**
 0.0988 0.00969 -0.667 0.811 0.684 -0.0198 -0.194 
 (0.752) (0.247) (0.00835) (1.527) (0.741) (1.345) (0.0493) (0.144) 
Observations 848 841 849 850 753 850 850 850 
R-Squared 0.732 0.647 0.178 0.430 0.836 0.814 0.816 0.942 
Mean of Dependent 2.691 2.019 0.0316 5.818 8.496 15.85 0.535 4.823 
Notes: Each column reports coefficients from a separate regression estimated using data from the CDC’s NNDSS, where the outcome variable is 
the number of reported cases per 100,000 population of the disease listed in the column header. All regressions include state-level controls and state 
and year fixed effects, and are weighted by state population. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level.  
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 
0.05, 
***
 p < 0.0 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DIRECT AND SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF MIDDLE SCHOOL VACCINATION 
REQUIREMENTS 
 
With Christopher S. Carpenter 
2.1. Introduction 
Reductions in vaccine-preventable diseases through increased uptake of vaccinations are 
some of the most significant public health improvements in American history (Centers for 
Disease Control 1999).  These improvements have been particularly striking for diseases that 
have historically harmed infants and young children such as measles, mumps, and rubella.  
Public policies, information and education campaigns, and general changes in attitudes have all 
received credit for dramatically reducing the incidence of these childhood diseases. 
Vaccination of slightly older adolescent children is also a key health priority, but 
improvements for this age group have been slower and less remarkable than for elementary 
school-age children.  For example, while HealthyPeople 2020 (HP2020) recommends 
maintenance of the already high vaccination rates for kindergarten age children, those same 
recommendations explicitly acknowledge the need to increase vaccination coverage for 
adolescents.  The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) – an advisory body 
that issues recommendations regarding vaccinations (similar to the United States Preventive 
Services Task Force) – currently recommends four vaccinations for routine administration to 
middle school age youths: one dose of tetanus-diphtheria-acellular pertussis (Tdap) booster 
vaccine, one dose of meningococcal conjugate vaccine (MCV), the human papillomavirus (HPV) 
 59 
vaccine series, and an annual influenza vaccine.
41
  Of these, only the Tdap booster vaccination 
rates currently meet their HP2020 target of 80 percent.
42
  A particular challenge in vaccinating 
adolescents is that they primarily encounter healthcare providers only for acute injuries and 
sports-related physicals, and as a result they have much lower rates of attachment to the 
healthcare system than individuals in other age groups (Woodwell and Cherry 2004, Humiston 
and Rosenthal 2005). 
In an effort to increase adolescent vaccination rates and reduce the morbidity 
consequences of vaccine-preventable diseases, in the last decade 46 states have adopted laws 
requiring adolescents to receive a Tdap booster prior to middle school entry.
43
  We provide the 
first comprehensive quasi-experimental evaluation of the effects of these middle school 
vaccination mandates on vaccination take-up and on pertussis (whooping cough) morbidity using 
the staggered timing of mandate adoption.  Prior studies in public health have examined the 
effects of these vaccination policies by comparing means across states stratified based on 
mandate status or have examined the experiences of single states before and after a middle 
school mandate.  However, no prior work has used multiple states and years in the two-way fixed 
effects and event study frameworks that have become standard in the economics literature. 
The primary outcomes we consider are receipt of vaccinations by the age of 13 for Tdap 
                                                   
41
 During our sample period the HPV vaccine was recommended to be administered as part of a 3-dose 
series.  As of December 2016 the recommendation has been updated to reflect new evidence 
demonstrating that receiving only the first 2 doses of the series is of equivalent efficacy to the full 3-dose 
series.  ACIP now recommends that individuals initiating the series before the age of 15 receive only 2 
doses of the vaccine.   
42
 In contrast, the vaccination rate for 13-15 year olds for MCV in 2012 was 73.8 percent (target of 80 
percent), and the seasonal influenza vaccination rate for children 6 months to 17 years was 46.9 percent in 
the 2010-11 flu season (target of 70 percent).  The case of HPV is even worse: only 35.1 percent of 13-15 
year olds (50 percent of girls and 20.9 percent of boys) had initiated the HPV vaccine by 2012, far below 
of the HP2020 target of 80 percent. 
43
 As of January 2016, 22 of those 46 states also required MCV vaccination, and only two states had 
adopted requirements that students receive the HPV vaccine series.  No state requires students to receive 
the influenza vaccine. 
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(direct effect) and for MCV, HPV, and influenza (possible cross-vaccine spillover effects).  
Using the same empirical models, we also estimate mandate effects on the incidence of pertussis 
(which is protected against by the Tdap booster) and tuberculosis (which is not protected against 
by the Tdap booster) in the population and by ten-year age groups.  These morbidity analyses 
allow us to address the extent to which population morbidity effects are due to adolescents being 
directly targeted by vaccine mandates versus morbidity spillover effects accruing to infants, 
younger children, adults, and/or the elderly (i.e., cross-age spillovers). 
Understanding the effects of middle school vaccination requirements is important for 
several reasons.  First, the large majority of states have adopted these requirements, and so it is 
important to document whether these laws have worked to increase take-up of the covered 
vaccines and reduce morbidity from the associated diseases.  Notably, Figure 1 shows that 
adolescent vaccination rates for Tdap and MCV have both increased sharply since they were 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2005: while no youths were receiving 
these vaccinations prior to 2005, by 2014 over 70 percent of adolescents had received the 
immunizations.
44
  Second, there is substantial latitude for further improvements if the middle 
school mandates are found to be effective at increasing vaccination and reducing morbidity.  In 
addition to the remaining states adopting a first vaccination requirement, states with existing 
requirements could strengthen them (for example by requiring other vaccines in addition to 
Tdap). 
Third, by estimating population-level morbidity effects of increased Tdap vaccination our 
research augments the existing randomized control trial (RCT) evidence on the efficacy of the 
                                                   
44
 Disentangling the extent to which this increase is driven by mandates is particularly relevant given that 
mandating vaccination prior to school entry has become increasingly controversial as an anti-vaccination 
movement has gained popularity in the United States.   
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Tdap vaccine.
45
  In the presence of population morbidity spillovers, individual-level RCT 
estimates of vaccine effectiveness will understate the true reduction in pertussis in the population 
that may result from receipt of the Tdap vaccine.  Analyses of morbidity effects at the population 
level, however, provide a measure of the overall effectiveness of a vaccine at reducing disease 
incidence.  Although we face limitations in our ability to identify the effects of the mandate on 
vaccination rates across all age groups, we believe our results provide important new evidence 
on the overall effectiveness of the Tdap vaccine at reducing pertussis. 
Fourth, the literature specifically regarding determinants of adolescent HPV vaccination 
has largely failed to identify meaningful policy levers that could increase HPV vaccine uptake 
among adolescents.  As the HPV vaccine has the largest gap between current and targeted 
immunization rates for adolescents, understanding any credible policy lever to increase HPV 
vaccine uptake in this age group is important.  Finally, the literature on the effectiveness of 
public policies at promoting adolescent health is relatively underdeveloped compared to 
literatures on children at the younger and older ends of the age spectrum.  While we know a 
substantial amount about the causes and consequences of early child health (Almond and Currie 
2011, Almond et al. 2017) and high school student health (Gruber 2001), there is comparatively 
less research on the critical period of early adolescence.  In addition to the clinical changes 
associated with puberty, the vast majority of high risk behaviors are initiated during adolescence.  
Documenting the role vaccination policies play in adolescent health therefore contributes to a 
more complete picture of child development.
46
 
To preview, we find clear evidence that state laws requiring youths to obtain a Tdap 
                                                   
45
 Randomized control trial evidence of the efficacy of the acellular pertussis vaccine among adolescents 
and adults estimates overall vaccine efficacy to be 92 percent, with a 95 percent confidence interval 
ranging from 32 to 99 percent (Ward et al. 2005).   
46
 In fact, one reason why HPV-promoting public policies have been controversial is that some believe the 
HPV vaccine promotes sexual promiscuity. 
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booster prior to middle school entry were very effective at directly increasing Tdap booster take-
up.  Using the staggered timing of implementation of the Tdap booster requirements across 
states, we find that adoption of a Tdap booster mandate increased the likelihood that an 
adolescent received a Tdap booster between 10 and 12 years of age by 13.5-13.7 percentage 
points.  We also estimate the same difference-in-differences type models on pertussis morbidity 
and find substantial reductions in disease incidence as a result of the mandates.  These reductions 
in pertussis morbidity are observed primarily for adolescents who were targeted by the mandates, 
with some additional evidence of spillovers to infants and prime age adults. 
Finally, we find strong evidence of cross-vaccination spillovers: although most state 
mandates only required the Tdap booster, we find significant increases in other vaccinations that 
were also recommended for young adults.  For example, we estimate that state Tdap booster 
requirements increased MCV vaccination rates by 2.2-2.9 percentage points.  Even more 
striking, we find that these Tdap booster policies significantly increased HPV vaccination 
initiation by 4.2-4.9 percentage points and HPV vaccination completion by 2.5-3.3 percentage 
points.  These spillover effects are larger for youths from households with low socioeconomic 
status (SES).  Our results are the first to document that middle school vaccination requirements 
induced large improvements in adolescent and child health.  Furthermore, given the spillover 
effects to HPV vaccination, there are likely to be large longer-run payoffs due to reduced risk of 
HPV-related cancers in both men and women, especially cervical cancer. 
Our paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 provides institutional background on the 
mandates and conditions we study, and Section 2.3 provides a brief literature review.  Section 
2.4 describes the data and outlines the empirical approach.  Section 2.5 presents the results, and 
Section 2.6 discusses and concludes. 
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2.2. Institutional Background 
In this section we briefly describe the diseases and vaccinations under study as well as 
the middle school mandates and the mechanisms for spillovers.
47
 
2.2.1. Conditions Under Study 
Tetanus, diphtheria, and pertussis (or ‘whooping cough’) are all diseases caused by 
bacteria, and vaccination against them with a combination vaccine series (currently DTaP) has 
been routinely recommended for young children since the 1940s and 1950s.  In 2005 a booster 
for the series, the Tdap vaccine, was approved for use in adolescents and was recommended to 
be administered at age 11 or 12.  Tetanus and diphtheria are now extremely rare diseases, but 
pertussis remains endemic in the United States.  Pertussis is a highly contagious respiratory 
disease that is transmitted from person-to-person through respiratory secretions.
48
    Infants under 
12 months of age are hospitalized in 63 percent of pertussis cases (compared to 2 percent of 
infected adolescents) and account for 90 percent of the pertussis-related mortality.  Notably, 
infants cannot be vaccinated against pertussis until 2 months of age. 
Meningococcal disease includes infections of the lining of the brain and spinal cord 
(meningitis) and of the bloodstream (septicemia and bacteremia).  We focus on the quadrivalent 
meningococcal conjugate vaccine (MCV4), which provides protection against most 
meningococcal disease serogroups and has been routinely recommended for children age 11 or 
12 since 2005. 
Human papillomavirus (HPV) is the most common sexually transmitted infection in the 
United States: the CDC estimates that nearly all sexually active men and women will get HPV at 
                                                   
47
 The Appendix provides more detailed information on each condition we study. 
48
 Figure 2 plots population pertussis rates in the United States from 2000-2015. 
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some point in their lives.  Most HPV infections are asymptomatic and resolve on their own.  
High risk types of HPV cause the large majority of the cancers of the cervix, vagina, penis, anus, 
mouth, and throat.  The first HPV vaccine was licensed for use in females in the United States in 
June 2006, and it was further approved for males in October 2009.  The vaccine is only effective 
if it is given before an infection occurs.  It is currently recommended that all youths initiate the 
HPV vaccine series between ages 11-12. 
Seasonal flu (common in fall and winter months) is an acute and highly contagious viral 
infection that causes mild to severe illness; among infants and the elderly there is elevated risk of 
death due to complications.  The flu vaccine varies from season to season with respect to the 
particular strains of the influenza virus that it protects against.  The annual influenza vaccine was 
routinely recommended for children over the age of 6 months for the first time in 2010. 
2.2.2. Middle School Vaccination Requirements and ACIP Recommendations 
There is a long history in the United States of using school-based mandatory vaccination 
laws as a tool to increase vaccination rates, in part because compulsory schooling laws provide 
an effective means for enforcement.
49
  Although all states presently mandate the receipt of some 
vaccines, there is considerable variation in the set required for school attendance in each state 
(Malone and Hinman 2003).
50
  As of January 2016, forty-six states have adopted middle school 
                                                   
49
 A limitation to the effectiveness of mandates is the availability of individual exemptions.  During our 
sample period exemptions could be obtained for individuals whose religious beliefs oppose vaccination in 
all but 2 states, and 20 states additionally allowed exemptions for personal/philosophical beliefs (NCSL 
2015a).  All states grant exemptions for children who cannot be vaccinated due to medical reasons.  To 
our knowledge there is not good evidence on how children who do not meet the vaccination requirements 
are induced to get the required vaccinations (i.e., how the laws are enforced).  School-based nurses are 
unlikely to be able to fulfill the vaccination requirements, however, because most schools lack the 
administrative requirements to handle the billing and reimbursement for the vaccinations. 
50
 There have been school vaccine mandates implemented in all 50 states and Washington D.C. since 
1980. 
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entry requirements for the Tdap booster (Figure 3).  The mandates we study apply to both private 
and public school students in the vast majority of states; only in four states is the treatment of 
private school students unclear (CDC 2016b). 
In the United States recommendations on the use of vaccines are set by the Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). The ACIP is a 15 member committee composed 
of doctors and public health professionals and was established in 1964.  Their guidelines are 
directly linked to a number of health policies, as many states anchor their laws to current ACIP 
recommendations.
51
  As of January 2016, the ACIP recommended that 11-12 year olds receive 
an annual influenza vaccination, one dose of Tdap, the HPV vaccine series, and a single dose of 
quadrivalent meningococcal conjugate vaccine.
52
 
2.2.3. Spillovers 
In this paper we examine the direct effects of Tdap booster mandates on take-up of the 
Tdap booster and on pertussis morbidity among the targeted age group (5-14 year olds), but we 
are also interested in two types of spillover effects.  First, we examine the effects of the mandates 
on the pertussis morbidity rates of younger and older individuals in the state.  These cross-age 
spillovers may occur due to reduced disease transmission among the directly targeted 
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 For example, under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) preventive care provision (effective September 23, 
2010), all new insurance plans must provide all ACIP-recommended vaccines without cost sharing.  
Moreover, once the ACIP designates a vaccine as ‘routinely recommended’, the Vaccines for Children 
(VFC) program has to pay for them.  Individuals are eligible for free vaccinations under the VFC program 
if they are 18 years of age or younger, and are Medicaid-eligible, uninsured, American Indian or Alaskan 
Native, or are underinsured. 
52
 Out-of-pocket cost for this bundle of vaccines is potentially high.  At this time of this writing, 
Walgreens, for example, charged $249.99 for the first dose of the HPV vaccine, $214.99 for both the 
second and third doses of the HPV vaccine, $133.99 for the meningococcal vaccine, $63.99 for the Tdap 
booster, and $31.99 for the influenza immunization, for a total expense of nearly $700 (Walgreens 2016).  
Prior to the ACA, some private insurance plans covered some portion of these vaccines, and several states 
adopted laws requiring private insurance plans in the state to cover the vaccines (see Chang 2016a for 
evidence on these). 
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adolescents, which is referred to as the ‘herd immunity’ or ‘community’ effect in the medical and 
public health literatures.  Additionally, cross-age spillovers may occur if the middle school 
mandates cause behavioral spillovers that result in increased vaccination among non-targeted age 
groups.  
The second type of spillover we study is a cross-vaccine spillover from state Tdap 
mandates to immunization rates for other non-mandated vaccines, such as the MCV, HPV, or flu 
vaccines.  These types of spillovers may occur through several different channels.  For example, 
Tdap mandates lead to an implicit price reduction for the other vaccines that are recommended 
for adolescents by requiring the youth to seek out a health care provider.  These interactions with 
providers may also lead to information exchange whereby providers inform patients about and 
recommend receipt of other age-appropriate vaccinations.  Alternatively, the mandates may 
directly increase parental knowledge about other vaccines, perhaps through local news coverage 
or information provided by the school or state department of health.
53
 
2.3. Literature Review 
Our paper relates to a substantial literature on the economics of infectious diseases and 
vaccination (Philipson 2000).  Philipson (1996) shows that higher measles prevalence in an 
individual’s state is associated with earlier age at first measles vaccination, suggesting that 
vaccination responds to disease prevalence.  Oster (2016) finds a similar result for pertussis: 
whooping cough disease outbreaks increase vaccination rates of children in the following year, 
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 Appendix Figure 1 shows an example of this type of information provided to parents by the Wisconsin 
Department of Health.  Question 9 on the flyer asks ‘Are there any other vaccines that are recommended 
for my adolescent?’.  The answer provided instructs parents that, even though Tdap is the only 
immunization required under law for middle school entry, adolescents in this age group are also 
recommended to receive MCV, HPV, and seasonal influenza vaccinations.   
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with effect sizes that are too large to reflect actual changes in disease risk.  Schaller et al. (2017) 
also study pertussis outbreaks but focus on infants, finding that outbreaks increase infant 
vaccinations not only for pertussis but also for other vaccine-preventable diseases.  Multiple 
studies have examined the vaccination effects of the MMR-autism controversy in which a study 
in a major medical journal in the UK suggested that the measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine 
might cause autism, showing that highly educated mothers responded to the information by 
reducing MMR vaccination rates for their children (Anderberg et al. 2011, Chang 2016b).
54
 
Our study of middle school vaccination requirements is also related to several quasi-
experimental studies in economics that have examined similar vaccination mandates for 
kindergarten or childcare entry.  Abrevaya and Mulligan (2011) show that such vaccination 
mandates for varicella were associated with significant increases in varicella vaccination rates for 
young children using data from the 1996-2007 National Immunization Survey (NIS).  Lawler 
(2017) also uses NIS data to study similar requirements for hepatitis A and finds that both ACIP 
recommendations and state vaccination requirements significantly increased vaccination rates for 
hepatitis A and reduced hepatitis A morbidity.  Ward (2011) and Luca (2014) both consider the 
implementation of the first modern school vaccination laws (adopted between 1963 and 1980) 
and find reductions in morbidity and mortality for the vaccine-targeted diseases.
55
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 Numerous subsequent studies have failed to confirm a link between the MMR vaccine and autism, and 
the original study that purported the connection was retracted in 2010. 
55
 Other economics studies examine the role of non-mandate related vaccination policies.  For example, 
Chang (2016a) finds that state insurance mandates for various childhood vaccinations significantly 
increased infant vaccination rates, and Ward (2014) finds that influenza immunization campaigns are 
effective at increasing influenza vaccination rates. A number of studies focus particularly on the HPV 
vaccine, although we are not aware of any quasi-experimental literature that has identified significant 
causal determinants of adolescent HPV vaccination rates.  Moghtaderi and Adams (2016) use NIS-Teen 
data from 2008-2011 and find no effects of: requirements that parents and/or students receive education 
and information about the HPV vaccine; mandates requiring the vaccine for school entry; mandates 
requiring private insurers to cover the HPV vaccine; laws granting pharmacists the authority to give 
vaccinations; and general awareness campaigns.  Trogdon et al. (2016) use NIS-Teen data from 2008-
 68 
Within the medical and public health literature there are a number of papers that have 
considered the effects of state middle school vaccination mandates.  These studies generally use 
only a limited number of years (e.g., 2009 and 2010 in Bugenske et al. 2012) or study the 
experiences of a small number of states (e.g., New York in Kharbanda et al. 2010), though it is 
important to note that some of these studies have explicitly examined the possibility of cross-
vaccine spillovers from Tdap vaccination mandates to take-up of MCV and HPV vaccines (see, 
for example, Dempsey and Schaffer 2010).  Our work builds on the prior work in public health 
by using much more comprehensive nationally representative data spanning adoption of 
numerous state Tdap vaccination mandates.  The data and variation allow us to carefully test the 
parallel trends assumption required for identification in difference-in-differences models and to 
estimate credible event study models that trace out the immediate and medium term effects of the 
mandates.  We also go further by directly examining age-specific morbidity effects. 
  
2.4. Data Description and Empirical Approach 
Data on adolescent vaccination come from the 2008-2013 waves of the National 
Immunization Survey – Teen (NIS-Teen).56  The NIS-Teen is a random digit dialing telephone 
survey which targets adolescents between 13 and 17 years of age and includes provider-verified 
immunization histories and household sociodemographic characteristics.  Approximately 33,500 
households complete the survey each year;
57
 among these households there is adequate provider 
                                                                                                                                                                    
2014 and also find no significant relationship between pharmacist vaccination authority and either HPV 
vaccine initiation or completion. 
56
 Due to a survey revision in 2014, later waves of the NIS-Teen survey are not directly comparable to the 
2008-2013 waves (CDC 2015b).  For completeness, however, we show that our results are robust to 
adding the 2014 and 2015 waves in Appendix Table 10.  
57
 Among land-line samples the response rate ranges from 51.1 to 58.7 percent; among the cell-phone 
samples (administered in addition to the land-line survey for the 2011-2013 survey waves) response rates 
were substantially lower and ranged from 22.4 to 23.6 percent.  
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data for 58.7 percent of sample teens.
58
  In these data we observe immunization status for Tdap, 
MCV, HPV, and seasonal influenza vaccinations, as well as for other childhood vaccines.  
Importantly for our analyses, these data include the age (in years) at which the child received 
each vaccination, even if it occurred years prior to the NIS-Teen interview.  We use this 
information to restrict our analysis to vaccination doses received between 10 and 13 years of age 
– the age range for which middle school mandates are most likely to be binding.  Our effective 
sample for vaccination outcomes is therefore individuals who were age 13 between 2004 and 
2013.   
Our data on pertussis disease incidence were obtained directly from the CDC.  These data 
consist of counts of cases of a subset of nationally notifiable diseases by state, year, and ten-year 
age group.
59
  Availability of information on age group enables us to separately estimate the direct 
effects (on the ages targeted by the mandates) and indirect effects (on other age groups) of the 
middle school mandates on disease incidence in the population.  We observe morbidity outcomes 
for pertussis (covered by Tdap) and tuberculosis (a control condition transmitted in the same 
manner as pertussis, but not protected against by the Tdap vaccine) from 2000-2015.  We also 
use population morbidity data for a range of other diseases (e.g., Hepatitis A, Hepatitis B, 
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 Teens that completed the household interview may lack adequate provider data either because the 
household did not provide consent to contact providers (between 23.2 and 35.1 percent of households in a 
given survey wave) or because the contacted providers did not have medical records for the teen.  Across 
all survey waves provider response rates were extremely high, ranging from 92.7 to 96.3 percent. 
59
 The number of cases of nationally notifiable diseases is voluntarily reported to the CDC by state and 
territorial jurisdictions for nationwide monitoring of disease.  These data are considered the most 
comprehensive information available on U.S. national disease incidence, although they only include 
diagnosed cases (i.e. they exclude cases where the individual did not go to a health care provider or were 
misdiagnosed) and thus represent a substantial undercount of true disease incidence.  The reliance on 
provider diagnosis represents a potentially important limitation in this context, as providers may adjust 
the intensity of their surveillance in the presence of a vaccine mandate, thus biasing our morbidity results.  
Furthermore, it is difficult to sign this bias: Tdap mandates may increase provider surveillance intensity 
by increasing their awareness of pertussis, or it may decrease their surveillance if they lower their 
expectation of encountering a patient with pertussis.  
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meningococcal disease, measles, Lyme disease, and salmonellosis) as additional falsification 
tests. 
To estimate the effect of the Tdap mandates, we estimate standard difference-in-
differences models that rely on plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of mandate adoption 
across states.  Specifically, we estimate: 
(1) Yist = β0 + β1Xist + β2(MIDDLE SCHOOL ENTRY VACCINATION 
MANDATE)st + β3Zst + β4Ss + β5Tt + β6Ss*TREND + εist 
where Yist are the vaccination take-up outcomes available in the NIS-Teen data for 
individual i in state s who was age 13 in year t.  Xist is a vector of individual characteristics 
available in the NIS-Teen, including: child’s gender, fixed effects for child’s age at time of 
survey, child’s race/ethnicity (Hispanic, white, black, with other as the excluded category), 
number of other children under 18 years old living in the home (only 1 child, 2 to 3 children, 
with 4 or more children as the excluded category), maternal education (less than high school, 
high school, some college, with college or above as the excluded category), maternal age group 
(34 years old or younger, 35 to 44 years old, with 45 years or older as the excluded category) and 
an indicator variable for whether the mother is married.
60
   
MIDDLE SCHOOL ENTRY VACCINATION MANDATE is a vector of disease-
specific indicator variables equal to one in the states and years in which there is a vaccination 
mandate in effect.  Since all vaccination outcomes are observed at age 13 in year t, a vaccination 
mandate is considered in effect for individual i in state s if there was a binding mandate for 12 
                                                   
60
 The number of other children living in the home and maternal education, age group, and marital status 
are all observed at the time of the survey, not at the time the child was age 13.  Our main results are not 
sensitive to removing the controls in the X vector. 
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year olds in year t-1 or for 11 year olds in year t-2 in state s.
61
  This vector captures vaccination 
mandates for the tetanus, diphtheria, and pertussis booster (Tdap),
62
 the meningococcal vaccine 
(MCV), and the human papillomavirus series (HPV).  These three vaccines are the only 
immunizations for which routine administration is recommended for the first time at age 11 or 
12.  The influenza vaccine is additionally recommended annually for children ages 6 months 
through 18 years, although as of 2016 no state has mandated receipt of the influenza vaccine for 
school attendance.  Information on the timing of adoption of these mandates was taken from the 
Immunization Action Coalition.
63
 
Additionally contained in the vector MIDDLE SCHOOL ENTRY VACCINATION 
MANDATE are indicator variables that capture if individuals faced a newly binding `catch up’ 
middle school entry mandate for hepatitis A, hepatitis B, varicella, or a measles-containing 
vaccine.  These vaccines are frequently required for middle school entry, although they are 
routinely recommended for children much younger than middle school age.  Consequently, many 
states have companion kindergarten entry mandates for these diseases.  State requirements 
regarding these other diseases are still relevant, however, because some share of young adults are 
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 There is variation across states in the age for which a middle school mandate is binding.  For example, 
some states require vaccination by age 11, while in others the requirement is by age 12. Additionally, 
some requirements are by grade level, in which case we consider 6
th
 grade entry equivalent to age 11 and 
7
th
 grade entry equivalent to age 12.  We assume that there is no cross-state mobility between ages 11 and 
the time at which the child is surveyed (age 13-17); in a robustness test we have confirmed that our results 
are not sensitive to restricting attention to the 78 percent of our sample whose current state of residence 
matches their birth state of residence. 
62
 Among the states that have Tdap booster mandates, 9 previously had mandates requiring receipt of a 
TD-containing vaccine prior to middle school entry.  In the baseline specification we consider a TD-
containing mandate to be equivalent to a mandate for the Tdap booster.  
63
 Only two states over our sample period ever adopted a mandate for HPV vaccination (Washington DC 
and Virginia).  Given the well-documented challenges associated with credibly estimating difference-in-
differences models with a small number of policy changes (Conley and Taber 2011, MacKinnon and 
Webb 2016), we do not present estimates for this variable, as they are highly sensitive to specification.  
Twenty two states adopted MCV vaccination requirements, and we control for these throughout.  Note 
that a state never adopted a middle school vaccination requirement for MCV prior to adopting one for 
Tdap. 
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‘caught’ by them (i.e., they were too old at time of implementation of the disease-specific 
kindergarten vaccination mandate in their state to have been treated by it).
64
 
Zst is a vector of other potentially relevant state vaccination-related public policies, some 
of which have been studied in prior work.  These include: state mandates requiring insurance 
policies to cover various vaccinations (Chang 2016a) and well-child visits;
65
 nonmedical 
exemption policy (Bradford and Mandich 2015);
66
 state education requirements for the HPV and 
meningococcal vaccines (Moghtaderi and Adams 2016, Bugenske et al. 2012); high school and 
college immunization requirements for the meningococcal vaccine; immunization mandates for 
childcare/kindergarten entry for other diseases such as hepatitis A (Lawler 2017); and income 
eligibility thresholds for the state Medicaid/Children’s Health Insurance Program.67  The Z 
vector also includes controls for state unemployment rates and state demographic characteristics 
(fraction female; fraction black, Hispanic, and other non-white races; fraction of individuals with 
high school degrees and college or more; fraction of individuals under 21 and between 21-64; 
and fraction of individuals below the federal poverty line).
68
  In order to best capture the state 
characteristics that would have feasibly been relevant to the vaccination decisions considered 
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 Specifically, we  consider there to be an effective (newly binding) ‘catch up’ mandate if a child residing 
in state s who is age 13 in year t was subject to the mandate for middle school entry (i.e. there was a 
mandate effective for 12 year olds in year t-1 or for 11 years olds in year t-2) and was not subject to a 
mandate for the same vaccine prior to kindergarten entry (i.e. there was not a mandate in effect in state s 
for the same vaccine when the child was age 5 in year t-8). 
65
 Note that the preventive services requirement of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) required most 
insurance plans to cover ACIP-recommended vaccinations and well-child visits without cost-sharing 
beginning September 2010.  As such, we turn the insurance coverage indicator ‘on’ for all observations in 
years 2011 and later. 
66
 Over our sample period only two states changed their exemption policy for vaccinations; both did so by 
eliminating the personal belief exemption.   
67
 In a series of robustness checks we verify our results are unaffected by the inclusion of several 
additional controls for which we have data only for a subset of our sample years.  These include: state 
Section 317 funding, state Vaccines For Children (VFC) policies, and scope of practice laws regarding 
pharmacist prescribing authority (Trogdon et al. 2016).   
68
 State unemployment rates come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  State demographic characteristics 
are from the Census Bureau.  Our main results are not sensitive to removing the controls in the Z vector. 
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here, all variables contained in the Zst vector are measured in the year in which the child was 11 
(year t-2).  We also include in the Zst vector the lagged population-wide pertussis and 
meningococcal disease rates in the state, following Philipson (1996) and Oster (2016).  All 
models additionally control for a full set of state and birth cohort fixed effects.  In some models 
we further control for state-specific linear cohort trends where we interact each state fixed effect 
with a variable TREND that equals 1 for individuals who were age 13 in 2004, 2 if age 13 in 
2005, and so forth.  We use sample weights provided by NIS-Teen, and we cluster standard 
errors at the state level (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).
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β2 represents our coefficient of interest and reflects the direct and indirect (i.e., spillover) 
effects of middle school vaccination requirements.  The key identifying assumption in this 
difference-in-differences style model is that vaccination outcomes would have evolved similarly 
in states that did and did not adopt a middle school vaccination requirement in the absence of the 
mandate, or alternatively that there were no other unobserved shocks to vaccination outcomes in 
states coincident with adoption of the middle school vaccination requirements.  In some models 
we replace the vector of Tdap, MCV, and HPV middle school vaccination requirements with a 
series of indicator variables representing years relative to adoption of the respective state 
vaccination requirement.  This event-study style framework allows us to explicitly address and 
visually inspect the parallel trends assumption in the two-way fixed effects framework. 
For analyses of the morbidity data we estimate a variant of equation (1) where the 
outcome is the age-specific morbidity rate in state s and year t, measured as number of cases per 
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 In 2011 NIS-Teen switched from single frame landline-only sampling to dual frame sampling that 
included landlines and cell phones, and in that year only both single and dual frame weights are provided.  
In all reported estimates we use dual frame weights starting in 2011.  None of the main results is sensitive 
either to this decision or to the exclusion of weights.  
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100,000 population.
70
  Age-specific morbidity rates are calculated using the number of cases for 
each disease by age group (as provided to us by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) 
and age-specific population estimates from the Surveillance and Epidemiologic End Results 
(SEER) system.   In this more aggregate level model, we include year fixed effects instead of 
birth cohort fixed effects, and all policies are considered in effect at the start of the calendar year 
following implementation.  These models use age-specific state population weights. 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Appendix Table 1 presents means of key variables relating to Tdap, MCV, HPV, and 
influenza vaccination-related outcomes and demographic characteristics from the NIS-Teen 
2008-2013 sample.  By age 13, 45 percent of the NIS-Teen sample received the Tdap booster, 
and 35.7 percent received the MCV vaccine.  These rates are respectively higher in states that 
had implemented a middle school entry mandate for the Tdap booster by 2013.  Notably, MCV 
and HPV vaccination rates were also higher in states with Tdap vaccination requirements in 
place by 2013, though the same is not true for seasonal influenza vaccination rates.  In the full 
sample, HPV and seasonal influenza vaccination rates are both substantially lower than Tdap 
booster vaccination rates at 23.6 and 12.2 percent, respectively.  As mentioned previously, 
Figure 1 shows the trends in Tdap, MCV, and HPV vaccination rates for adolescents over our 
sample period; all have increased substantially since 2005.  Appendix Table 1 also shows that 
slightly less than half the NIS-Teen sample is female, over 57 percent is white, 20 percent is 
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 We note that given the nature of disease contagion, there is potential for cross-state spillover in reduced 
disease incidence, which would bias our estimated effects towards zero using this identification strategy.  
Ideally we would test for the presence of this type of geographic spillover, however doing so would 
require morbidity measures at a sub-state level, which the CDC does not release due to confidentiality 
concerns.  
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Hispanic, and over 14 percent is black.  At the time of the survey, over a third of the mothers in 
the NIS-Teen sample were college educated, while 69.6 percent were married. 
2.5.2. Direct Effects of Tdap Mandates on Tdap Vaccination and Pertussis Cases 
In Table 1 we present difference-in-differences estimates of the effects of state middle 
school vaccination mandates on vaccine take-up and morbidity outcomes that take explicit 
advantage of the plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of policy adoption across states.  
Columns 1 and 2 (without and with linear state trends, respectively) of Table 1 present results 
from separate regressions of the model specified in equation (1) where the outcome variable is 
receipt of the Tdap booster between ages 10 and 12.  We report the coefficients on the policy 
indicator for the state Tdap booster requirement. 
The results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 provide strong evidence that Tdap vaccination 
mandates for middle school entry were effective at increasing take-up of the Tdap vaccine.  The 
estimate in column 1 indicates that Tdap mandates were associated with a 13.5 percentage point 
increase in the likelihood that an adolescent received a Tdap booster between 10 and 12 years of 
age, and this finding is invariant to the inclusion of smooth state-specific linear time trends.  
Figure 1 showed that over our sample period Tdap vaccination rates increased from about 0 to 80 
percent; the estimates in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 indicate that Tdap mandates can explain 
about 17 percent of this overall increase.
71
  We show visually event-study-based estimates of the 
direct effect of Tdap mandates on Tdap-vaccine uptake in Figure 3 (the actual estimates from the 
event study specification are presented in Appendix Table 2).  Figure 3 shows that the Tdap 
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 Note that vaccination rates are not 100%.  This is due in part to the fact that five states still have not 
adopted requirements for the Tdap booster as a condition of middle school entry.  It is also due to some 
amount of noncompliance, though the channels of noncompliance are quite rare.  For example, 
adolescents and parents can evade state Tdap booster requirements for middle school entry by 
homeschooling their children, though nationally the rate of homeschooling is less than 3.5 percent during 
our sample period (Snyder, de Brey, and Dillow 2016). 
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mandates induced large, immediate, and significant increases in Tdap booster take-up, and there 
is no evidence of systematic trends prior to Tdap mandate adoption.  This is consistent with the 
validity of the parallel trends assumption required for identification. 
Were these increases in vaccination rates effective at reducing morbidity?  We present 
difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Tdap mandates on population-wide pertussis 
morbidity in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.  The outcome variable in these columns is the 
population incidence rate of pertussis per 100,000 population from 2001-2015.
72
  The estimates 
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 provide some evidence that the Tdap booster requirements for 
middle school entry were effective at reducing population-wide pertussis incidence.  
Specifically, we estimate that adoption of a Tdap booster mandate reduced pertussis morbidity 
by 2.2 cases per 100,000 population, or by about 32 percent relative to the sample mean.
73
  The 
point estimate on the Tdap booster requirement variable is statistically significant in the two-way 
fixed effects model of column 3; adding linear state trends in column 4 reduces the estimate 
somewhat and renders it statistically insignificant.
74
  We additionally present event-study 
estimates of the effect of the Tdap mandates on population-wide pertussis morbidity in Figure 5 
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 Note that although we have disease incidence data for 2000-2015, the inclusion of a lagged measure of 
disease incidence in our baseline specification means that we are only able to examine disease incidence 
as an outcome variable for the years 2001-2015. 
73
 In additional analyses presented in Appendix Table 3 we investigate potential nonlinearities in the 
effect of the mandate based on initial levels of disease prevalence.  We find no significant interaction 
effect when we interact the mandate with baseline (2004) incidence rates, although estimates from models 
that include interactions with disease incidence rates in the year prior to mandate implementation suggest 
that mandates are especially effective at reducing pertussis in states with higher pertussis rates.  When 
combined with the event study evidence that Tdap mandates were not systematically adopted in response 
to sharp upward spikes in pertussis incidence (as shown in Figure 5), this suggests the potential 
importance of nonlinearities in the effects of the policies.  
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 As a sensitivity check we also estimated the morbidity analyses using log (pertussis cases + 1) as the 
outcome variable. Our results are robust to this alternative specification.  
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(coefficient estimates are presented in Appendix Table 4).
75
  Although the visual evidence of a 
population-wide pertussis reduction appears quite short-lived, there is no evidence that Tdap 
mandates were implemented in response to pertussis outbreaks in a state.
76
 
We examine cross-age morbidity spillover effects in Table 2.  Specifically, Table 2 
makes use of age-specific morbidity data for two diseases: pertussis and tuberculosis (which is 
not protected against by the Tdap vaccine).  With these data we estimate two-way fixed effects 
models as in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1, but we replace the outcome variable with an age-group 
specific rate of pertussis incidence.  All regressions are weighted by age-group specific 
population measures.  The results from this analysis are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2, 
and we report only the coefficient on the single Tdap mandate indicator.  Thus, each table entry 
is the coefficient from a separate regression, where the relevant age group is provided in the row 
label.  All regressions include the full set of state-level controls and state and year fixed effects; 
column (2) adds state-specific linear time trends. 
The results in Table 2 provide evidence that the middle school vaccination requirements 
for the Tdap booster were effective at reducing morbidity among the targeted group: 5-14 year 
olds.  We estimate that a Tdap mandate reduced pertussis cases of 5-14 year olds by 9 cases per 
100,000 population, and this estimate is statistically significant at the five percent level.  
Including linear state trends reduces the magnitude somewhat but continues to suggest large, 
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 Figures 3 and 4 (event studies for Tdap vaccine take-up and pertussis morbidity, respectively) show 
estimates from models without linear state trends.  Estimates from the models with trends were 
qualitatively similar (see Appendix Tables 2 and 4). 
76
 There are many reasons why a sustained increase in Tdap vaccination rates might result in only a short 
term reduction in pertussis rates.  One is that the immunity effect wears off after a couple of years, which 
is why many states require periodic vaccination ‘boosters’.  Another is that many states implemented the 
Tdap mandate by requiring the vaccine not only for those in 6
th
 or 7
th
 grade, but also for students through 
9
th
, or in some cases 12
th
, grade, with the idea that they wanted to increase Tdap vaccination as much as 
possible among these youths.  This means that in practice, in the years after initial Tdap mandate 
adoption, only the new sixth or seventh grade youths (depending on the grade configuration in the state) 
or new enrollees would be required to be newly vaccinated. 
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though not significant, reductions in pertussis in the targeted age group when Tdap mandates are 
adopted.  Notably, we also estimate that state Tdap mandates significantly reduced pertussis 
morbidity for infants age 0-4 and adults age 25-34.  These findings are consistent with the 
possibility of herd immunity effects induced by the increased vaccination of disease transmitters 
(adolescents).
77
  Although the statistical significance of these estimates is somewhat affected by 
the inclusion of linear state trends, the estimated magnitudes are large and consistently suggest 
meaningful reductions in pertussis incidence.
78
  Spillover effects to infant pertussis morbidity are 
not surprising, as infants cannot be vaccinated against pertussis until two months of age, and it 
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 As noted previously, the cross-age morbidity spillovers documented in Table 2 might not be herd 
immunity effects if there were cross-age behavioral spillovers to increased vaccination rates of non-
targeted age groups.  We tested this possibility directly in Appendix Tables 5 and 6.  In Appendix Table 5 
we examine the effects of the mandate on vaccination rates among 7-9 year olds, 14-15 year olds, and 16-
17 year olds, using NIS-Teen data and the same specification as in our baseline vaccination estimates.  
For the 14-5 and 16-17 year olds we limit our sample to states that did not require the Tdap booster for 
any ages above 13, so that we could credibly identify behavioral spillovers.  We find suggestive evidence 
of behavior spillovers to 16-17 year olds, although estimates are small in magnitude (1.3-2.3 percentage 
points).  In Appendix Table 6 we use vaccination data from the 2003-2015 National Immunization 
Survey, which is a counterpart to (and precursor of) the NIS-Teen and which targets children age 19-35 
months.  Using a similar two-way fixed effects model as presented in equation (1), we estimate the effect 
of the Tdap mandates for middle school entry on the probability that a young child is up-to-date with the 
infant diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis vaccine, DTaP (for infants age 19-35 this is 4 doses).  We find no 
evidence that Tdap mandates were associated with meaningful changes in infant DTaP vaccination rates, 
and this null finding was not sensitive to the presence of other children in the household.  In results not 
reported but available upon request we also estimate effects on adults using data from the CDC BRFSS 
from 2012-2016.  For 12 states these data include answers to the question “Have you received the Tdap 
vaccine since 2005?” for a subset of years (for a total of 40 state-year observations).  Although 
identification for this analysis is only based on three states, we do find suggestive evidence that the 
mandates increased Tdap vaccination rates among adults by 1.1-1.2 percentage points.  Given the data 
limitations, however, we interpret these results cautiously.  
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 In Appendix Figure 2 we present age group specific pertussis incidence rates in the year prior to the 
vaccine development (2004) and in the last year of the sample (2015). We also visually present, in 
Appendix Figure 3, the estimated proportional pertussis morbidity reduction attributable to the Tdap 
mandates (relative to the age-group specific 2004 mean) across the life course.  Appendix Figure 3 
confirms that the effects of the Tdap mandates for middle school entry were large across all age groups 
but were particularly effective for infants and prime age adults. 
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takes multiple doses over several months for them to develop a high level of protection.
79
 
As a robustness/falsification analysis we also estimate the effects of the Tdap mandates 
on age-specific tuberculosis morbidity, the only other disease with a plausibly similar 
transmission mechanism for which we were able to obtain age-specific morbidity data at the 
state/year level from the CDC.
80
  Tuberculosis is a relatively common infection caused by 
bacteria, and it is transmitted from person-to-person through the air.
81
  Symptoms include a 
cough that typically lasts at least 3 weeks, chest pain, fatigue, and a fever.  Tuberculosis, while 
similar to pertussis in transmission mode and clinical symptoms, is not prevented by the Tdap 
vaccine; thus, if we observed effects of the Tdap booster mandates on tuberculosis morbidity for 
5-14 year olds (or for other age groups), this would be suggestive of a model misspecification or 
an omitted variables problem.  We present the estimates of the Tdap mandates on tuberculosis 
morbidity in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.  The estimates are small and statistically 
insignificant in nearly all models.  Thus, overall we find strong evidence that the Tdap mandates 
for middle school entry generated large reductions in pertussis morbidity that extended beyond 
the directly targeted age group (5-14 year olds).  Some of these morbidity effects for other age 
groups – particularly infants – could be consistent with herd immunity from increased 
vaccinations of middle school age youths. 
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 This result is consistent with findings in the epidemiological literature, which, in a different context, 
similarly document that the herd immunity effects of the Tdap vaccine primarily occur for infants (Rohani 
et al. 2010, Domenech de Cellès et al. 2016).   
80
 We also present in Appendix Table 7 a set of falsification analyses using a number of other nationally 
notifiable diseases for which we were able to obtain morbidity data at the population level only. We find 
no significant effect of the Tdap mandate on any of the other disease we consider, and the estimated 
effects are consistently very small in magnitude.  
81
 The mean rate of tuberculosis during our sample period was 4.1 cases per 100,000 population. 
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2.5.3 Cross-Vaccination Spillovers 
We next consider the potential for cross-vaccination spillovers among middle school-
aged children.  For these analyses we take advantage of the fact that among the 46 states that 
mandate receipt of any of the vaccines routinely recommended for 11-12 year olds prior to 
middle school entry, all mandate the Tdap booster, less than half mandate the MCV vaccine, 
only 2 mandate HPV, and none mandate seasonal influenza.  In all states, Tdap was the first 
among this set of vaccines to be required for middle school entry.  If after controlling for all 
other middle school vaccination mandates there is an effect of the Tdap mandate on receipt of 
other vaccines among middle school-aged individuals, then we interpret this as evidence of 
cross-vaccination spillovers from Tdap booster mandates to non-Tdap vaccination rates. 
We present these findings in Table 3 for the other ACIP-recommended vaccines for 
adolescents: MCV (columns 1-2), HPV vaccine initiation by age 13 (columns 3-4), HPV vaccine 
completion by age 13 (columns 5-6), and seasonal influenza vaccine between the ages of 10 and 
13 (columns 7-8) for models without and with linear state trends in the odd and even-numbered 
columns, respectively.
82
  Results in Table 3 indicate the presence of cross-vaccine spillover 
effects of Tdap mandates for middle school entry.  The estimate in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3, 
for example, indicate that Tdap mandates increased the probability an adolescent received the 
MCV vaccine by 2.2-2.9 percentage points, and these estimates are statistically significant at the 
ten percent level in models with linear state trends.  Note that since the Tdap vaccine was always 
in the first set of vaccines to be mandated for middle school entry, the Tdap mandate effect in 
these models is identified from the 27 states that adopted Tdap requirements but not MCV 
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 To account for the fact that the HPV vaccine was not approved for use in males until 2009, the 
estimation sample for HPV vaccination outcomes is restricted to females who were age 13 between 2007-
2013 and males who were age 13 between 2011-2013. 
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requirements, as well as from the small number of states that first adopted a Tdap requirement 
and then years later adopted an MCV requirement. 
Columns 3 through 6 of Table 3 also show striking evidence of sizable cross-vaccination 
spillover from Tdap mandates to HPV initiation (columns 3 and 4) and completion (columns 5 
and 6).
83
  Specifically, our estimates in columns 3 and 4 suggest that the Tdap mandates 
increased HPV vaccine initiation by 4.2-4.9 percentage points, and these estimates are 
statistically significant.  Moreover, columns 5 and 6 indicate that the Tdap mandates also 
significantly increased completion of the three-dose series of the HPV vaccine on the order of 
2.5-3.3 percentage points.
84
  Finally, columns 7 and 8 of Table 3 provide no evidence that Tdap 
mandates increased take-up of the seasonal influenza vaccine. 
What might explain the null effect of the Tdap mandates on seasonal influenza 
vaccination?  One possibility is timing.  Whereas vaccines for Tdap, MCV, and HPV are 
generally available throughout the year – including prior to the start of the school year – the 
same is not true for seasonal influenza.  Typically seasonal flu vaccines become available in 
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 For completeness we also estimated the spillover effects to the receipt of at least two doses of the HPV 
vaccine series, since the ACIP recently revised its guidelines to recommend that younger adolescents 
obtain just two doses of the HPV vaccine instead of three.  Our estimates suggest that the Tdap mandates 
significantly increased the probability of having received at least two doses of the HPV vaccine series by 
2.8-2.9 percentage points. 
84
 Appendix Table 8 shows event study estimates for the Tdap mandate spillovers to MCV vaccination, 
HPV vaccine initiation, and HPV vaccine completion.  In general we find little evidence of systematic 
pre-trends in outcomes prior to Tdap mandate adoption and significant immediate increases in vaccination 
rates for MCV, HPV initiation, and HPV completion, none of which were mandated by the policy whose 
event time coefficients are reported.  Appendix Table 9 shows that if we define cross-vaccine spillovers in 
a different way by considering outcomes that are the combination of the Tdap booster with each of the 
other ACIP-recommended vaccines, we continue to find that the Tdap mandates for middle school entry 
had spillover effects at increasing take-up of MCV and HPV vaccines.  Appendix Table 10 shows that our 
spillover estimates are robust to adding data from the 2014 and 2015 NIS-Teen which used different 
criteria for determining completeness of provider vaccination data than earlier years.  Appendix Table 11 
shows that the spillover effects to MCV and HPV are largely driven by years in which the respective 
vaccine was ACIP-recommended for adolescents.  Note that once a vaccine is ACIP-recommended, the 
Vaccines for Children program must pay for it for low-income children. 
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September, after most adolescents have started the school year.  Thus, it could be that when 
parents take their child to a healthcare provider for the required Tdap vaccine prior to middle 
school entry, the MCV and HPV vaccines are in stock but the seasonal flu vaccine is not.
85
   
2.5.4. Heterogeneity 
In Table 4 we investigate heterogeneity in the effects of the Tdap mandates for middle 
school entry on Tdap vaccination rates (the direct effect) and on vaccination rates for the other 
routinely recommended vaccines for youths in this age range where we find spillovers: MCV, 
HPV vaccine initiation, and HPV vaccine completion.  In each entry of Table 4 we present the 
relevant subsample mean and the coefficient on the Tdap mandate (and its associated standard 
error) from a separate fully saturated regression model with linear state trends.  The outcome 
variable for each regression is provided in the column header, and each row reports results for a 
different subsample; we reprint the results for the full sample in the top row.  We separately 
consider the effects of the Tdap mandate on vaccination by gender of the child (rows 2 and 3), 
race/ethnicity (rows 4-6), and maternal education (rows 7 and 8). 
Table 4 reveals several intriguing patterns with respect to heterogeneous effects.  First, 
we find that the direct compliance effect of the Tdap mandate on Tdap vaccination rates (column 
1) is larger for girls than for boys and is larger for mothers with lower education relative to 
mothers with higher education.  This latter gradient could reflect that the children with lower 
educated mothers have a lower vaccination rate in the absence of the mandate and thus have 
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 Also, the flu vaccine is different from the other vaccines in that it was the most recent to be 
recommended for routine vaccination, and it is also recommended for adolescents and the rest of the 
members of the household on an annual basis.  It could be that getting the flu vaccine is a qualitatively 
different experience for the family, since everyone in the household is recommended to get the influenza 
vaccine every year. 
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further to go to achieve compliance.
86
 
In terms of spillover effects, several patterns are notable.  The gender difference in the 
direct effect (i.e., larger effects for girls) is also observed for the spillover effect of Tdap 
mandates to MCV and HPV vaccination.  For race/ethnicity, we find that although the direct 
effect of the Tdap mandate is largely invariant to race/ethnicity, the spillover effects to HPV 
vaccine initiation are much larger for Hispanic youth compared to white youth, while the 
spillover effects to HPV vaccine completion are largest for black youths. 
Finally, the spillover effects of Tdap mandates also vary by maternal education.  Lower 
educated mothers are much more likely to take-up the MCV vaccine and the first dose of the 
HPV vaccine for their children compared to highly educated mothers when their state requires 
their child to receive the Tdap booster.  This could happen for several possible reasons, including 
the possibility that the information sent home to parents is more of a treatment for low educated 
mothers than for highly educated mothers (who may have known about the other ACIP-
recommended vaccines even in the absence of the Tdap mandate).  It could also be that the low-
educated mothers are complying with the Tdap mandate in qualitatively different ways than the 
high-educated mothers, for example by visiting different types of providers where the interaction 
leads to different types of cross-vaccine spillovers.
87
  Finally, it could be an income effect: if 
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 Specifically, in states and years in which there is not an effective Tdap mandate for middle school 
entry, the Tdap vaccination rate by age 13 for children whose mothers have a bachelor’s degree is 35.9 
percent, compared to 27.8 percent of children whose mothers whose highest level of education is less than 
a bachelor’s degree.  A similar pattern holds if we stratify by household income instead of mother’s 
education. 
87
 In results not reported but available upon request, we additionally considered heterogeneity in mandate 
effects by type of provider and by insurance status.  For provider type, the NIS-Teen data allow us to 
identify whether the child received her vaccines exclusively at public institutions (e.g., public clinics), 
exclusively at private institutions (e.g., a physician’s office or retail clinic), or in a mixture of public and 
private settings.  Acknowledging that the type of setting chosen for vaccination is endogenous, we do find 
that the spillover effects of the Tdap mandates were significantly larger for individuals whose 
vaccinations were received exclusively at public providers.  We also test for differential effects of the 
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low-educated mothers are more likely to be eligible for free vaccines under the Vaccines for 
Children program, the increased take-up of the MCV vaccines could reflect downward sloping 
demand.  We explore mechanisms in the next section. 
2.5.5. Mechanisms 
 Our final sets of analyses attempt to disentangle mechanisms for the cross-vaccination 
spillovers observed in Tables 3 and 4.  In addition to the implicit price reduction for the non-
mandated vaccines brought about by the fact that the child has to see a provider to obtain the 
required Tdap vaccine, there are also possible roles for parents and providers.  For example, it 
could be that state Tdap mandates cause parents to receive new information about other age-
recommended vaccines, and this causes them to get their child vaccinated against those 
conditions even though it is not required.  Alternatively, it could be that the Tdap mandates 
simply cause parents to have increased contact with the healthcare system whereby a provider 
informs them about other age-appropriate vaccinations for their child.  These mechanisms have 
different implications for the most effective policy for increasing immunizations. 
We investigate these issues in a variety of ways.  First, we consider a range of outcomes 
available in the NIS-Teen data: whether the parent had ever heard of human papillomavirus or 
HPV; whether the parent had ever heard of a vaccine for HPV called Gardasil or Cervarix (the 
trade names for the HPV vaccine); whether the parent reports that her doctor ever recommended 
the HPV vaccine; and whether the child had an 11-12 year old well-child visit.  A positive effect 
                                                                                                                                                                    
mandate in states that allow pharmacists to administer vaccines to adolescents, but we do not find 
evidence of a significant interaction between the two policies.  Limiting our sample to adolescents aged 
13 at the time of survey (since we only observe the child’s insurance status at the time of the survey, not 
at the time of vaccination), we find no evidence of heterogeneous effects of the mandate by insurance 
status.  We further examine, separately by child insurance status, if mandates had differential effects in 
states with immunization insurance mandates or after the ACA preventive services mandate went into 
effect.  We find no evidence of heterogeneous effects of the mandates along these dimensions.  
 85 
of the Tdap mandates on these last two outcomes – receipt of a physician recommendation for 
the HPV vaccine or the likelihood that the youth had a well-child visit (and thus interacted with 
the healthcare system) – would provide evidence in favor of the provider mechanism.  The first 
two outcomes, parental knowledge of HPV and of the HPV vaccine, are more ambiguous and 
could be affected through receipt of new information regarding vaccination from the school or 
through the provider channel.  In the absence of other evidence for the provider mechanism, 
however, an effect on these outcomes would lend support for the idea that patient behavior 
underlies the spillover.   
Table 5 presents these results for the sample of youths who were age 13 at the time of 
survey (and for whom the reference window of the questions is most recent and relevant).
88
  We 
find little evidence that Tdap mandates are significantly associated with increases in the 
likelihood of any of the outcomes except for a robust and statistically significant increase in the 
likelihood of having had an 11-12 year old well-child visit.  This offers some mixed support for 
the provider mechanism, though in this case we would have also expected Tdap mandates to 
have increased the likelihood of having received a physician recommendation for the HPV 
vaccine.
89
 
We also investigated the patient mechanism using data from Google Trends which 
captures the relative popularity of specific search terms in an area from 2005 to the present.  
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 Because these analyses are done using a subset of the sample used in our main vaccination analyses 
presented in Tables 1 and 3, we re-estimate effects on Tdap, MCV, and HPV uptake for this more limited 
sample.  Results are presented in Appendix Table 12 and return patterns similar to those from the full 
sample.  
89
 It could also be that children are receiving vaccines that they or their parents are not aware they are 
receiving.  Anecdotally some parents follow a rule of thumb whereby they instruct the provider to give 
any vaccination that is recommended for their child.  While vaccine information statements are required 
to be provided to parents, it is not obvious how much the parent/provider interaction is an informed 
negotiation. 
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These data have been used by other scholars studying a range of topics, including vaccination 
(see, for example, Oster 2016).  The advantage of the Google Trends data in our setting is that 
we can examine the popularity of searches for, say, ‘Tdap’ to see if adoption of Tdap mandates 
for middle school entry at the state level is associated with meaningful increases in search 
behavior.  Since parents far outnumber providers (and we think providers are not using Google to 
find out about various vaccinations), any relationship between the mandates and the search 
behavior is likely to reflect parent behavior.  At a minimum it may suggest that information 
about the Tdap vaccine is disseminating broadly in the community following Tdap mandate 
adoption.  Moreover, we can examine searches for MCV and HPV-related terms as well to 
provide additional tests of the role of information and parent search behavior in driving the 
spillover effects. 
The results of the Google Trends analyses are presented in Table 6.  Specifically we 
present coefficients on the Tdap mandate in a two-way fixed effects regression on the relative 
search popularity score provide by Google for each state, where each state’s popularity is 
anchored at 100 in the month/year combination for that state where the search was most popular.  
We also report the coefficient on the pertussis rate in the state as an additional validity check, as 
Oster (2016) shows using Google Trends data that disease outbreaks increase vaccination in part 
by increasing information.  The results in Table 6 provide striking evidence in favor of an 
information-based mechanism driving the direct and spillover effects of Tdap mandates for 
middle school entry.  Columns 1 and 2 (without and with linear state trends, respectively) show 
that a Tdap mandate for middle school entry is significantly and positively associated with 
increased searches for ‘tdap’ and that the current pertussis rate in a state is also significantly and 
positively associated with searches for ‘tdap’.  Columns 3 and 4 and columns 5 and 6, 
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respectively, show that the former relationship is also true for searches related to the 
meningococcal vaccine and HPV: the popularity of both searches in a state is estimated to 
increase significantly when the state adopts a Tdap mandate.  This is strongly consistent with 
parent behavior playing an important role in driving the cross-vaccine spillovers identified 
above.
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2.6. Discussion and Conclusion 
We provide a variety of analyses showing that state mandates requiring Tdap vaccination 
prior to middle school entry were highly effective at significantly increasing Tdap vaccine 
uptake between the age of 10 and 12 by 13.5-13.7 percentage points.  Event study analyses show 
that the direct vaccination effects of the mandates occur immediately and are sustained over 
time.  Similarly specified models of population-wide morbidity suggest a population-wide 
reduction on the order of 32 percent of the sample mean.  Disaggregated age-specific pertussis 
morbidity data confirm that the Tdap mandates for middle school entry substantially reduced 
pertussis rates among 5-14 year olds (whose vaccination rates were directly affected) but also 
induced meaningful reductions in pertussis morbidity for infants and young adults.  Some of 
these effects may have occurred due to herd immunity (i.e., the reduced transmission attributable 
to directly targeted adolescents). 
We also find clear evidence of cross-vaccination spillovers: state requirements that 
middle school youths obtain the Tdap booster resulted in increases in MCV vaccination even in 
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 We also note that the fact we find any effect of state Tdap mandates on completion of the HPV vaccine 
series – which over our time period required three doses, each administered during separate visits to a 
healthcare provider over a minimum of 6 months – strongly suggests that patient behavior has to play an 
important role.  Notably, this finding contrasts with that in Lawler (2017) who finds in the context of a 
different vaccine (hepatitis A) that vaccination recommendations are effective at inducing initiation but 
not completion of a vaccine series in young children. 
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states that did not require MCV vaccination for middle school entry.  More striking, the Tdap 
mandates also significantly increased HPV vaccination rates.  We also find that these spillover 
effects are larger for females, nonwhites, and children of less educated mothers.  When we 
investigate mechanisms, we find some evidence that the mandates increased contact with 
healthcare providers.  There is stronger evidence that the laws increased Google search behavior 
for information on the Tdap booster, meningococcal disease, and HPV.  Taken together these 
patterns suggest that both parents and providers are responsible for the remarkable cross-vaccine 
spillovers attributable to state Tdap mandates. 
Our results suggest that the private and social returns to middle school vaccination 
requirements for the Tdap booster are extremely large.  Estimates from Table 2 indicate that, if 
implemented nationally, Tdap mandates would reduce pertussis incidence by 1,890 cases per 
year among 0-4 year olds (19.9 million 0-4 year olds in US * 9.49 cases/100,000 population) and 
3,700 cases per year among 5-14 year olds.  Additionally, using conservative estimates of the 
pertussis fatality rate, we find that these mandates potentially save the lives of 7-9 infants and 
children each year (CDC 2015a, Purdy et al. 2004).  For adults, reductions are smaller but still 
substantial; we estimate the mandates would reduce pertussis incidence nationally by 380 cases 
per year among 25-34 year olds.  
To estimate the value of this averted pertussis morbidity, we refer to Purdy et al. (2004), 
who provide age-group-specific cost estimates of pertussis morbidity.  Their cost estimates 
include both direct costs due to outpatient and inpatient health care, as well as indirect costs due 
to lost work productivity (due to own illness or to care for sick family members).  Based on their 
estimates, on average each averted infant case saves approximately $6,432, each averted child 
case saves approximately $3,757, and each averted adult case saves approximately $1,374.  In 
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total, this suggests that the reductions in pertussis morbidity resulting from national 
implementation of middle school Tdap mandates would generate approximately $24.3 million 
per year of social savings.  Reductions in pertussis mortality, valued using an estimate of the 
value of statistical life of $9.1 million, would result in an additional $65.8 million in social 
savings annually (Viscusi and Aldy 2003).  
For estimates of policy cost we separately consider the costs of the increased vaccination 
and of policy enforcement.  Our results in Table 1 suggest that national implementation of the 
Tdap mandates would increase the number of administered Tdap doses by approximately 
540,000 doses per year (4 million 11 year olds in the US * 0.135).  Using estimates from 
Whitney et al. (2014) and the CDC’s Vaccine Price List (2018), we estimate the cost of each 
additional Tdap vaccine administered to be approximately $112, for a total cost of approximately 
$60.7 million per year.  This estimate incorporates measures of the value of caregiver time and 
travel costs, vaccine administration costs, and the cost of the vaccine dose itself.
91
  We also allow 
for an overall rate of vaccine wastage of five percent. 
As an estimate of policy enforcement costs, we use personnel costs from a school-based 
health clinic vaccine administration study done by Kempe et al. (2012).  In this study, school-
based health clinic staff first checked student immunization records and then proceeded to meet 
with and administer vaccines to those with missing doses, for a per child average personnel cost 
of $2.21.  Scaling this estimate by the total number of 11 year olds in the United States suggests 
an upper bound on school-based enforcement costs of approximately $8.84 million dollars per 
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 We account for the substantial differences in the price of a vaccine dose and its administration across 
public and private providers by using a weighted average price that reflects the distribution of adolescents 
across providers and the relative estimated effect sizes for adolescents that see each provider type in our 
sample.  In our calculations we use an estimated price per dose of Tdap of $34.67, with an associated 
administrative cost of $16.57. 
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year.  
Overall, our estimates suggest that national implementation of middle school Tdap 
booster mandates would generate approximately $90.1 million in social savings per year (due to 
reductions in pertussis morbidity and mortality) while costing approximately $69.5 million 
annually.  These estimates imply a benefit-cost ratio of 1.30:1, or equivalently, that for each 
additional dollar spent, middle school Tdap mandates yield $1.30 in social benefits.  Notably, 
this analysis likely underestimates the social benefits of the Tdap mandates, as our spillover 
estimates further suggest potentially large returns due to increased HPV vaccination.  For 
example, our most conservative estimate suggests that HPV vaccine completion rates increased 
by 2.5 percentage points (column 5 of Table 3).  Given that there are 4 million 11 year olds in the 
United States, this translates to about 100,000 adolescents and young adults who received three 
doses of the HPV vaccine because their state required them to get a Tdap booster prior to middle 
school entry.  The American Cancer Society indicates that the lifetime risk of developing 
cervical cancer is about 0.6 percent; given that the HPV vaccine protects against the viruses that 
cause 70% of all cervical cancers, we estimate that Tdap mandates will prevent about 210 cases 
of cervical cancer (50,000 adolescent girls having completed the HPV vaccine due to Tdap 
mandates * 0.006 * .70).  Similar calculations suggest that the Tdap booster mandates will also 
prevent 659 cases of throat cancer, 160 cases of anal cancer, and 74 cases of cancer of the 
vulva.
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Future work could also examine other longer term consequences of the Tdap booster 
mandates for middle school entry.  For example, since the laws increased interactions with 
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 Information on lifetime risk of developing various cancers comes from the American Cancer Society 
(2017) and the National Cancer Institute (2017a, b).  Information on the proportion of cancers by type that 
are caused by HPV comes from the CDC (2016a). 
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healthcare providers, it is possible that other adolescent health outcomes and behaviors could 
have been affected.  And by identifying an exogenous increase in HPV vaccine uptake, our work 
offers a new setting for tests of the moral hazard concerns about increased risky sexual behaviors 
in the context of HPV vaccination.  One might also imagine that the policy changes had longer 
term effects on preventive cancer screenings for the youths whose HPV vaccine behavior was 
affected.  These and related effects on longer term outcomes are fruitful avenues for future work. 
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Figure 1: Trends in Adolescent Vaccination Rates for ACIP-Recommended Vaccines 
 
Notes: Data are from NIS-Teen. Vaccination status is measured directly prior to age 13, and assigned to the year in 
which the individual was age 12. 
 
 
Figure 2: Trends in Population-Wide Pertussis Incidence, 2000-2015 
 
Notes: Data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  
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Figure 3: Timing of Tdap Mandate Policy Adoption 
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Figure 4:  Event Study Estimates of the Direct Effects of Middle School Vaccination 
Requirements for the Tdap Booster 
  
Notes: Coefficients are relative to the excluded group of the year prior to policy implementation.  The coefficients 
presented for -6 periods and 5 periods relative to implementation should be interpreted as the coefficient on 6 or 
more years prior to implementation and 5 or more years since implementation, respectively.  
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Figure 5: Event Study Estimates of Effects of Middle School Vaccination Requirements for the 
Tdap Booster on Population Pertussis Morbidity 
 
Notes: Coefficients are relative to the excluded group of the year prior to policy implementation.  The coefficients 
presented for -6 periods and 5 periods relative to implementation should be interpreted as the coefficient on 6 or 
more years prior to implementation and 5 or more years since implementation, respectively.  
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Table 1: Middle School Tdap Vaccination Requirements Increased Tdap Vaccination Rates by 
age 13 and Reduced Population Pertussis Morbidity 
NIS-Teen (2008-2013) and CDC Data (2001-2015) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1 dose Tdap 
booster 
1 dose Tdap 
booster 
Pertussis 
morbidity 
Pertussis 
morbidity 
Sample mean 0.449 0.449 6.889 6.889 
Δ (final year - base year mean) 0.814 0.814 3.792 3.792 
     
Tdap Mandate for Middle School 
Entry 
0.135
***
 0.137
***
 -2.241
*
 -2.220 
(0.0140) (0.0164) (1.262) (1.543) 
     
R-squared 0.335 0.338 0.439 0.486 
N 116304 116304 763 763 
Individual characteristics? Y Y Y Y 
Other policy controls? Y Y Y Y 
Other state/time varying Xs? Y Y Y Y 
State and year fixed effects? Y Y Y Y 
Linear state trends? N Y N Y 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Results in columns 1 and 2 are from linear 
probability models and use NIS-Teen  sampling weights.  The outcome in columns 1 and 2 is an indicator for 
whether the individual received the Tdap booster by age 13.  Individuals are observed at ages 13-17 between 2008 
and 2013.  All models include controls for individual demographic characteristics (age at observation fixed effects, 
gender, race, number of children in the household, and mother's age, education level, and marital status); state, year 
of survey, and birth cohort fixed effects; state mandates for insurance coverage of well-child visits and vaccines; 
state college and high school immunization and education requirements for MCV; state HPV policies (see text for 
details); state immunization mandates for child care/kindergarten entry; lagged state pertussis and meningococcal 
disease incidence; state children’s Medicaid/CHIP income eligibility thresholds; state unemployment rates; and state 
demographic characteristics (fraction black, Hispanic, and other races, fraction of individuals with high school 
degree and with some college or more, and fraction below the federal poverty level).  Results in columns 3 and 4 are 
estimated using disease incidence data from the CDC and are weighted by state population.  The dependent variable 
in columns 3 and 4 is the number of reported cases of pertussis per 100,000 population.  These models include 
controls for state mandates for insurance coverage of well-child visits and vaccines; all child care/school vaccination 
mandates; state HPV and MCV policies; lagged pertussis incidence; state children’s Medicaid/CHIP income 
eligibility thresholds;  state unemployment rates; state demographic characteristics (fraction black, Hispanic, and 
other races, fraction of individuals with high school degree and with some college or more, and fraction below the 
federal poverty level); and state and year fixed effects.  Columns 2 and 4 also include linear state trends.  Standard 
errors are clustered at the state level.   
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Table 2:Middle School Tdap Vaccination Requirements Reduced Pertussis Morbidity, CDC Data 2001-2015 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pertussis incidence rate Pertussis incidence rate TB incidence rate TB incidence rate 
Direct effect:    
Age 5-14 -8.986 (4.318)
**
 -8.242 (5.479) -0.0950 (0.0716) -0.0309 (0.0775) 
     
Spillover effects:   
Age 0-4 -9.490 (4.709)
**
 -9.698 (5.650)
*
 0.0647 (0.190) 0.0208 (0.233) 
     
Age 15-24 -1.260 (1.324) -1.533 (1.503) 0.205 (0.132) 0.245 (0.130)
*
 
Age 25-34 -0.861 (0.481)
*
 -0.746 (0.525) 0.0335 (0.176) 0.153 (0.175) 
Age 35-44 -0.886 (0.561) -0.703 (0.630) -0.130 (0.156) -0.0754 (0.112) 
Age 45-54 -0.603 (0.470) -0.470 (0.489) -0.0630 (0.170) 0.0511 (0.158) 
Age 55-64 -0.516 (0.332) -0.539 (0.362) -0.129 (0.118) -0.0258 (0.123) 
Age 65+ -0.318 (0.239) -0.349 (0.295) 0.0606 (0.171) 0.0288 (0.178) 
Linear state trends? N Y N Y 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The dependent variable is the number of reported cases of each disease per 100,000 population, 
separately by age group (reported in each row).  Each entry is from a separate regression and represents the coefficient on the Tdap mandate.  All models include 
controls for state mandates for insurance coverage of well-child visits and vaccines; all child care/school vaccination mandates; state HPV and MCV policies; 
lagged pertussis incidence; state children’s Medicaid/CHIP income eligibility thresholds;  state unemployment rates; state demographic characteristics (fraction 
black, Hispanic, and other races, fraction of individuals with high school degree and with some college or more, and fraction below the federal poverty level); 
and state and year fixed effects.  Columns 2 and 4 also include linear state trends.  Regressions are weighted by age-specific state population.  Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level. 
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Table 3: Middle School Tdap Vaccination Requirements Had Cross-Vaccine Spillovers to Other ACIP-Recommended Vaccines for 
Adolescents, NIS-Teen 2008-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 1 dose 
MCV 
1 dose 
MCV 
Initiated 
HPV 
vaccine 
Initiated 
HPV 
vaccine 
Completed 
HPV 
vaccine 
Completed 
HPV 
vaccine 
Had 
influenza 
vaccine, age 
10-13 
Had 
influenza 
vaccine, age 
10-13 
Sample mean 0.357 0.357 0.236 0.236 0.0987 0.0987 0.122 0.122 
Δ (final year - base 
year mean) 
0.724 0.724 0.306 0.306 0.139 0.139 0.436 0.436 
         
Tdap Mandate for 
Middle School 
Entry 
0.0223 0.0290
*
 0.0490
***
 0.0416
***
 0.0247
***
 0.0331
***
 0.0123 0.00709 
(0.0159) (0.0148) (0.0151) (0.0152) (0.00863) (0.0107) (0.00815) (0.00657) 
         
R-squared 0.285 0.289 0.111 0.113 0.065 0.066 0.172 0.175 
N 116304 116304 57133 57133 57133 57133 116304 116304 
Linear state trends? N Y N Y N Y N Y 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  See notes to Table 1 for details on the specification and control variables.    Columns 3-6 are 
restricted to females who were age 13 between 2007-2013 and males who were age 13 between 2011-2013. 
 
  
 107 
Table 4: Heterogeneity in the Effects of Middle School Tdap Vaccination Requirements, NIS-Teen 2008-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1 dose Tdap 
(direct effect) 
1 dose MCV 
(spillover effect) 
Initiated HPV vaccine 
(spillover effect) 
Completed HPV vaccine 
(spillover effect) 
1. Full sample, mean 0.449 0.357 0.236 0.099 
Tdap mandate effect: 0.137
***
 0.0290
*
 0.0416
***
 0.0331
***
 
 
(0.0164) 
 
(0.0148) (0.0152) (0.0107) 
2. Girls, mean 0.448 0.355 0.265 0.117 
Tdap mandate effect: 0.152
***
 0.0392
*
 0.0349
**
 0.0361
**
 
 
(0.0170) 
 
(0.0196) (0.0147) (0.0136) 
3. Boys, mean 0.449 0.358 0.123 0.028 
Tdap mandate effect: 0.122
***
 0.0190 -0.0609 0.0301 
 
(0.0167) 
 
(0.0133) (0.0482) (0.0481) 
4. White, mean 0.453 0.343 0.205 0.095 
Tdap mandate effect: 0.150
***
 0.0378
**
 0.0438
**
 0.0332
***
 
 
(0.0192) 
 
(0.0182) (0.0174) (0.0111) 
5. Black, mean 0.412 0.347 0.238 0.078 
Tdap mandate effect: 0.150
***
 0.0757
***
 0.0454 0.0637
***
 
 
(0.0390) 
 
(0.0243) (0.0354) (0.0224) 
6. Hispanic, mean 0.456 0.389 0.303 0.118 
Tdap mandate effect: 0.128
***
 0.0305 0.0972
**
 0.0470
**
 
 
(0.0142) 
 
(0.0189) (0.0368) (0.0197) 
7. Mother has at least BA, mean 0.509 0.403 0.206 0.094 
Tdap mandate effect: 0.111
***
 0.00570 0.0290 0.0314
***
 
 
(0.0207) 
 
(0.0202) (0.0185) (0.0108) 
8. Mother has less than BA, mean 0.418 0.333 0.252 0.101 
Tdap mandate effect: 0.149
***
 0.0397
***
 0.0474
***
 0.0349
**
 
 (0.0180) (0.0145) (0.0173) (0.0140) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Columns 3 and 4 are restricted to females aged 13 between 2007-2013, and males aged 13 
between 2011-2013.  See notes to Table 1 for details on the specification and control variables.  All models include state trends. 
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Table 5: Evidence on Mechanisms, NIS-Teen 2008-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Ever heard 
of HPV  
Ever heard 
of HPV 
Ever heard 
of HPV shot 
Ever heard 
of HPV shot 
Doctor 
recom-
mended 
HPV 
vaccine 
Doctor 
recom-
mended 
HPV 
vaccine 
Had an 11-
12yo well 
child visit 
Had an 11-
12yo well 
child visit 
Sample mean: 0.947 0.947 0.922 0.922 0.480 0.480 0.915 0.915 
Δ (final year - base 
year mean) 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.009 -0.009 0.056 0.056 0.041 0.041 
         
Tdap Mandate for 
Middle School Entry 
-0.00171 0.0368 0.0236 0.0443
*
 0.0312 0.0348 0.0331
***
 0.0382
**
 
(0.0178) (0.0249) (0.0175) (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0433) (0.00973) (0.0166) 
         
R-squared 0.0810 0.101 0.0879 0.0994 0.105 0.109 0.0349 0.0385 
N 7757 7757 7764 7764 17399 17399 24144 24144 
Linear state trends? N Y N Y N Y N Y 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  See notes to Table 1 for details on the specification and control variables.  All samples are 
restricted to individuals who have adequate provider vaccination data and are age 13 at time of survey, as the outcomes in columns 1-6 are measured at time of 
interview; they are not able to be retrospectively measured at age 13.  The outcomes in columns 1-4 are only reported for 2008-2011, and so the estimation 
sample for these outcomes is females who are age 13 at the time of survey, 2008-2011.  The actual question for the outcome in Columns 3 and 4 asks about the 
cervical cancer vaccine, genital warts vaccine, HPV shot, Gardasil, or Cervarix.  The estimation sample for columns 5 and 6 consists of the set of females aged 
13 at time of survey, for the 2008-2013 survey waves and males aged 13 at time of survey for the 2011-2013 survey waves.  
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Table 6: Further Evidence on Mechanisms, Google Trends 2005-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Relative Google 
search 
popularity for 
‘Tdap’ 
Relative Google 
search 
popularity for 
‘Tdap’ 
Relative Google 
search 
popularity of the 
‘Meningococcal 
vaccine’ topic 
Relative Google 
search 
popularity of the 
‘Meningococcal 
vaccine’ topic 
Relative Google 
search 
popularity for 
‘hpv’ 
Relative Google 
search 
popularity for 
‘hpv’ 
Sample mean 30.82 30.82 56.63 56.63 43.83 43.83 
Δ (2013 mean - 2005 
mean) 
25.54 25.54 -30.98 -30.98 1.18 1.18 
       
Tdap Mandate for Middle 4.230
** 
7.248
***
 2.236 3.622
**
 2.019
**
 1.450
**
 
School Entry (1.763) (1.613) (1.875) (1.575) (0.875) (0.665) 
       
Pertussis rate in the state 0.125
*
 0.202
**
 0.00178 0.00801 -0.0321 -0.0310 
 (0.0647) (0.0755) (0.0245) (0.0210) (0.0245) (0.0273) 
       
R-squared 0.666 0.733 0.614 0.657 0.793 0.803 
N 4845 4845 4825 4825 5508 5508 
Linear state trends? N Y N Y N Y 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The outcome variable is a measure of the popularity of a given search term or topic, in which, 
for each state, the month of peak search volume is normalized to 100.  All models include the state policy controls and state demographics as described in the 
notes to Table 1 as well as fixed effects for each state and for each month-year.  Columns 2, 4, and 6 also include linear state trends.  
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2.8. Appendix 
 This Appendix describes in greater detail the diseases under study. 
2.8.1 Tetanus, Diphtheria, and Pertussis 
Tetanus, diphtheria, and pertussis are all diseases caused by bacteria, and vaccination against 
them with a combination vaccine series (DTP or DTaP) has been routinely recommended for young 
children since the 1940s and 1950s.  In early 2005 a new vaccine, Tdap (tetanus, diphtheria toxoid and 
acellular pertussis), was approved for use in adolescents and was recommended for preteens aged 11 or 
12 as a booster for their DTP/DTaP series.
93
 
Over the past 50 years there have been consistently high immunization rates for DTP/DTaP and, 
likely as a result, tetanus and diphtheria have become extremely rare in the United States.
94
  That vaccine 
series has proven less effective against pertussis in the long-run, however, and so pertussis (or ‘whooping 
cough’) remains endemic in the United States. 
Pertussis is a highly contagious respiratory disease,
95
 and its symptoms include nose and throat 
inflammation and a violent cough.  It is transmitted from person-to-person through respiratory secretions 
expelled while coughing or sneezing.  The morbidity consequences of pertussis are most severe for 
infants under 12 months of age – they are hospitalized in 63 percent of cases (compared to 2 percent of 
infected adolescents) and account for 90 percent of the pertussis-related mortality. 
 
                                                   
93
 Prior to the development of the Tdap vaccine, it had been recommended that adolescents receive a dose 
of the tetanus and diphtheria toxoids vaccine (Td) at age 11 or 12.  This vaccine did not provide 
protection against pertussis, however.  Protection under the acellular pertussis vaccines (DTaP and Tdap) 
wanes between 5-10 years after vaccination. 
94
 Specifically, for the duration of our study  period there have been 41 or fewer cases of tetanus (an 
infection that attacks the nervous system and causes muscle spasms) per year in the United States 
(approximately 0.01 cases per 100,000 population). Over that same time period that have been 2 or fewer 
cases of diphtheria (an infection that causes a thick covering in the back of the throat) per year.  Due to 
the extremely low incidence of these diseases we are unable to credibly examine the effect of middle 
school vaccination mandates on the prevalence of diphtheria and tetanus.  
95
 Secondary cases are estimated to occur at a rate of 80 percent among susceptible contacts in a 
household in which there has been a case of pertussis (CDC 2015a).  
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2.8.2 Meningococcal Disease 
Meningococcal disease encapsulates the set of infections caused by the bacteria Neisseria meningitidis 
and includes infections of the lining of the brain and spinal cord (meningitis) and of the bloodstream 
(septicemia and bacteremia). There are numerous different serogroups (variations) of the bacteria; 
serogroups A, B, C, Y, and W are the most significant sources of meningococcal disease in the United 
States.
96
 In our analysis we focus on the quadrivalent meningococcal conjugate vaccine (MCV4), which 
provides protection against serogroups A, C, Y, and W and has been routinely recommended for children 
age 11 or 12 since 2005.
97
  Older teens are recommended to receive a second booster shot of MCV4 when 
they are 16 years old.   
2.8.3 Human Papillomavirus (HPV) 
HPV is the most common sexually transmitted infection in the United States: the CDC estimates 
that nearly all sexually active men and women will get HPV at some point in their lives.  An estimated 79 
million Americans are currently infected with HPV, with about 14 million people becoming newly 
infected each year.   Most HPV infections are asymptomatic and typically resolve on their own.  In some 
cases, however, infections persist and cause symptoms which can take years to develop.  There are 
numerous types of HPV: low-risk types which can cause skin warts, and high risk types which cause the 
majority of the cancers of the cervix, vagina, penis, anus, mouth, and throat.
98
  In the United States, rates 
of cervical cancer incidence and mortality are substantially higher among blacks and Hispanics 
                                                   
96
 The relative importance of each serogroup varies by age group: among children under the age of 5, 
serogroup B accounts for 60 percent of the cases of meningococcal disease, while for individuals over the 
age of 10, serogroups C, Y, and W cause 73 percent of the cases.  
97
 The first vaccine providing protection against serogroup B was not approved in the United States until 
late 2014. 
98
 Nearly all cervical cancer (11,000 cases per year in the United States) is due to HPV, with two specific 
types (HPV16 and HPV18) accounting for over 65% of all cervical cancers, 55% of all cancers of the 
vagina, 49% of all cancers of the vulva, 48% of all cancers of the penis, 79% of all cancers of the anus, 
79% of all cancers of the rectum, and 60% of all cancers of the throat (CDC 2016a).   
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(American Cancer Society 2015).
99
 
The first HPV vaccine was licensed for use in females in the United States in June 2006, and it 
was further approved for males in October 2009.  This vaccine is a 3-dose series and provides protection 
against HPV types 6, 11, 16, and 18.  The vaccine is only effective if it is given before an infection 
occurs, and so should be given prior to an individual’s sexual debut.  The ACIP currently recommends 
that all boys and girls initiate the HPV vaccine series between ages 11 and 12.  Individuals who are not 
vaccinated by age 13 are recommended to receive catch-up vaccinations through age 21 (26) for men 
(women). 
2.8.4 Seasonal influenza 
Seasonal flu (common in fall and winter months) is an acute viral infection that can cause mild to 
severe illness with fever, cough, sore throat, runny nose, muscle aches, fatigue, vomiting, and/or diarrhea.  
It is highly contagious; individuals can infect other people up to an entire day before and up to a week 
after symptoms develop.  Young children, the elderly, and people with compromised immune systems are 
at particularly high risk for seasonal flu complications.  The flu vaccine varies from season to season with 
respect to the particular strains of the influenza virus that it protects against.  The annual influenza 
vaccine was routinely recommended for children over the age of 6 months for the first time in 2010; in 
the subsequent flu season less than half of youths between 6 months and 17 years of age received the 
influenza vaccine.  Each year millions of people in the United States become ill from the seasonal flu, 
hundreds of thousands are hospitalized, and tens of thousands die. 
                                                   
99
 In the United States over the period 2008-2012, cervical cancer incidence rates were 44 percent higher 
for Hispanics and 41 percent higher for blacks, relative to whites.  Over that same time period, mortality 
rates for Hispanics were 35 percent higher and 105 percent higher for blacks, relative to whites. 
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Appendix Figure 1:  Example of State Department of Health Flyer for Middle School 
Vaccination Requirement, Wisconsin 
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Appendix Figure 1, continued: 
Example of State Department of Health Flyer for Middle School Vaccination Requirement, 
Wisconsin 
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Appendix Figure 2: Age Profile of Pertussis Incidence, 2004 and 2015 
 
Notes: Each point represents the age-group specific pertussis rate per 100,000 population, calculated at the national 
level using CDC data. 
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Appendix Figure 3: Estimated Effect Sizes of Direct and Spillover Effects of Tdap Mandates on 
Pertussis Incidence Across the Life Course (relative to 2004) 
 
 
 
Notes: Each point is equal to the coefficient on the Tdap mandate indicator variable from a regression in which the 
outcome variable is the rate of disease incidence for the given age group, divided by the age-group specific disease 
incidence rate in the base year of 2004. These values are then multiplied by negative one, in order to obtain the 
estimated percent reduction in disease incidence.  All coefficients are from specifications that include the full set of 
state policy controls as described in the notes to Table 1and state-specific linear time trends.    
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Appendix Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics, NIS-Teen 2008-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full sample Individuals in 
states that had a 
Tdap mandate by 
2013 
Individuals in 
states that did not 
have a Tdap 
mandate by 2013 
Child’s vaccination rates, by age 13    
Tdap Booster 0.449 0.454 0.379 
Meningococcal Vaccine 0.357 0.360 0.312 
Initiation of HPV series 0.236 0.238 0.204 
Completion of HPV series 0.099 0.100 0.079 
Influenza vaccine (past 3 years) 0.122 0.121 0.137 
    
Child’s characteristics    
Female  0.488 0.488 0.490 
Hispanic 0.203 0.212 0.079 
White 0.576 0.577 0.554 
Black 0.142 0.134 0.251 
Other ethnicity 0.079 0.076 0.116 
11-12 year old check-up 0.897 0.898 0.888 
    
Mother’s characteristics    
Less than high school 0.140 0.143 0.099 
High school 0.261 0.260 0.272 
Some college 0.259 0.259 0.256 
College degree or above 0.340 0.338 0.372 
Married 0.696 0.697 0.684 
Age: <35 yrs 0.094 0.093 0.102 
Age: 35-44 yrs 0.455 0.455 0.451 
Age: 45+ yrs 0.451 0.452 0.447 
    
Morbidity Rates per 100,000 pop.    
Pertussis, population rate 6.96 6.92 8.88 
Pertussis, 10-14 year old rate 21.7 21.6 27.7 
    
Observations 116304  100899 15405 
Notes: All values are weighted means calculated by the authors from NIS-Teen 2008-2013 data, using provided 
sample weights. The mean rates of HPV vaccine series initiation and completion are calculated using the sample of 
females who were aged 13 between 2007-2013 and males who were aged 13 between 2010-2013. 
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Appendix Table 2:  Event Study Estimates of the Direct Effect of Middle School Vaccination 
Requirements, NIS-Teen 2008-2013 
 (1) (2) 
 1 dose Tdap booster 1 dose Tdap booster 
Sample mean 0.449 0.449 
Δ (final year - base year mean) 0.814 0.814 
   
6+ years before Tdap mandate 0.00831 (0.0375) -0.122 (0.0755) 
5 years before Tdap mandate -0.0163 (0.0289) -0.137 (0.0614)
**
 
4 years before Tdap mandate -0.0111 (0.0228) -0.0975 (0.0427)
**
 
3 years before Tdap mandate 0.00591 (0.0145) -0.0613 (0.0298)
**
 
2 years before Tdap mandate 0.0104 (0.0120) -0.0280 (0.0176) 
   
Year of Tdap mandate 0.0508 (0.0118)
***
 0.0799 (0.0156)
***
 
1 year after Tdap mandate 0.151 (0.0197)
***
 0.204 (0.0342)
***
 
2 years after Tdap mandate 0.212 (0.0186)
***
 0.290 (0.0422)
***
 
3 years after Tdap mandate 0.238 (0.0265)
***
 0.351 (0.0512)
***
 
4 years after Tdap mandate 0.211 (0.0336)
***
 0.351 (0.0732)
***
 
5+ years after Tdap mandate 0.249 (0.0285)
***
 0.399 (0.0755)
***
 
   
N 116304 116304 
R-Squared 0.337 0.339 
Other policy controls? Y Y 
Other state/time varying Xs? Y Y 
State and year fixed effects? Y Y 
Linear state trends? N Y 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  See notes to Table 1 for details on the 
specification and control variables.   
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Appendix Table 3: Estimates of Non-linear Effects of Mandates Based on Prior Disease 
Incidence, CDC Data 2001-2015 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pertussis 
rate 
Pertussis rate Pertussis rate Pertussis rate 
Sample mean 6.889 6.889 6.889 6.889 
Δ (2015 mean - 2001 
mean) 
3.792 3.792 3.792 3.792 
Lagged pertussis rate 0.0719 -0.00980 0.0718
*
 -0.0206 
 (0.0439) (0.0344) (0.0419) (0.0350) 
     
Tdap mandate -2.608
*
 -2.347 -1.000 0.378 
 (1.376) (1.632) (1.362) (1.177) 
     
Tdap mandate *  0.0479 0.0162 --- --- 
2004 pertussis rate (0.0470) (0.0592)   
     
Tdap mandate * --- --- -0.137
**
 -0.299
**
 
Lagged pertussis rate   (0.0570) (0.122) 
     
N 763 763 763 763 
R-Squared 0.440 0.486 0.440 0.490 
Linear state trends? N Y N Y 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  See notes to Table 1 for details on the 
specification and control variables. 
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Appendix Table 4: Event Study Estimates of the Direct Effect of Middle School Vaccination 
Requirements, CDC Data 2001-2015 
 (1) (2) 
 Pertussis Morbidity Pertussis Morbidity  
Sample mean 6.889 6.889 
Δ (2015 mean - 2001 mean) 3.792 3.792 
   
6+ years before Tdap mandate -2.404 (2.489) -5.304 (2.715)
*
 
5 years before Tdap mandate -2.825 (2.016) -4.181 (2.043)
**
 
4 years before Tdap mandate -0.776 (3.159) -1.769 (2.860) 
3 years before Tdap mandate -3.039 (2.194) -3.371 (1.973)
*
 
2 years before Tdap mandate -3.976 (2.386) -3.846 (2.288)
*
 
   
Year of Tdap mandate -3.656 (1.677)
**
 -2.203 (1.384) 
1 year after Tdap mandate -6.701 (3.784)
*
 -5.146 (3.361) 
2 years after Tdap mandate -5.158 (2.341)
**
 -2.545 (2.190) 
3 years after Tdap mandate -1.382 (1.925) 1.767 (2.501) 
4 years after Tdap mandate -0.190 (4.125) 4.247 (4.320) 
5+ years after Tdap mandate -2.761 (3.640) 3.525 (4.643) 
   
N 763 763 
R-Squared 0.468 0.518 
Other policy controls? Y Y 
Other state/time varying Xs? Y Y 
State and year fixed effects? Y Y 
Linear state trends? N Y 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  See notes to Table 1 for details on the 
specification and control variables. 
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Appendix Table 5: Tdap Mandates Had No Effects on Diseases Other than Pertussis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Pertussis Hepatitis A Hepatitis B Mening-
ococcal 
Disease 
Tuberculosis Measles Lyme Disease Salmon-ellosis 
Sample mean 6.889 1.261 2.130 0.361 4.083 0.0441 9.443 12.25 
         
Tdap mandate -2.241
*
 0.0489 0.278 -0.0259 0.000313 0.111 -0.617 -0.563 
 (1.262) (0.105) (0.553) (0.0211) (0.0773) (0.0698) (1.530) (1.221) 
         
Sample years: 2001-2015 2001-2015 2001-2015 2001-2015 2001-2015 2001-2015 2001-2015 2001-2015 
Observations 763 760 748 764 764 763 749 745 
R-Squared 0.439 0.751 0.601 0.834 0.969 0.211 0.862 0.710 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Sample means are calculated over the full period.  Results are estimated using disease incidence 
data from the CDC and are weighted by state population.  The dependent variable is the number of reported cases of the disease per 100,000 population.  These 
models include controls for state mandates for insurance coverage of well-child visits and vaccines; all child care/school vaccination mandates; state HPV and 
MCV policies; lagged pertussis incidence; state children’s Medicaid/CHIP income eligibility thresholds;  state unemployment rates; state demographic 
characteristics (fraction black, Hispanic, and other races, fraction of individuals with high school degree and with some college or more, and fraction below the 
federal poverty level); and state and year fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the state level.   
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Appendix Table 6: Effects of mandates on Tdap vaccination of 7-9 and 14-17 year olds in NIS-Teen 
NIS-Teen 2008-2013 
 All states  Only states that did not mandate receipt for >13 year olds 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 1 dose Td-
containing 
vaccine, 7-9 
year olds 
1 dose Td-
containing 
vaccine, 7-9 year 
olds 
 1 dose Td-
containing 
vaccine, 14-15 
year olds  
1 dose Td-
containing 
vaccine, 14-15 
year olds  
1 dose Td-
containing 
vaccine, 16-17 
year olds  
1 dose Td-
containing 
vaccine, 16-17 
year olds  
Sample mean 0.0232 0.0232  0.141 0.141 0.0419 0.0419 
Δ(final-base year mean) 0.005 0.005  -0.255 -0.255 -0.183 -0.183 
Tdap mandate 0.00436 0.000424  -0.0158 0.00114 0.0134
**
 0.0233
***
 
 (0.00399) (0.00492)  (0.0147) (0.0172) (0.00626) (0.00801) 
        
R-Squared .0232 .0232  0.123 0.131 0.0906 0.0952 
N 59981 59981  91041 91041 82060 82060 
Individual characteristics? Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Other policy controls? Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Other state/time varying Xs? Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
State and year fixed effects? Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Linear state trends N Y  N Y N Y 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Sample means are calculated over the full period.  Results are from linear probability models 
and use NIS-Teen sampling weights.  All models include controls for individual demographic characteristics (age at observation fixed effects, gender, race, 
number of children in the household, and mother's age, education level, and marital status); state,  and birth cohort fixed effects; state mandates for insurance 
coverage of well-child visits and vaccines; state college and high school immunization and education requirements for MCV; state HPV policies (see text for 
details); state immunization mandates for child care/kindergarten entry; lagged state pertussis and meningococcal disease incidence; state children’s 
Medicaid/CHIP income eligibility thresholds; state unemployment rates; and state demographic characteristics (fraction black, Hispanic, and other races, fraction 
of individuals with high school degree and with some college or more, and fraction below the federal poverty level).  Even numbered columns also include linear 
state trends.  Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
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Appendix Table 7: Cross-Age Morbidity Effects Among Infants Were Disease-Related, Not 
Vaccination-Related (i.e., Consistent with Herd Immunity Effects, not Behavioral Spillover 
Effects) 
NIS 2003-2015, 19-35 month olds 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Up-to-date, 4 doses of 
DTaP 
Up-to-date, 4 doses of 
DTaP other children in 
HH 
Up-to-date, 4 doses of 
DTaP, no other 
children in HH 
Sample mean 0.846  0.834 0.882 
Δ (2015 mean - 2003 mean) 0.001 0.000 -0.003 
    
Tdap Mandate for Middle School 
Entry 
-0.00706 -0.00487 -0.0124 
(0.00479) (0.00637) (0.00793) 
    
R-squared 0.0420 0.0445 0.0289 
N 212202 159157 53045 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Results are from linear probability models and use 
NIS  sampling weights.  All models include controls for individual demographic characteristics (age at observation 
fixed effects, gender, race, number of children in the household, and mother's age, education level, and marital 
status); state and year fixed effects;  state mandates for insurance coverage of well-child visits and vaccines; child 
care and school vaccination mandates; state HPV policies; lagged state pertussis and meningococcal disease 
incidence; state children’s Medicaid/CHIP income eligibility thresholds; state unemployment rates; and state 
demographic characteristics (fraction black, Hispanic, and other races, fraction of individuals with high school 
degree and with some college or more, and fraction below the federal poverty level).  All models also include linear 
state trends.  Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  
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Appendix Table 8: Event Study Estimates of the Spillover Effects of Middle School Vaccination Requirements for Tdap,  
NIS-Teen 2008-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 1 dose MCV 
vaccination 
1 dose MCV 
vaccination  
1 dose HPV Vaccine  1 dose HPV 
Vaccine 
Completed HPV 
Vaccine 
Completed HPV 
Vaccine 
Sample mean 0.357 0.357 0.236 0.236 0.0987 0.0987 
Δ (final year 
mean - base 
year mean) 
 
0.724 
 
0.724 
 
0.306 
 
0.306 
 
0.139 
 
0.139 
Years relative to 
Tdap mandate: 
      
6+ years before -0.0725 (0.0292)
**
 -0.0881 (0.0412)
**
 -0.117 (0.0460)
**
 -0.112 (0.146) -0.00172 (0.0262) 0.0442 (0.0939) 
5 years before -0.0792 (0.024)
***
 -0.109 (0.0345)
***
 -0.102 (0.0359)
***
 -0.110 (0.112) -0.0214 (0.0194) 0.00906 (0.0729) 
4 years before -0.0396 (0.0204)
*
 -0.0600 (0.0259)
**
 -0.0921 (0.0228)
***
 -0.0744 (0.0786) -0.0282 (0.0142)
*
 0.00822 (0.0539) 
3 years before -0.0511 (0.018)
***
 -0.0744 (0.021)
***
 -0.0682 (0.0177)
***
 -0.0655 (0.0506) -0.0170 (0.0144) 0.00168 (0.0382) 
2 years before -0.0079 (0.0126) -0.0249 (0.0128)
*
 -0.0335 (0.0136)
**
 -0.0446 (0.0256)
*
 -0.0161 (0.00880)
*
 -0.0160 (0.0190) 
       
Year of  0.0282 (0.0104)
***
 0.0419 (0.0142)
***
 0.0573 (0.0129)
***
 0.0686 (0.0229)
***
 0.0260 (0.0126)
**
 0.0288 (0.0182) 
1 year after 0.0482 (0.0183)
**
 0.0752 (0.0227)
***
 0.108 (0.0186)
***
 0.142 (0.0364)
***
 0.0507 (0.0140)
***
 0.0624 (0.0284)
**
 
2 years after 0.0972 (0.0176)
***
 0.140 (0.0262)
***
 0.142 (0.0319)
***
 0.198 (0.0531)
***
 0.0492 (0.0198)
**
 0.0623 (0.0392) 
3 years after 0.109 (0.0224)
***
 0.176 (0.0347)
***
 0.152 (0.0330)
***
 0.244 (0.0652)
***
 0.0615 (0.0223)
***
 0.0885 (0.0541) 
4 years after 0.0949 (0.0306)
***
 0.191 (0.0450)
***
 0.171 (0.0449)
***
 0.284 (0.0747)
***
 0.0634 (0.0257)
**
 0.0888 (0.0617) 
5+ years after 0.143 (0.0327)
***
 0.250 (0.0530)
***
 0.187 (0.0489)
***
 0.348 (0.0845)
***
 0.0649 (0.0306)
**
 0.104 (0.0718) 
       
N 116304 116304 57133 57133 57133 57133 
R-Squared 0.287 0.290 0.112 0.114 0.066 0.067 
Linear trends? N Y N Y N Y 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  See notes to Table 1 for details on the specification and control variables.  Columns 3-6 
are restricted to females who were aged 13 between 2007-2013 and males who were aged 13 between 2010-2013. All models include the full set of 
controls, columns 2, 4, and 6 additionally include state linear trends.  Sample means are calculated using the base year of data. 
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Appendix Table 9:  Other Ways to Measure Cross-Vaccine Spillover Effects of Tdap Mandates: Combinations of Outcomes,  
NIS-Teen 2008-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Had 1 dose Tdap 
AND 1 dose MCV 
Had 1 dose Tdap 
AND Initiated HPV 
vaccine 
Had 1 dose Tdap 
AND Completed 
HPV vaccine 
Had 1 dose Tdap 
AND 1 dose MCV 
AND Initiated HPV 
vaccine 
Had 1 dose Tdap 
AND 1 dose MCV 
AND Completed 
HPV vaccine 
Sample mean 0.303  0.170 0.076 0.150 0.068 
Δ (final year mean - base 
year mean) 
0.693 0.203 0.074 0.212 0.082 
      
Tdap Mandate for Middle 
School Entry 
0.0458
***
 0.0445
**
 0.0505
***
 0.0479
***
 0.0461
***
 
(0.0123) (0.0171) (0.0163) (0.0153) (0.0136) 
      
R-squared 0.297 0.161 0.082 0.145 0.073 
N 116304 58474 58474 58474 58474 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  See notes to Table 1 for details on the specification and control variables.  Columns 2-5 are 
restricted to females who were aged 13 between 2007-2013 and males who were aged 13 between 2011-2013.  All models include the full set of controls, 
including linear state trends.  
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Appendix Table 10: Main Vaccination Results Are Robust to Including NIS-Teen 2014 and 2015 Sample Waves,  
NIS-Teen 2008-2015 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 1 dose Tdap 
booster 
1 dose Tdap 
booster 
1 dose MCV 1 dose MCV Initiated HPV 
vaccine 
Initiated HPV 
vaccine 
Completed 
HPV vaccine 
Completed 
HPV vaccine 
Sample mean 0.530 0.530 0.438 0.438 0.265 0.265 0.111 0.111 
Δ (final year mean - 
base year mean) 
0.824 0.824 0.773 0.773 0.431 0.431 0.203 0.203 
         
Tdap Mandate for 
Middle School Entry 
0.137
***
 0.154
***
 0.0330
**
 0.0366
**
 0.0331
***
 0.0165 0.0180
***
 0.0156
**
 
(0.0138) (0.0154) (0.0137) (0.0147) (0.0119) (0.0130) (0.00520) (0.00716) 
         
R-squared 0.339 0.341 0.299 0.301 0.117 0.118 0.0601 0.0612 
N 158268 158268 158268 158268 97233 97233 97233 97233 
Linear state trends? N Y N Y N Y N Y 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  See notes to Table 1 for details on the specification and control variables.  Columns 5-8 are 
restricted to females who were age 13 between 2007-2015 and males who were age 13 between 2011-2015.   
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Appendix Table 11: Other Ways to Measure Cross-Vaccine Spillover Effects of Tdap Mandates: the Role of ACIP Recommendations, 
NIS-Teen 2008-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1 dose MCV  Initiated HPV vaccine  Completed HPV vaccine  Had seasonal influenza 
vaccine, age 10-13  
Sample mean 0.357  0.236 0.099 0.122 
Δ (final year mean - base year mean) 0.724 0.306 0.139 0.436 
     
Tdap Mandate for Middle School Entry 
-0.0482 0.00147 0.0199 0.00494 
(0.0317) (0.0263) (0.0142) (0.00670) 
     
Tdap Mandate × ACIP recommendation 
for MCV 
0.0769
***
    
(0.0246)    
     
Tdap Mandate × ACIP recommendation 
for HPV 
 0.0475
**
 0.0157  
 (0.0197) (0.0117)  
     
Tdap Mandate × ACIP recommendation 
for Flu 
   0.0247
*
 
   (0.0139) 
     
R-squared 0.289 0.114 0.067 0.175 
N 116304 57133 57133 116304 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  See notes to Table 1 for details on the specification and control variables.  Columns 2-3 are 
restricted to females who were aged 13 between 2007-2013 and males who were aged 13 between 2011-2013.  All models include the full set of controls, 
including linear state trends.   
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Appendix Table 12: Effects of Middle School Tdap Vaccination Requirements for Table 5 Samples, NIS-Teen 2008-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 1 dose Tdap 
 
1 dose Tdap 
 
1 dose MCV 
 
1 dose MCV Initiated HPV 
vaccine 
 
Initiated HPV 
vaccine 
 
Completed 
HPV vaccine 
 
Completed HPV 
vaccine 
 
1. ‘Ever heard of 
HPV’ sample 
 
0.0811
**
 0.0720
*
 0.0767
**
 0.0145 0.0574 -0.0165 0.0733
***
 0.0346 
(0.0356) (0.0381) (0.0344) (0.0729) (0.0486) (0.0504) (0.0196) (0.0275) 
         
2. ‘Ever heard of 
HPV shot’ 
sample 
0.0816
**
 0.0713
*
 0.0803
**
 0.0170 0.0564 -0.0235 0.0754
***
 0.0347 
(0.0355) (0.0369) (0.0337) (0.0720) (0.0481) (0.0502) (0.0194) (0.0271) 
         
3. ‘Doctor 
recommended 
HPV vaccine’ 
sample 
0.135
***
 0.120
***
 0.0176 0.00520 0.0654
***
 0.0122 0.0430
***
 0.0450
**
 
(0.0221) (0.0356) (0.0182) (0.0314) (0.0233) (0.0369) (0.0119) (0.0197) 
         
4. ‘Had an 11-12 
yo well child 
visit’ sample 
0.129
***
 0.130
***
 0.0232 -0.0136 0.0528
***
 0.0117 0.0354
***
 0.0404
***
 
(0.0228) (0.0304) (0.0207) (0.0266) (0.0187) (0.0223) (0.00904) (0.0131) 
Linear state 
trends? 
N Y N Y N Y N Y 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The sample in row 1 corresponds to the sample in columns (1) and (2) of table 5; the sample in 
row 2 corresponds to the sample in columns (3) and (4) in table 5; the sample in row 3 corresponds to the sample in columns (5) and (6) of table 5; the sample in 
row 4 corresponds to the sample in columns (7) and (8) in table 5.   See notes to Table 1 for details on the specification and control variables.  Each entry is the 
coefficient on the Tdap mandate. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
GIVING TEENS A BOOST? EFFECTS OF MENINGOCOCCAL DISEASE VACCINATION 
POLICIES 
3.1. Introduction 
Increased availability and utilization of vaccines is often considered to be one of the key 
reasons why the United States has experienced dramatic reductions in disease incidence in the 
past century (CDC 1999).  Historically, immunization programs have been primarily targeted 
towards young children, as they are a particularly vulnerable population and typically have faced 
the highest burdens of morbidity and mortality from vaccine-preventable diseases. Within the 
past several decades, however, new data and innovations have substantially increased the number 
of vaccines recommended for receipt during adolescence.100  Accompanying these scientific 
innovations has been the implementation of a broad set of national and state policies aimed at 
increasing uptake of these adolescent vaccines; presently nearly all states have an adolescent 
immunization policy of some form in effect.  
In this paper I provide the first evidence on the effectiveness of two vaccination policies 
targeted at high-school aged adolescents:  national recommendations issued by the Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) in 2011 for 16 year olds to receive a booster dose 
of the quadrivalent meningococcal conjugate vaccine (referred to as MenACWY or MCV4), and 
state laws that require individuals to receive a dose prior to entry into either 11
th
 or 12
th
 grade. As 
of January 2017, eight states had implemented 11
th
 or 12
th
 grade mandates; six more states have 
already passed mandates that will go into effect over the next couple of years.  Meningococcal 
                                                   
100
 For example, in 1989 only one vaccine, the tetanus and diphtheria (Td) vaccine, was recommended by 
the CDC for children over the age of 6. As of this writing, there are 5 separate vaccines recommended for 
receipt between the ages of 11 and 18.  
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disease is a severe and deadly disease, and vaccination is targeted at this age group due to 
increased incidence among 16 to 21 year olds.  Notably, over the past two decades there have 
been substantial reductions in the incidence of meningococcal disease in the United States. 
Between 2000 and 2016 the population rate decreased from 0.80 meningococcal cases per 
100,000 population to the historic low of 0.12 cases per 100,000 population. For 15-24 year olds 
the reductions were even larger, dropping from a rate of 1.22 cases per 100,000 population in 
2000 to 0.18 cases per 100,000 population in 2016.  I present these trends in Figure 1.  
In my analyses I first estimate the effects of the ACIP recommendations and high school 
vaccine mandates on the probability that an individual receives a dose of the meningococcal 
vaccine at ages 16 or 17, using provider-reported immunization data from the National 
Immunization Survey-Teen (NIS-Teen).  I focus on vaccine doses received at these ages because 
they are most directly affected by the policies, and notably, an age 16 booster dose is 
recommended even if an individual received their primary dose as recently as age 15. I then 
consider effects on morbidity, using data on meningococcal disease incidence at the state-year- 
age group level, which I obtained directly from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC). These data were provided separately for 0-4 year olds, 5-14 year olds, 15-24 year olds, 
25-64 year olds, and 65 years and older, which allows me to focus my analyses on incidence 
among the most directly targeted group, 15-24 year olds. The final set of analyses I do focuses 
on potential spillovers of the high school vaccine mandates to receipt of other forms of 
preventive care, as measured in the NIS-Teen dataset. Specifically, I consider potential spillovers 
to the probability of having a preventive care visit, receiving a dose of a non-mandated vaccine, 
or being diagnosed with any of a range of health conditions.  
I use a difference-in-differences framework to identify the causal effects of the ACIP 
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recommendation and high school vaccine mandates on vaccination rates and disease incidence. 
However, because the ACIP recommendation was implemented at the national level, and school 
vaccination mandates were implemented at the state-level, my specific estimation strategy differs 
across the two policies. Broadly, my strategy for estimating the effects of the ACIP 
recommendation relies on the fact that the policy applied only to the meningococcal vaccine, and 
that it was specific to 16-18 year olds. To identify vaccination effects of the recommendation, I 
compare meningococcal vaccination rates over time to the vaccination rates of another vaccine 
that is approved for use but not routinely recommended for 16 and 17 year olds: the tetanus, 
diphtheria, acellular pertussis (Tdap) vaccine.   
For estimates of the morbidity effects of the ACIP age 16 booster dose recommendation, 
I make a slightly different comparison: I analyze the change in meningococcal disease incidence 
among the directly targeted age group (15-24 year olds) relative to the change in incidence 
among all other (untargeted) age groups. Within these analyses I also estimate the morbidity 
effects of an earlier ACIP recommendation made in 2005, which recommended routine 
meningococcal vaccination of 11-12 year olds.  Although I am unable to causally estimate the 
vaccination effects of the 2005 recommendation due to lack of a suitable vaccine control group, I 
am able to provide evidence of the resulting morbidity effects by comparing the change in 
disease incidence among 5-14 year olds to the change among all other age groups.  A notable 
limitation of each of these differencing strategies, however, is that there is potential for positive 
spillovers of the ACIP recommendation to the control groups. If these spillovers occur, these 
strategies will underestimate the effects of the ACIP recommendations on vaccination rates 
and/or disease incidence.  
Next, to estimate the effects of the state-level high school meningococcal booster 
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mandates, I take advantage of the fact that different states implemented the mandates at different 
times. For both vaccination and morbidity outcomes I implement more standard difference-in-
differences models that include state and year fixed effects, and identify effects by comparing the 
change in outcomes over time in adopting versus non-adopting states. I am able to further extend 
these analyses and consider potential spillover effects of the mandates to receipt of other types of 
preventive care. As a final component to the analyses of both policies, I additionally estimate 
event study versions of all baseline models. These models allow me to estimate dynamic policy 
effects, as well as provide evidence to support the parallel trends assumption that is necessary for 
identification in the difference-in-differences framework,  
Overall I find that both the ACIP age 16 booster recommendation and the high school 
vaccine mandates significantly increase the probability that an individual receives a dose of the 
meningococcal vaccine at ages 16 or 17. The magnitude of the effect is comparable across 
policies – I find a 20.6 to 25.7 percentage point increase following the implementation of the 
ACIP age 16 booster dose recommendation, and the subsequent implementation of a high school 
mandate further increased vaccination rates by 19.0 to 21.2 percentage points.  Heterogeneity 
analyses of these vaccination results, however, reveal that the policy effects vary substantially 
across different demographic sub-groups. In particular, the ACIP recommendation appears to 
potentially exacerbate pre-existing disparities in receipt of the vaccine, as higher income and 
higher educated households are more responsive to the ACIP recommendation, while also being 
more likely to have been vaccinated in the period prior to the issuing of the recommendation. 
My results also suggest that these policies led to reductions in meningococcal disease 
incidence. Results from the baseline specification show that, relative to other age groups, the 
ACIP age 16 booster dose recommendation significantly reduced incidence among 15-24 year 
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olds by 17 percent, while the recommendation targeted towards 11-12 year olds resulted in a 
robust 30 percentage point reduction in incidence among 5-14 year olds. Morbidity effects of the 
mandates are smaller and are not significant in the baseline difference-in-differences 
specification. Event study specifications, however, suggest there may be important dynamics to 
the morbidity effects of the mandates, as the point estimates show that two years after 
implementation there is a significant reduction in disease incidence among 15-24 year olds of 
over 50 percent.  
Notably, my results also suggest that the high school vaccination mandates had 
significant effects on the probability of receiving additional (non-mandated) preventive care. I 
find a significant 6.9 percentage point increase in the probability of having a check-up at age 16 
or 17, and approximately 4.7-5.4 percentage point increases in the probability of receiving a dose 
of the HPV or Tdap vaccine at those same ages. These findings are particularly striking, given 
that high school is the period of time when many high risk behaviors are initiated, and when 
children are least likely to have regular contact with a primary care provider (Gruber 2001; 
Uddin et al. 2016).   
This paper makes a number of contributions.  First, I provide important new evidence on 
the effects of one of the most widely implemented vaccination policies: ACIP recommendations. 
To date, only one other study has used quasi-experimental methods to estimate their effects on 
vaccination rates among any age group (Lawler 2017), and no other study has estimated the 
effects for high school-aged adolescents. Specifically, Lawler (2017)  examines the effects of 
ACIP vaccination recommendations that apply to very young children (less than three years old), 
a group which has both very different patterns of health care utilization and a very different pre-
existing vaccine policy environment relative to16 and 17 year olds. Given this, a priori it is 
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unclear the extent to which the findings from that study may apply to other populations. 101 
Second, these findings are directly informative for policy makers who may be 
considering the implementation of a high school vaccine mandate.  Although school vaccination 
mandates have been more broadly studied than ACIP recommendations, previous papers have 
focused only on mandates that apply to younger age groups (see for example, Lawler 2017; 
Carpenter and Lawler 2018; Abrevaya and Mulligan 2011).  Given that 37 states have not yet 
implemented a high school meningococcal congujate vaccine mandate, there is considerable 
scope for this research to directly affect policy decisions.  
Finally, this paper provides important new evidence on how adolescents (or their parents) 
respond to age-targeted health policies.  The teen years are a period of the life course when rates 
of provider contact are low, and when many high-risk behaviors are initiated, and yet 
comparatively little is known about the effectiveness of public policies targeted at this age group. 
My results suggest that simple non-binding recommendations have substantial potential to 
increase the receipt of the recommended preventive care among this age group.  Moreover, the 
spillover effects I identify also suggests that there is substantial scope for vaccine-specific 
mandates to more broadly increase contact with health care providers and the receipt of 
preventive care among high school-aged adolescents.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section I provides background on 
meningococcal disease and the policies studied, Section II provides a brief literature review, and 
                                                   
101
 Notably, there is a clear need for this information among policy makers: although the stated goal of 
routine meningococcal vaccination is to reduce disease incidence during the higher risk ages of 16 to 21, 
policy makers initially recommended administration at ages 11 or 12, as opposed to later in adolescence, 
because they believed the higher rates of health care provider contact among 11-12 year olds would lead 
to greater take-up of the meningococcal vaccine (CDC, 2010). It was only after new evidence 
demonstrated immunity waned more quickly than believed, and therefore vaccines administered at ages 
11-12 were not providing protection through the high risk ages of 16-21, that ACIP revised their 
recommendation to include an age 16 booster dose. 
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Section III describes the data and outlines the empirical approach. I present the main set of 
results in Section IV, with ancillary results presented in Section V. Finally, Section VI 
concludes. 
3.2. Background 
3.2.1 Meningococcal Disease & Vaccination 
Meningococcal disease encapsulates the set of infections caused by the bacteria Neisseria 
meningitidis, and most commonly presents as an infection of the lining of the brain and spinal 
cord (meningitis), or of the bloodstream (septicemia). Illness from meningococcal disease is 
severe and has a high risk of mortality: even among those that receive treatment mortality rates 
range from 10 to 15 percent. Both meningococcal meningitis and meningococcal septicemia are 
characterized by sudden onset of fever and vomiting; symptoms of meningitis frequently also 
include headache and stiff neck, while septicemia is more frequently additionally associated with 
fatigue, chills, and a rash. Additionally, up to 20 percent of people who recover from 
meningococcal disease have permanent disabilities including brain damage, hearing loss, and 
cognitive impairment (CDC 2018).    
The bacteria that cause meningococcal disease are spread by respiratory and throat 
secretions (e.g. saliva), transmitted through close person-to-person contact. In general, the 
communicability of meningococcal disease is considered to be limited, and studies indicate that 
secondary cases only occur at a rate of 3 to 4 percent among household contacts. Crowded living 
conditions and smoking are both considered to be environmental risk factors for meningococcal 
disease.102 Infection rates peak among children less than 5 years of age, with a second peak 
                                                   
102
 Additionally, certain genetic factors and chronic illnesses are considered to be risk factors for 
infection.  
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occurring for adolescents and young adults aged 16 to 21. I present in Appendix Figure 1 age 
group-specific trends in meningococcal disease incidence in the United States for 2000-2016.  
There are numerous different serogroups (variations) of the bacteria; serogroups A, B, C, 
W, and Y are the most significant causes of meningococcal disease in the United States.103 This 
paper focuses specifically on vaccination against the A, C, W, and Y serogroups, for which a 
vaccine has been licensed in the United States since 1974.104 The original meningococcal 
vaccines were polysaccharide (sugar molecule) vaccines, which generated immunity for only a 
relatively short duration, and were particularly ineffective among the most vulnerable age group 
(<5 year olds). Given this, these vaccines were never recommended for routine vaccination and 
instead were utilized primarily in cases of outbreaks or for particular high-risk individuals (CDC 
2000). 
 In 2005 the first quadrivalent A, C, W, and Y conjugate (polysaccharide bonded to a 
protein) vaccine (MCV4) was approved in the United States. In general, this type of vaccine is 
preferred to the polysaccharide vaccine, as conjugate vaccines are typically able to generate a 
better and more long-lasting immune response, resulting in a more effective vaccine.  
Additionally, for meningococcal disease, the conjugate vaccine is more effective at reducing 
asymptomatic carriage of the N. meningitdis bacteria, which is necessary in order for vaccination 
to reduce disease transmission in a community and to generate herd immunity effects (CDC 
2005). At the time of licensure, available evidence suggested that a dose of MCV4 would 
provide protection for at least 10 years, however, subsequent studies suggest that immunity may 
significantly decline within 3 to 7 years (CDC 2011; Cohn et al. 2017). 
                                                   
103
 The relative importance of each serogroup varies by age group: among children under the age of 5, 
serogroup B accounts for 60 percent of the cases of meningococcal disease, while for individuals over the 
age of 10, serogroups C, W, and Y cause 73 percent of the cases (CDC 2015). 
104
 The first vaccine to provide protection against serogroup B was not approved in the United States until 
2014. 
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3.2.2. Meningococcal vaccination policy  
In the United States recommendations on the use of vaccines are set by the Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). The ACIP is a 15 member committee composed 
of doctors and public health professionals and was established in 1964.  The recommendations 
issued by the ACIP are potentially very influential both because they serve as the de facto 
standard of care, and because they are directly tied to a number of state and national health 
laws.105    
Routine vaccination against meningococcal disease was recommended by ACIP for the 
first time in 2005, following the approval of the first quadrivalent conjugate vaccine (MCV4) in 
January of that year. At that time ACIP recommended routine administration of 1 dose of the 
MCV4 vaccine at ages 11-12, with catch-up vaccination recommended through age 15, as well 
as routine vaccination of college freshman residing in dormitories. Recommendations for catch-
up vaccination were extended through age 18 in 2007.106 At the time of the 2005 ACIP 
recommendation, the expectation was that immunity from the vaccine would persist for at least 
10 years, and so vaccination at age 11 or 12 was expected to provide adolescents with protection 
through the high-risk ages of 16 to 21. In January 2011, based on new data that suggest 
significant declines in the persistence of antibodies 3 to 7 years after vaccination, ACIP updated 
their recommendations once again to include a booster dose at age 16 (CDC 2011).107  
                                                   
105
 For example, under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) preventive care provision (effective September 23, 
2010), all new insurance plans must provide all ACIP-recommended vaccines without cost sharing.  
Moreover, once the ACIP designates a vaccine as ‘routinely recommended’, the Vaccines for Children 
(VFC) program has to pay for them.  Individuals are eligible for free vaccinations under the VFC program 
if they are 18 years of age or younger, and are Medicaid-eligible, uninsured, American Indian or Alaskan 
Native, or are underinsured. 
106
 When MCV4 was first approved in 2005 there were concerns about there being sufficient vaccine 
supply to vaccinate all adolescents up to age 18. This supply issue was resolved in 2007 (CDC 2007). 
107
 Specifically, the ACIP recommends receipt of a booster dose at age 16, even if the first dose was 
received as recently as age 15. Catch-up vaccination is recommended through age 18 (CDC 2011).  
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In addition to the 11-12 year old MCV4 dose and 16 year old MCV4 booster dose, the 
ACIP also recommends three other vaccines for routine administration to adolescents: the 
tetanus, diphtheria, and acellular pertussis (Tdap) vaccine, one dose of which is recommended at 
ages 11-12, the human papillomavirus vaccine (HPV), which was recommended to be 
administered as a three dose series initiated at ages 11-12 for the duration of my sample period, 
and the influenza vaccine, which is recommended annually for everyone over the age of 6 
months.108  
Since 2000, individual states have implemented a number of different policies that aim to 
increase meningococcal vaccination rates among targeted groups. These policies range from 
education mandates, which require schools to provide educational materials on meningococcal 
vaccination to students and/or their parents, to vaccine mandates, which require students to 
receive a dose of the meningococcal vaccine in order to attend school. States have targeted these 
policies at different age groups of students, with each policy generally applying to either middle 
school, high school, or college students.109   
In this paper I focus on the effects of laws that require high school students to receive the 
booster dose of the meningococcal vaccine prior to entry into 11
th
 or 12
th
 grade. Over my sample 
period, eight states adopted 11
th
 or 12
th
 grade mandates, with West Virginia being the first state 
to adopt in 2012.110 I graphically present in Figure 2 the timing of the roll out of the mandates 
                                                   
108
 As of December 2016, the HPV series is recommended as a two dose series if initiation occurs before 
age 15 (CDC 2016). The HPV vaccine was first approved and recommended for use in females in 2006. It 
was not until October 2009 that it was approved for use in males, and only in December 2011 was it 
routinely recommended for it to be administered to males.   
109
 Information on vaccination policies was obtained from the Immunization Action Coalition 
(www.immunize.org) and the National Council of State Legislatures (2012), and independently verified 
with state statues, news articles, or school publications, when necessary. 
110
 An additional six states have already passed mandates that will become effective over the next couple 
of years. Also, effective for the 2016-2017 school year, Delaware has a mandate requiring a dose of the 
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across states; of the states that had an effective mandate as of January 2017, there is notable 
geographic clustering, with no adopting states in the western census region.  
Laws requiring vaccines for school entry are extremely common in the United States, 
with all states mandating at least one vaccine for school entry as early as 1980 (Malone and 
Hinman, 2003).  Historically, however, these mandates have largely applied to childcare or 
elementary school entry and not to older adolescents. Notably, in all states except Alaska, MCV4 
is currently the only vaccine with a binding mandate that applies to 11
th
 and 12
th
 grade 
students.111  More recently, some states have also implemented vaccine mandates for college 
students or health care workers.  
School vaccine mandates are an appealing policy tool, as compulsory schooling laws 
provide an effective means of enforcement. An important limitation of these laws, however, is 
the availability of individual exemptions (Bradford and Mandich 2015). As of January 2017, all 
states (including Washington D.C.) allow for exemptions due to medical reasons, while 48 states 
allow exemptions due to religious beliefs, and of those, 17 states additionally allow exemptions 
due to philosophical beliefs (NCSL 2017). 
3.3. Literature review 
This paper contributes to the broader economic literature on infectious disease and the 
causal determinants of vaccination (Philipson 2000).  Of particular relevance is a number of 
existing papers that have focused on the effects of information shocks on vaccination rates. 
These shocks take a range of forms: Moghtaderi and Adams (2016) examine the effects of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
meningococcal vaccine prior to 9
th
 grade entry (age 14), although since this does not apply to 16 or 17 
year olds, I do not treat this as an effective mandate. 
111
 Alaska mandates receipt of the Tdap vaccine 10 years after completion of the childhood DTaP series, 
which is usually completed between ages 4 and 6. Alaska does not require receipt of the MCV4 vaccine 
for high school students.   
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awareness campaigns and provision of educational materials on the HPV vaccine,  and show 
those programs have no effect on uptake of the HPV vaccine; Anderberg et al. (2011) and Chang 
(2018, forthcoming) examine the effects of media coverage of the purported link between the 
measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine and autism,  and find resulting reductions in 
childhood vaccination rates, especially in households with more highly educated mothers .112  
To date, only one other paper has used a quasi-experimental framework to estimate the 
causal effects of ACIP recommendations.113 Lawler (2017) examines ACIP recommendations for 
routine hepatitis A vaccination of young children (<3 years old), which were implemented across 
groups of states at different times based on historic hepatitis A incidence in the state.  Using a 
difference-in-differences framework and data from the National Immunization Survey-Child, 
Lawler finds that those ACIP recommendations increased vaccination rates among 2-3 year olds 
by 27 percentage points.  Given that these recommendations only applied to young children, 
however, who typically already receive preventive care at relatively high rates, it is not clear the 
extent to which these findings can be expected to apply to other age groups.   
Another strand of the literature that is closely related to this work focuses on the effects 
of state-level vaccination mandates on targeted vaccination rates and associated morbidity. The 
majority of these studies focus on mandates that apply to child care or elementary school entry, 
and find large and significant increases in the uptake of the targeted vaccine (Abrevaya and 
Mulligan 2011;  Lawler 2017), and/or reductions in associated morbidity (Lawler 2017; Luca 
                                                   
112
 Adjacent to this literature on the effects of information shocks is a set of papers that have examined the 
effects of disease outbreaks and found that they significantly increase the probability of being vaccinated 
against the relevant disease (Philipson 1996; Oster 2016; Schaller et al. 2017). To the extent that 
estimated effects on vaccination are too large to reflect actual changes in disease risk, these outbreaks 
may be serving as information shocks.  
113
 There are a number of papers in the medical and public health literatures that have examined the 
effects of ACIP recommendations for adolescent vaccination, however these studies are limited in that 
they rely on before versus after comparisons to identify the effects (see for example MacNeil et al. 2018; 
Ackerson et al. 2017). 
 141 
 
2016; Ward 2011).  In a slightly different context, White (2018) examines mandates for health 
care workers in California to receive the influenza vaccine, and finds that they result in 
significant increases in healthcare worker vaccination rates and reductions in influenza 
hospitalizations. 
 Most similar to this paper is Carpenter and Lawler (2018), which estimates the effects of 
Tdap vaccine mandates that apply to middle school -aged adolescents. They find that the 
mandates increased uptake of the Tdap vaccine by age 13 by approximately 13.5 percentage 
points, and significantly reduced pertussis incidence among children and infants. Notably, they 
also find that the Tdap mandate caused spillovers to the uptake of the MCV4 and HPV vaccines, 
as well as increases in the probability of a well child check-up at ages 11 or 12 by 3 to 4 
percentage points.  
Overall, this article makes important contributions to the literature on immunization 
policy along several dimensions.  In particular, this paper is the first to consider the effects of 
vaccination policies that target high school-aged adolescents.  This is an important population to 
study given that they have much lower rates of contact with primary care providers compared to 
younger children, and that this is the period of time in which many high-risk behaviors are 
initiated.   Due to these differences between high school-aged adolescents and younger age 
groups, the previous evidence on the effects of ACIP recommendations may not be informative 
for this population.  Additionally, these differences suggest that there is a much larger scope for 
mandates to affect vaccination rates, and for potential spillovers to receipt of other types of 
preventive care.  Finally, this paper is the first to estimate the effects of meningococcal disease-
targeted vaccination policies on vaccination rates and disease incidence in a quasi-experimental 
framework. Given differences in transmission, contagion, and morbidity across diseases, disease-
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specific analyses are necessary in order for policy makers to estimate the cost-effectiveness of a 
given vaccination policy.    
3.4. Data and Empirical Strategy 
3.4.1. Data sources 
I utilize several different data sources for these analyses.  Vaccination data are from the 
National Immunization Survey – Teen (NIS-Teen), 2008-2016. NIS-Teen is a random digit 
dialing survey that targets 13 to 17 year olds, and the data consist of both household 
demographic characteristics, collected during the household survey, as well as immunization 
data obtained directly from the adolescent’s healthcare provider(s).  In these data I observe the 
teen’s vaccination status for a range of recommended childhood vaccines, as well as the age in 
years at which the vaccine dose was received. Because the policies of interest in these analyses 
apply to 16 or 17 year olds, I restrict my sample to individuals who were 17 years old at the time 
of survey, and I focus on vaccine doses received between the ages of 16 and 17.   My primary 
outcome of interest is receipt of the quadrivalent meningococcal conjugate vaccine (MCV4), at 
ages 16 or 17.
114
 
An important limitation of the NIS-Teen is that I am unable to observe the calendar 
month the survey was administered or the student’s current school grade. Since most of the 
                                                   
114
 Due to changes in the coding of variables across survey waves, in some years individuals who received 
a meningococcal vaccine that provided protection against serogroups A,C,W, and Y, but for whom the 
vaccine subtype is unknown (e.g. if it is a conjugate vaccine or a polysaccharide vaccine), are unable to 
be distinguished from individuals who received a dose of a meningococcal vaccine that provided 
protection only against serogroup B. Therefore, for my main outcome variable, I require individuals to 
have documented receipt of a dose of MCV4. As a robustness check I re-estimate all models with the 
outcome variable of “receipt of any meningococcal-containing vaccine,” which includes receipt of 
unknown subtype A,C, W, and Y serogroup vaccines, but also includes serogroup B vaccines. My results 
are robust to this alternative definition of the outcome variable.  
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booster mandates I am examining are binding on 17 year olds at entry into 12
th
 grade, and I am 
unable to tell if the 17 year olds in my data are currently in 11
th
 or 12
th
 grade, I am likely 
underestimating the vaccination effects of these mandates. 
Data on disease incidence were obtained directly from the CDC for the years 2000-2016, 
as reported by states to the Nationally Notifiable Disease Surveillance System. These data 
consist of counts of cases at the state-year-age group level (0-4 year olds, 5-14 year olds, 15-24 
year olds, 25-64 year olds, and 65 and older), and allow me to estimate the effects of 
meningococcal vaccine policy on disease incidence at the population level and among the most 
directly targeted age group (15-24 year olds).115 Notably, while these data represent the most 
comprehensive measure of meningococcal disease in the United States, because they rely on 
physician diagnosis they necessarily represent an underestimation of true disease incidence. 
I present in Appendix Figure 2 trends in adolescent vaccination rates over time, and show 
summary statistics on key vaccination and morbidity outcomes, as well as sample demographics 
from the NIS-Teen in Appendix Table 1.  In column 1 I present the statistics for the full sample 
of states and years; columns 2 and 3 respectively summarize the data for the years prior to and 
after the 2011 ACIP booster recommendation; presented in columns 4 and 5 are statistics for 
states with and without, respectively, a high school booster mandate in place by the end of 2016. 
These statistics show that vaccination rates among 16 and 17 year olds are increasing over time 
for the MCV4, HPV, and influenza vaccine. Rates among 16 and 17 year olds for the Tdap 
vaccine are actually decreasing, which is consistent with the fact that the Tdap vaccine is 
routinely recommended for 11-12 year olds, but was more commonly received by older cohorts 
                                                   
115
 For 2005-2016 the meningococcal disease data are additionally available by state-year-serogroup. I do 
not present results using these data, however, due to reports from contacts in the Meningitis and Vaccine 
Preventable Diseases Branch at the CDC that these data are of poor quality and suffer from “non-random 
missingness.”  Results from analyses using these data are available upon request, however, and support 
my primary findings.  
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as a catch-up vaccine in the initial years following introduction of the vaccine. 
Vaccination rates across mandating and non-mandating states are generally comparable, 
although notably MCV4 rates are actually lower on average in states with the high school 
booster mandate. States with booster mandates also differ from non-adopting states along several 
demographic dimensions: samples in adopting states are more white, less Hispanic, and mothers 
in adopting states are slightly more likely to be older, unmarried, and have a high school degree 
as their highest level of education.  Summary statistics on morbidity show that meningococcal 
disease incidence has declined substantially over time. Given the strong secular downward trend 
in meningococcal incidence in the years prior to the introduction of the MCV4 vaccine, the 
extent to which this decline is due to increased vaccination is an empirical question.    
3.4.2. Estimation of ACIP Recommendation Effects 
In my analyses I estimate the effects of the national-level ACIP meningococcal vaccine 
recommendations, as well as the effects of state laws requiring receipt of the MCV4 vaccine 
prior to entry into 11
th
 or 12
th
 grade.   Given the differing levels of variation across these policies, 
I implement separate identification strategies in order to estimate the causal effect of each policy 
on vaccination rates and meningococcal disease incidence. 
First, to estimate the vaccination effects of the 2011 ACIP recommendation for the age 
16booster dose of MCV4, I take advantage of the fact that this policy, while implemented at the 
national level, applied only to the MCV4 vaccine and not to other adolescent vaccines.  
Specifically, I estimate the following difference-in-differences model, in which I compare the 
probability a 16 or 17 year old receives the MCV4 vaccine versus the Tdap vaccine, in the period 
before the 2011 ACIP booster recommendation versus after: 
(2) Yistb = β1 + 𝝉𝒕+ β2MCVib + β3(MCVxPOST2011)tb + β4(MCVxZ)stb  + εistb 
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where Yistb is a dummy variable equal to one if individual i in state s who is age 17 in year t 
received a dose of vaccine b at age 16 or 17 and is equal to zero otherwise. MCV is an indicator 
variable that is equal to 1 if vaccine b is the MCV vaccine; the variable MCVxPOST2011 is the 
interaction between MCV and an indicator variable equal to one if the adolescent was 17 years 
old in 2012 or later.116 In this specification 𝛽3 is the coefficient of interest, as it captures the 
differential effect of exposure to the ACIP meningococcal booster recommendation on the 
probability of receiving a dose of MCV4 at age 16 or 17, compared to the probability of 
receiving a dose of the Tdap vaccine at those same ages.  Notably, if the ACIP recommendation 
for the MCV4 booster dose had spillover effects to the probability of receiving a Tdap vaccine, 
then 𝛽3 will underestimate the true effect of the ACIP recommendation. 
In this specification 𝝉𝒕 is a vector of year fixed effects. By including year fixed effects I 
am able to control for any potential policies or changes in attitudes which may generally affect 
the probability individuals in a given year receive either vaccine.  Some state policies, however, 
may differentially affect the probability an individual receives a dose of MCV4 relative to Tdap. 
In order to allow for this, I include the interaction between a vector of state-level characteristics, 
𝑍𝑠𝑡, and the indicator variable MCV (which is equal to one if the outcome variable is receipt of 
the MCV4 vaccine).  The vector 𝑍𝑠𝑡 captures the following state policies and characteristics: 
effective high school MCV4 booster mandates; post-secondary meningococcal education, 
waiver, and vaccine mandates; secondary school meningococcal education mandates;  separate 
indicator variables for if the individual’s cohort was exposed to a middle school MCV4 mandate, 
or by a middle school TD-containing vaccine mandate; and measures of meningococcal and 
pertussis (protected against by the Tdap vaccine) disease incidence in the state in the previous 
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 In this baseline specification I assume a 1-year lag in the effects of the recommendation. I relax that 
assumption in the event-study model presented later in equation 2.   
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year.  
In some specifications I further include measures of state insurance policies in the 𝑍𝑠𝑡 
vector, as the out-of-pocket cost of MCV4 is markedly higher than the out-of-pocket cost of the 
Tdap vaccine, and so a change in insurance access may differentially affect the probability of 
receiving one vaccine relative to the other.117 Specifically, I additionally include indicator 
variables for if the state has insurance mandates for the coverage of well-child visits and 
immunizations, lagged state Medicaid/CHIP income thresholds, and an indicator variable for if a 
state had implemented Medicaid expansion by June of the survey year. Finally, to allow for 
differential linear trends in vaccination rates of the two vaccines, in some specifications I 
additionally include vaccine-specific linear time trends. All regressions include NIS-Teen 
provider-sample weights, and standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
This estimation strategy relies on the assumption that observed vaccination rates of a 
non-routinely recommended adolescent vaccine (Tdap) serves as a valid counterfactual for how 
MCV4 vaccination rates would have evolved in the absence of the ACIP recommendation.  I 
focus on the Tdap vaccine as the counterfactual vaccine for two main reasons:  one, both MCV4 
and Tdap vaccines were first approved for use in the United States in the same year (2005), and 
second, within a year of approval both vaccines were recommended for routine administration to 
11-12 year old, with catch-up vaccination recommended through age 18. In Figure 3 I show 
national level trends in the probability of receiving a dose of the Tdap vaccine or MCV4 at age 
16 or 17; visual inspection of these trends confirms that prior to the 2011 ACIP recommendation, 
trends in vaccination rates for these two vaccines were very similar.  
To further test the assumption that vaccination rates were following parallel trends in the 
                                                   
117
 As of April 2018, the out of pocket cost of a Tdap vaccine at Walgreens was listed as $63.99, 
compared to the meningococcal vaccine, which was $133.99 per dose. 
https://www.walgreens.com/topic/healthcare-clinic/price-menu.jsp  
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pre-period and to allow for dynamic treatment effects, I re-estimate equation 1 and replace the 
single POST2011 indicator variable with a series of indicator variables that separately capture 
each calendar year: 
(3) Yistb =  β1 + 𝝉𝒕 + β2MCVib + ∑ 𝛃𝐣(𝐘𝐄𝐀𝐑𝐣 𝐱𝐌𝐂𝐕𝐣∈𝐉 )𝐭𝐛 + β4(MCVxZ)stb  + εistb 
where J={2008, 2009, 2011, 2012,…,2016}, with 2010 as the omitted year, and all other 
variables are as described in equation 1. In this specification, 𝛃𝒋 is the change in the relative 
probability of receiving a dose of the MCV4 vaccine, in year j compared to the omitted base 
year.  In addition to this specification allowing for more rigorous examination of the parallel 
trends assumption, it also has the advantage of allowing for dynamic treatment effects.  
Morbidity model 
Unfortunately, while the above difference-in-differences strategy is useful for estimating 
the vaccination effects of the ACIP meningococcal booster recommendation, the same strategy 
cannot be implemented to estimate the resulting morbidity effects, as the disease analogs of the 
Tdap vaccine (tetanus, diphtheria, and pertussis) follow very different trends relative to 
meningococcal disease in the pre-period.118 Given this, I modify my estimation strategy and 
instead identify morbidity effects of the vaccination recommendation by comparing 
meningococcal disease incidence rates among the directly targeted age group (15-24 year olds) 
to disease incidence among other age groups. As mentioned previously, this strategy also allows 
me to estimate morbidity effects of the 2005 ACIP recommendation which recommended routine 
vaccination of 11-12 year olds. Specifically, I estimate the following difference -in-differences 
model: 
                                                   
118
 Specifically, tetanus and diphtheria are very rare in the United States, with 34 and 0 cases, 
respectively, reported to the CDC in 2016. Pertussis, while more common in the United States, is 
extremely cyclical, unlike meningococcal disease.   
 148 
 
(4) Ysta = β1 + 𝝉𝒕 + AGE GROUPa + β2(15-24yrolds xPOST2011)ta  
+ β3(5-14yrolds xPOST2005)ta + β4(AGE GROUP xZ)sta  + εist 
where Ysta is a measure of meningococcal disease incidence in state s, at year t, among age group 
a. I specify the outcome variable as either an incidence rate, in which the measure is the number 
of reported cases per 100,000 population, or as the natural log of (number of cases + 1). 
Specifications in which ln(meningococcal cases + 1) is the outcome variable additionally include 
the natural log of the age group-specific population in state s and time t as a control variable. As 
in equation 1,  𝝉𝒕 is a vector of year fixed effects. In this specification AGE GROUP is a vector 
of age group fixed effects, and 15-24yrolds xPOST2011 and 5-14yrolds xPOST2005 are the 
interactions between the stated age group fixed effect and an indicator variable that is either 
equal to one for years after 2011 or for years after 2005, respectively. Thus, in this specification 
β2 and β3 are the coefficients of interest, as they capture the extent to which the difference in 
disease incidence between the directly targeted groups (15-24 year olds for the 2011 
recommendation, and 5-14 year olds for the 2005 recommendation) and other age groups 
changes after a given ACIP recommendation.  This differencing strategy accounts for secular 
trends in meningococcal disease incidence, as well as controls for any potential shocks at the 
year level that may have generally affected meningococcal disease incidence.  As in equation 1, 
to additionally control for state policies that may have differentially affected the treatment versus 
control group, I include the interaction between a vector of state vaccination and insurance 
policies, Z, and the age group fixed effects. In some specifications I also include age group-
specific linear time trends. I weight each observation by the state-year-age group population and 
cluster standard errors at the state level.  
As with the vaccination model, in order to test for dynamic treatment effects and to 
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empirically check for parallel trends in outcomes in the pre-period, I additionally estimate an 
event study model, in which the POST variables are replaced by a series of indicator variables 
that capture the specific year, with the year prior to the given recommendation as the omitted 
year. All other variables are as specified in equation 3.  
3.4.3. Estimation of Effects of State Meningococcal Vaccine Mandates 
To estimate the effects of state laws requiring receipt of the meningococcal vaccine prior 
to entry into 11
th
 or 12
th
 grade I use difference-in-differences models in which I compare 
vaccination rates in adopting states versus non-adopting states, before versus after adoption.  
Specifically, I estimate the following model: 
(5) Yist = β0 + β1Xist + β2(HIGH SCHOOL MCV4 MANDATE)st + β3Zst 
 + β4Ss + β5Tt + εist 
where Yist is a specified vaccine outcome for individual i in state s who was age 17 in year t.  
HIGH SCHOOL MCV4 MANDATE is the policy variable of interest, as it is an indicator 
variable that is equal to one if there is an 11
th
 or 12
th
 grade MCV4 mandate in effect in an 
individual’s state of residence in year t.  Because of ambiguity in the implementation of MCV4 
mandates in Indiana and D.C., I drop them from analyses of the effects of the high-school 
booster mandates.
119
  
Xist is a vector of individual characteristics available in the NIS-Teen, including: child’s 
gender, child’s race/ethnicity (Hispanic, white, black, with other as the excluded category), 
number of other children under 18 years old living in the home (only 1 child, 2 to 3 children, 
with 4 or more children as the excluded category), maternal education (less than high school, 
high school, some college, with college or above as the excluded category), maternal age group 
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 I do verify, however, that all baseline estimates are robust to the inclusion of these two states.  
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(34 years old or younger, 35 to 44 years old, with 45 years or older as the excluded category) and 
an indicator variable for whether the mother is married. In this specification Zst represents a 
vector of other state policies that may plausibly affect the probability that an individual decides 
to vaccinate. Specifically, it captures exposure to middle school vaccine mandates for the 
vaccines routinely recommended for administration at ages 11 or 12 (Tdap, MCV4, and HPV),
120
 
as well as exposure to binding `catch-up’ mandates for vaccines that are routinely recommended 
to be administered during early childhood;
121
 lagged measures of state laws requiring educational 
materials on the HPV or MCV4 vaccine to be distributed to students, parents, or through 
awareness campaigns; state non-medical exemption policies for vaccine mandates; 
contemporaneous measures of all childcare, kindergarten, and post-secondary school vaccine 
mandates that are changing over the sample period;  state insurance policies as previously 
discussed (state laws requiring insurance coverage of well-child visits or immunizations for 16 
year olds, lagged state Medicaid/CHIP income thresholds, and state Medicaid expansion);  state 
pharmacist authority to administer vaccines to 16 year olds; lagged state pertussis and 
meningococcal disease incidence; lagged state unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics; and lagged state demographic characteristics as measured by the Current Population 
Survey (fraction black, Hispanic, and other races, fraction of individuals with high school degree 
and with some college or more, and fraction below the federal poverty level).  𝑆𝑆 and 𝑇𝑡 
represent state and year fixed effects, respectively. I cluster standard errors at the state level, and 
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 I consider an individual to have been exposed to a middle school mandate if there was an effective 
mandate in their state of residence when they were 12 years of age. 
121
 A number of states have ‘catch-up’ mandates in place for high school students and middle school 
students, in which they require students to have received a vaccine that is recommended for routine 
administration at a younger age. These vaccines are also mandated for receipt in either middle or 
elementary school, and thus I only consider a catch-up mandate to be binding for a given cohort if they 
were not exposed to the vaccine mandate at a younger age due to the timing of the implementation. I 
control for measles, varicella, hepatitis B, and hepatitis A catch-up mandates.  
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all specifications are weighted by NIS-Teen provider-sample weights. 
For estimates of the morbidity effects of the high school meningococcal mandates I 
estimate a variant of equation 4, in which the outcome variable is the rate of meningococcal 
disease per 100,000 population in state s and year t, and regressions are weighted using state 
population estimates.  In this aggregate level model, all policies are considered in effect at the 
start of the calendar year following implementation.  I also estimate an event study model variant 
of equation 4, for both vaccination and morbidity outcomes, in which the indicator variables for 
each of the MCV4-specific policies are replaced with a series of indicator variables capturing 
years relative to policy implementation.
122
 In these models the period prior to implementation of 
the mandate (t=-1) is the omitted base period.  
3.5. Main Results 
3.5.1. Vaccination Effects of Recommendations 
I first estimate the effects of the ACIP meningococcal booster recommendation on the 
probability of receiving the MCV4 vaccine, using the difference-in-differences model with state-
by-year fixed effects that is presented in equation 1.  Results in Table 1 show that the ACIP 
booster recommendation increased the probability that an individual received a dose of the 
MCV4 vaccine at ages 16-17 (column 1)  by 20.6 percentage points, relative to their probability 
of receiving a dose of the Tdap vaccine at the same ages.  Results in columns 2 and 3 show the 
estimates are robust to allowing changes in state insurance policies to have differential effects on 
the probability of receiving the MCV4 versus Tdap vaccines, and to the inclusion of vaccine-
specific linear time trends, respectively. Compared to the pre-2011 mean MCV4 vaccination 
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 Given that there was staggered roll-out of these policies across states, relative event time in this model 
is distinct from calendar year, unlike in equation 2.   
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rate, these estimates suggest the ACIP recommendation caused a 129 (.206/.161 * 100) percent 
increase in MCV4 vaccination at ages 16-17.  Notably, if this ACIP recommendation also had 
the effect of increasing receipt of the Tdap vaccine, these estimates understate the true effect of 
the recommendation on vaccination rates.  
I further explore the effects of the recommendation by estimating the event study model 
specified in equation 2, the results of which are presented graphically in Figure 4.  These 
estimates show that there are important dynamics of the recommendation effect that are not 
captured by the baseline difference-in-differences specification. First, the results suggest that 
there is a lag period of approximately one year before there is a significant detectable effect of 
the recommendation on MCV4 vaccination rates, and, second, they show that the magnitude of 
the effect grows consistently over time, with estimated effects five years after implementation as 
large as 38.5 percentage points.  The estimated coefficients for the years prior to the ACIP 
recommendation also show that  there were not pre-existing differential trends in the probability 
that an individual received an MCV4 vaccine compared to the Tdap vaccine, as they are all 
relatively small in magnitude, and only one coefficient is even marginally significant at the 10 
percent level.  This provides further evidence that the trend in Tdap vaccination is an appropriate 
counterfactual for how MCV4 vaccination rates would have evolved in the absence of the ACIP 
recommendation.  
3.5.2. Vaccination Effects of High School Mandates 
I next examine the vaccination effects of high school vaccine mandates, using the state-
level difference-in-differences model specified in equation 4.  The results from these analyses are 
presented in columns 4 and 5 of Table 1.  The results in column 4 indicate that the high school 
meningococcal booster mandates increase the probability of receiving a dose of the MCV4 
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vaccine between the ages of 16 and 17 by approximately 19.0 percentage points, and this result is 
robust to the inclusion of state-specific linear time trends (column 5). Note that because all high 
school mandates are implemented after the ACIP recommendation, this effect captures the 
marginal effect of a mandate given the presence of a recommendation.  
Event study estimates, presented graphically in Figure 5, show that the mandates resulted 
in an immediate increase in vaccination rates among 16 and 17 year olds, and that this effect was 
even larger in the first and second years following implementation. Given how recent the 
identifying variation is for these mandates, it is not possible to more comprehensively trace out 
policy dynamics over time. Importantly, however, pre-implementation coefficients are 
consistently small in magnitude and generally not statistically significant,  supporting the validity 
of the identifying parallel trends assumption and reducing concerns of endogenous policy 
implementation in response to particularly low vaccination rates.  
3.5.3. Morbidity results 
I next analyze the extent to which the large increases in meningococcal vaccination rates 
caused by the ACIP recommendation and high school mandates translated into reductions in 
disease incidence. I first focus on the effects of the ACIP recommendation, and present in Table 
2 the results of estimating equation 3. Observations in this model are at the state-year-age group 
level, and the sample includes observations from all age groups.  The outcome variable is the 
natural log of (age group-specific count of meningococcal cases +1).
123
 I graphically present 
trends over time in ln(meningococcal cases+1) in Figure 6A for 5-14 year olds versus all other 
age groups, and in Figure 6B for 15 -24 year olds versus all other age groups.
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 For these models, the specifications in which the outcome variable is the age group-specific disease 
incidence rate consistently fail to demonstrate parallel trends in the pre-period, and so I do not present 
results from these specifications. 
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The difference-in-differences estimates in column 1 of Table 2 suggest the 2005 ACIP 
recommendation significantly reduced meningococcal incidence among 5-14 year olds by 30.6 
percent relative to all other age groups, while the 2011 ACIP recommendation significantly 
reduced meningococcal disease incidence among 15-24 year olds relative to all other age groups 
by17.5 percent.
124
 When I additionally allow for state insurance policies to have differential 
effects on disease incidence across the age groups (column 2) and include age group-specific 
linear time trends (column 3), the estimated effects of the 2005 recommendation on disease 
incidence among 5-14 year olds remains large and statistically significant at the one percent 
level. Estimated effects of the 2011 recommendation, however, are sensitive to the inclusion of 
these additional controls, and are no longer statistically significant at conventional levels.  The 
point estimates, however, remains negative and the large standard errors mean I am unable to 
rule out potentially large reductions in disease incidence among 15-24 year olds.  
I present the accompanying event studies in Figure 7A, for 5-14 year olds, and Figure 7B, 
for 15-24 year olds. These event study estimates shows that the dynamics of the morbidity 
effects are broadly consistent with the dynamics of the vaccination effects of the ACIP 
recommendation. Specifically, there appears to be a substantial lag in the effects on disease 
incidence, with the largest effects occurring several years after implementation.  
I present in Table 3 the estimated morbidity effects of the high school vaccine mandates, 
obtained from estimation of equation 4.  The outcome variable in columns 1 and 2 is the rate of 
meningococcal disease incidence among 15-24 year olds per 100,000 population, and in columns 
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 Additional analyses not presented here suggest that the resulting reductions in meningococcal disease 
were largest in states that had average incidence above the median during the pre-period, although I find 
no differential effects of the ACIP recommendation on vaccination rates along this same dimension. This 
indicates that there are potentially important nonlinearities in the effects of vaccination on meningococcal 
disease incidence. 
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3 and 4 I present estimates using full population incidence rates. In general these estimates are 
not very conclusive: although most estimates are negative and the large standard errors mean I 
am unable to rule out potentially large reductions in disease incidence, only one estimate is even 
marginally significant (column 3).
125
 Estimates from the event study model are presented in 
Figures 8A and 8B for 15-24 year olds and for population rates, respectively, and show that the 
mandates potentially did lead to large and significant reductions in meningococcal disease 
incidence, but that the reductions occurred with a lag relative to the timing of mandate 
implementation. Specifically, these estimates suggest that 2 years after implementation, there 
was a reduction in disease incidence among 15-24 year olds of a marginally significant 0.253 
cases per 100,000 population, and a significant reduction in the entire population of .169 cases 
per 100,000 population. Relative to mean incidence rates in state-years in which there was not an 
effective mandate, these respectively represent a reduction of approximately 57 (0.281/0.489) 
and 45 (0.154/ 0.346) percent. 
3.6. Additional Results 
In this section I do a number of additional analyses to further explore the effects of the 
meningococcal vaccine policies. First, I test for potential heterogeneity in the vaccination effects 
across subgroups by separately estimating the models for different groups. I next consider 
potential spillover effects of the mandates to receipt of other preventive care, and finally I 
examine the effects on Google searches for meningococcal-related terms.  
3.6.1. Heterogeneity 
To explore potential heterogeneity in the vaccination effects of the meningococcal 
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 Results from models with ln(meningococcal disease cases+1) as the outcome variable are similarly 
inconclusive: the estimates are never statistically significant and standard errors are extremely large.  
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policies I estimate the baseline difference-in-difference models separately for different 
demographics subgroups. Results from these analyses are presented in Table 4, where each row 
represents a separate subgroup.  For estimated effects of the ACIP recommendation (columns 1 
and 2) I re-estimate equation 1 and report the coefficient on MCVxPOST2011; for estimated 
effects of the high school meningococcal booster mandates (columns 3 and 4) I re-estimate 
equation 4 and report the coefficient on the indicator variable for a state having an effective high 
school mandate. Each reported coefficient is from a separate regression. To help contextualize 
the results, I also report the relevant sub-group mean MCV4 vaccination rate among 16 and 17 
year olds from states and years in which the given policy of interest was not in effect.   
In general, these results demonstrate that there are heterogeneous responses to the 
meningococcal disease policies. Across both policies I find that effects are generally smaller for 
males relative to females, and for low income and low maternal-education households, relative to 
households with higher income or higher maternal education. Notably, the estimated effects of 
the ACIP recommendation strongly suggest that this policy potentially exacerbates disparities in 
health across different socioeconomic groups: lower-educated and lower- income households are 
less likely to be vaccinated prior to, and are also less likely to increase vaccination rates in 
response to, the ACIP recommendation.  
 I caution, however, that the heterogeneity in the effects of the MCV booster mandate 
should be interpreted carefully. As in the main analyses, a limitation of  analyses of the effect of 
the meningococcal booster mandates on vaccination rates at age 17 is that I am unable to observe 
what grade the individual currently is in, and therefore am unable to determine if they have 
entered the grade for which the mandate is binding. In particular, if there are different patterns 
across the calendar year in timing of consumption of health care for different subgroups (e.g. if 
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low income households are more time-constrained, and therefore wait to get their child 
vaccinated closer to the start of the school year when the mandate becomes binding), then these 
differing time patterns may explain some portion of the observed heterogeneity in the effects of 
the booster mandate.   
3.6.2. Non-mandated preventive care 
I next examine the extent to which the vaccine mandates increased receipt of non-
mandated preventive care among the age-targeted group. I first examine effects on the 
probability of having a preventive care visit. The NIS-Teen survey asks how old the teen was at 
their most recent check-up, and using this information I construct an indicator variable that is 
equal to one if an individual reported that their most recent check-up was at ages 16 or 17.  
Results of these analyses are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, without and with 
state specific linear trends, respectively. I find that the high school meningococcal vaccine 
mandates significantly increase the probability that an individual has a preventive care visit at 
ages 16 or 17 by 6.2-6.9 percentage points. Notably, this effect is approximately twice as large as 
the preventive care visit spillover effect of middle school vaccine mandates found in Carpenter 
and Lawler (2018). This is consistent with the fact that older teens have lower rates of contact 
with health care providers than middle school-aged adolescents, and thus there is more room for 
change through policy intervention.  
I examine further potential spillovers of the increased receipt of preventive care on 
several other measures of adolescent health and  receipt of health care that are included in the 
NIS-Teen: indicator variables for initiation and completion of the HPV vaccine series by age 17, 
indicator variables for receiving any doses of the HPV vaccine or the Tdap vaccine at ages 16 or 
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17,  an indicator variable for receipt of the flu vaccine within the past 3 years, an indicator 
variable that is equal to 1 if an adolescent has ever been diagnosed with any of a group of health 
conditions,
126
  and an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the adolescent has ever been 
diagnosed with asthma. My results suggest that the high school booster mandate significantly 
increased the probability of receiving a dose of the HPV vaccine at age 16 or 17 (columns 9 and 
10), although estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of state-specific linear trends. These 
additional doses seem to have been administered to individuals who had already received at least 
one dose of the HPV vaccine series, as I find no evidence of increased initiation of the HPV 
series (columns 11 and 12) but do find a marginally significant increase in completion rates 
(receipt of at least 3 doses) in specifications that include state-specific linear time trends (column 
14).  The estimates in columns 15 and 16 also suggest significant spillovers to the uptake of a 
dose of the Tdap booster vaccine at ages 16 or 17, with effect sizes ranging from 3.8 to 5.4 
percentage points.  I find no evidence, however, of spillovers to the uptake of the flu vaccine in 
the past 3 years (columns 3 and 4), or to the probability of being diagnosed with any of the 
specified health conditions (columns 5 through 8).  
In Appendix Table 2 I examine potential heterogeneity in the outcomes for which I find 
significant spillover effects: check-ups and receipt of doses of the HPV and Tdap vaccines. In 
general, I find spillover effects to be largest for the households with lower income and lower-
educated mothers, even though these are the sub-groups for which the first-stage increase in the 
probability of receiving a dose of the meningococcal vaccine was the smallest. Notably however, 
the low socioeconomic status (SES) sub-groups are less likely to receive a 16-17 year old check-
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 The listed health conditions are as follows: “A lung condition other than asthma, a heart condition, 
diabetes, a kidney condition, sickle cell anemia or other anemia, or a weakened immune system caused by 
chronic illness or by medicines taken for a chronic illness” (DHHS 2016). 
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up or to be up-to-date with the HPV or Tdap vaccine in the absence of the high school booster 
mandate, and therefore have the largest potential for improvements along these margins.  
3.6.3. Google trends 
As an additional measure of the effects of the high school meningococcal vaccine 
mandates I estimate their effects on Google searches for meningococcal- related terms, using 
Google trends data from 2005-2016. Google trends data provide state-month level measures of 
relative search popularity for a given search term. Relative search popularity is standardized 
within each state such that the month with the highest search volume is equal to 100; if overall 
searches in a state are below a certain (non-disclosed) threshold, Google will not release the data 
disaggregated to the state level. As a result, for some of the less common search terms (e.g. 
`Meningitis vaccine’), data are missing for several states.  
Results from these analyses are presented in Table 6. The reported coefficients are from 
difference-in-difference models that include state and month-year fixed effects, as well as 
contemporaneous measures of all state-level policies and demographic characteristics previously 
discussed, including current and lagged measures of meningococcal disease incidence. Estimates 
consistently show that high school meningococcal vaccine mandates increase Google searches 
for a range of meningococcal-related terms. These results suggest that beyond increasing 
vaccination rates among targeted age groups, these mandates may have also resulted in the 
broader dissemination of information about meningococcal disease.  
Given the spillover effect of the meningococcal booster mandate to receipt of a dose of 
the HPV vaccine and the Tdap vaccine at ages 16 or 17, I also test if the mandate increased HPV 
or Tdap-related Google searches. These results are presented in Appendix Table 7; estimates 
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show that there is no evidence that the meningococcal booster mandates increased searches for 
“hpv,” the “HPV vaccine” search topic, or for “tdap.” The null HPV result is consistent with the 
fact that the mandates did not affect overall initiation into the HPV vaccine series, and may 
suggest that the meningococcal booster mandate did not have spillover effects to knowledge 
regarding the HPV vaccine.  
3.7. Conclusion 
Over the past several decades, new scientific advances have substantially increased the 
number of vaccines that are approved and recommended for receipt during adolescence. 
Policymakers have responded to these advances by implementing a broad range of policies 
aimed at increasing vaccination rates among adolescents. In this paper I provide the first quasi-
experimental evidence on the effects of two commonly implemented policies, ACIP 
recommendations and school entry immunization mandates, on vaccination rates among high 
school-aged adolescents.   My results show that both of these policies cause large and significant 
increases in the probability that individuals receive a dose of the meningococcal vaccine at age 
16 or 17.  Additional analyses suggest, however, that there is substantial heterogeneity in the 
effects of the policies across different demographic sub-groups. Most notably, I find that in the 
case of the meningococcal vaccine, ACIP recommendations may serve to exacerbate pre-existing 
disparities in the probability of being vaccinated, as households with higher socioeconomic 
status are most responsive to the recommendation, as well as most likely to have been vaccinated 
prior to the recommendation being issued.  
I also provide suggestive evidence that these large increases in vaccination rates resulted 
in reductions in the incidence of meningococcal disease.  Importantly, given that mortality rates 
of meningococcal infection range from 10 to 15 percent, and the fact that up to 20 percent of 
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individuals that survive suffer from permanent disabilities, even small reductions in disease 
incidence translates into large societal gains.  Additionally, I find the dynamics of the morbidity 
effects to be important, as event study estimates suggest a lagged effect that continues to increase 
for up to several years following policy implementation.  
Finally, my results show that the implementation of a high school immunization mandate 
significantly increases the probability that an individual has a preventive care visit at ages 16 or 
17. I also find that after a mandate is implemented, teens are more likely to receive other non-
mandated vaccines (HPV and Tdap) during those same ages. Given that many high-risk 
behaviors are initiated during the teenage years, it is possible that the increased provider contact 
resulting from the immunization mandate could have a number of further spillover effects to 
adolescent health and behavior that I am unable to identify in the datasets used here. 
Interestingly, these spillovers to other types of preventive care mainly occur in low 
socioeconomic status households, and actually serve to reduce pre-existing disparities across 
groups.  
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Figure 1 : National Trend in Meningococcal Disease Incidence  
 
Notes: Disease incidence data are from the CDC’s Nationally Notifiable Disease Surveillance System, age group-
specific population estimates are from the Surveillance and Epidemiologic End Results (SEER) system.  Rates are 
calculated as number of reported cases per 100,000 population.  
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Figure 2: Timing of MCV4 Booster Mandate Across States 
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Figure 3:  National Trends in Receipt of MCV4 and Tdap Vaccine, at ages 16-17 
 
 
Notes: Data are from NIS-Teen, means are calculated using NIS-Teen provider weights. Sample is restricted to 
individuals who were 17 years old at the time of the survey. 
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Figure 4: Event Study Estimates of the Effect of the 2011 ACIP Recommendation On  
Meningococcal Vaccination Rates Among 16-17 Year Olds, Relative to Tdap Vaccination  
 
 
 
Notes: Reported coefficients are from the interaction between the stated calendar year and the indicator variable for 
the MCV vaccine. Coefficients are relative to the excluded group of the year prior to the given ACIP 
recommendation, and are from the baseline specification that includes the interaction between the MCV indicator 
variable and a vector of state meningococcal and Tdap vaccination policies. Brackets represent the 95% confidence 
interval.  
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Figure 5: Event Study Estimates of the Effect of High School Immunization Mandates On 
Meningococcal Vaccination Rates Among 16-17 Year Olds Vaccination  
 
  
Notes: Sample excludes DC & IN. Coefficients are relative to the excluded period of the year prior to mandate 
adoption. The coefficients presented for -6 periods relative to implementation should be interpreted as the 
coefficient on 6 or more years prior. Estimated coefficient for three or more years post implementation is not 
reported, as it is identified by only one state. Brackets represent the 95% confidence interval.  
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Figure 6A:   National Trends in ln(meningococcal cases +1), 5-14 year olds versus all other age 
groups 
 
 
Figure 6B: National Trends in ln(meningococcal cases +1), 15-24 year olds versus all other age 
groups 
 
 
 
Note: Data are from CDC NNDSS. In Figure A the series are each adjusted to be mean zero in 2004, in Figure B the 
series are adjusted to be mean zero in 2010. 
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Figure 7A: Event Study Estimates of the Effect of 2005 ACIP Recommendation on Disease 
Incidence Among 5-14 Year Olds, Relative to All Other Age Groups 
 
 
Figure 7B: Event Study Estimates of the Effect of 2011 ACIP Recommendation on Disease 
Incidence Among 15-24 Year Olds, Relative to All Other Age Groups 
 
 
Notes: In Figure A, reported coefficients are from the interaction between the stated calendar year and the indicator 
variable for the 5-14 year old age group; in Figure B they are the coefficients on the interaction between the given 
calendar year and the indicator variable for the 15-24 year old age group. Both sets of coefficients are from the same 
regression, in which the outcome variable is ln(age group-specific meningococcal cases+1), and which includes the 
interaction between age group fixed effects and a vector of state meningococcal vaccination policies. Coefficients 
are relative to the excluded group of the year prior to the given ACIP recommendation; brackets represent the 95% 
confidence interval.  
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Figure 8A: Event Study Estimates of the Effect of High School Immunization Mandates on 
Disease Incidence Among 15-24 Year Olds 
 
Figure 8B:  Event Study Estimates of the Effect of High School Immunization Mandates on  
Population Disease Incidence  
 
Notes: Sample excludes DC & IN. Coefficients are relative to the excluded period of the year prior to mandate 
adoption. The coefficients presented for -6 periods relative to implementation should be interpreted as the 
coefficient on 6 or more years prior. Estimated coefficient for three or more years post implementation is not 
reported, as it is identified by only one state. Coefficients in Figures A and B are from separate regressions, in which 
the outcome variable is the rate of meningococcal disease per 100,000 population for 15-24 year olds, or for the total 
population, respectively. Brackets represent the 95% confidence interval.  
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Table 1:  Age-targeted MCV4 Vaccination Policies Increased MCV4 Vaccination Rates at age 
16-17, NIS-Teen (2008-2016)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Pr (Receive 
Vaccine 
Dose, age 
16-17)  
Pr (Receive 
Vaccine 
Dose, age 
16-17) 
Pr (Receive 
Vaccine 
Dose, age 
16-17) 
1 dose 
MCV4, age 
16-17 
1 dose 
MCV4, age 
16-17 
      
Post- 2011 ACIP  X MCV 0.206
***
 0.257
***
 0.202
***
   
(0.0179) (0.0133) (0.0220)   
      
High school MCV Mandate    0.190
***
 0.212
***
 
    (0.0244) (0.0242) 
      
State and vaccine fixed 
effects? 
Y Y Y N N 
Includes MCVxState 
Insurance policies? 
N Y Y N N 
Vaccine-specific linear 
trend? 
N N Y N N 
State and year fixed effects? N N N Y Y 
Linear state trends? N N N N Y 
Observations (unique 
individuals) 
33386 33386 33386 31585 31585 
R-squared 0.108 0.112 0.113 0.0945 0.0999 
Mean MCV4 vacc. rate 0.247 0.247 0.247 0.244 0.244 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Results are from linear probability models and use 
NIS-Teen  sampling weights.  The sample in all columns is restricted to individuals who were 17 year old at the time 
of survey, columns 4 and 5 additionally exclude observations from Indiana and DC.  The coefficients in columns 1-3 
are from the estimation of equation 1, in which the outcome variable is an indicator for whether the individual 
received a dose of the specified vaccine (either MCV4 or Tdap) at age 16 or 17. These models include vaccine and 
year fixed effects and include a vector of controls for state policies and disease incidence (state college and high 
school immunization and education requirements for MCV; state middle school immunization mandates for Tdap 
and MCV; lagged state pertussis and meningococcal disease incidence) interacted with an indicator variable for the 
MCV vaccine. Column 2 additionally includes the interaction between state insurance policies (state mandates for 
insurance coverage of well-child visits and vaccines; state children’s Medicaid/CHIP income eligibility thresholds; 
indicator variable for if the state expanded Medicaid) and the MCV indicator variable, and column 3 adds vaccine 
specific linear trends. The coefficients in columns 4 and 5 are from the estimation of equation 4; the outcome 
variable is an indicator for if the individual received a dose of the MCV4 vaccine between ages 16 and 17. In 
addition to controls for the state immunization policy, disease incidence and insurance variables listed above, 
models in columns 4 and 5 additionally include controls for individual demographic characteristics (gender, race, 
number of children in the household, and mother's age, education level, and marital status); state and year  fixed 
effects; state HPV policies (see text for details); state immunization mandates for child care/kindergarten entry; state 
catch-up vaccination mandates; state pharmacist vaccination authority; state unemployment rates; and state 
demographic characteristics (fraction black, Hispanic, and other races, fraction of individuals with high school 
degree and with some college or more, and fraction below the federal poverty level).  Column 5 also includes linear 
state-specific trends.  All standard errors are clustered at the state level.   
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Table 2: Effects of ACIP Recommendations on Disease Incidence, CDC Data (2001-2016) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Ln(Meningococcal 
cases +1), age-group 
specific 
 control group: all other 
ages 
Ln(Meningococcal 
cases +1) , age-group 
specific 
 control group: all other 
ages 
Ln(Meningococcal 
cases +1) , age-group 
specific 
 control group: all other 
ages 
    
Post-2005 ACIP X  
 5-14 yr olds 
-0.306
***
 -0.300
***
 -0.427
***
 
(0.0895) (0.0904) (0.121) 
    
Post-2011 ACIP X  
 15-24 yr olds 
-0.175
*
 -0.151 -0.0712 
(0.0889) (0.117) (0.125) 
    
State and age-group 
fixed effects? 
Y Y Y 
(Age group FE) x 
Insurance policies? 
N Y Y 
Age group-specific 
linear trend? 
N N Y 
Observations 4080 4080 4080 
R-squared 0.895 0.896 0.899 
Mean 1.951 1.951 1.951 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Results are from linear probability models and are 
weighted by state age-specific population.  The sample in columns 5-8 exclude observations from Indiana and DC.  
The coefficients in columns 1-4 are from the estimation of equation 3, where the outcome variable and control age 
group are listed in the column header. Each of these models include age-group and year fixed effects.  The 
coefficients in columns 5-8 are from the estimation of a variant of equation 4. See the notes to Table 1 for more 
information on the controls included in each model. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.   
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Table 3: Effects of Meningococcal Vaccination Policies On Disease Incidence, CDC Data (2001-
2016) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Meningococcal 
Incidence Rate, 
15-24 year olds 
Meningococcal 
Incidence Rate, 
15-24 year olds 
Population 
Meningococcal 
Incidence Rate 
Population 
Meningococcal 
Incidence Rate 
     
High-school 
MCV Mandate 
-0.0291 0.00189 -0.0747
*
 -0.0277 
(0.0805) (0.145) (0.0441) (0.0525) 
     
State and year 
fixed effects? 
Y Y Y Y 
Linear state 
trends? 
N Y N Y 
Observations 734 734 734 734 
R-squared 0.582 0.628 0.825 0.850 
Mean 0.436 0.436 0.314 0.314 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Results are from linear probability models and are 
weighted by state age-specific population.  The sample in columns 5-8 exclude observations from Indiana and DC.  
The coefficients are from the estimation of a variant of equation 4. See the notes to Table 1 for more information on 
the controls included in each model. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.   
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Table 4:  Heterogeneous Effects of Vaccination Policies on Receipt of MCV4 
 Effect of the 2011 ACIP Recommendations  Effect of High School Booster Mandates 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
 Pre-2011 mean 
MCV4 vacc. rate 
1 Dose, Age 16-
17 
1 Dose, Age 16-
17 
 Pre-Mandate 
mean MCV4 
vacc rate 
1 Dose MCV4, 
Age 16-17 
1 Dose MCV4, 
Age 16-17 
Sub-group        
Females   0.165 0.203
***
 0.220
***
  0.243 0.225
***
 0.279
***
 
 (0.0189) (0.0203)   (0.0384) (0.0624) 
        
Males 0.152 0.209
***
 0.187
***
  0.229 0.157
***
 0.151
***
 
 (0.0193) (0.0330)   (0.0369) (0.0480) 
        
Mom ed: ≤HS 0.148 0.190*** 0.191***  0.217 0.0945*** 0.0946** 
 (0.0225) (0.0294)   (0.0333) (0.0407) 
        
Mom ed:  
Any College 
0.163 0.214
***
 0.198
***
  0.248    0.251
***
 0.299
***
 
 (0.0209) (0.0228)   (0.0294) (0.0263) 
        
Inc: <$40k 0.141 0.173
***
 0.168
***
  0.220 0.134
***
 0.111
**
 
 (0.0228) (0.0382)   (0.0357) (0.0430) 
        
Inc: $40-75k 0.158 0.190
***
 0.176
***
  0.215 0.257
***
 0.289
***
 
 (0.0223) (0.0350)   (0.0825) (0.0903) 
        
Inc: +$75k 0.169  0.245
***
 0.248
***
  0.260 0.242
***
 0.323
***
 
  (0.0238) (0.0345)   (0.0392) (0.0436) 
Linear trends?  No Yes    No Yes 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Each estimate is from a separate regression. In columns 1 and 2 the reported estimate is the 
coefficient on the interaction term POST-2011XMCV; in columns 3 and 4 reported estimates are the coefficient on the indicator variable for if a state has an 
effective high school MCV4 booster mandate. Specifications in columns 1 and 2 include vaccine and year fixed effects, estimates in column 2 are from the fully 
saturated model that additionally include vaccine-specific linear trends and the interaction between state insurance policies and the MCV indicator. Specifications 
in columns 3 and 4 include year and state fixed effects; column 4 estimates additionally include state-specific linear trends.  The sample in columns 3 and 4 also 
exclude observations from DC and Indiana.  
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Table 5: Effects of the Mandate on Contact with Health Care Provider and Health Outcomes, NIS-Teen 2008-2016  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Check-up, 
Age 16-17 
Check-up, 
Age 16-17 
Flu vaccine, 
past 3 years 
Flu vaccine, 
past 3 years 
Ever 
diagnosed 
with group of 
conditions 
Ever 
diagnosed 
with group of 
conditions 
Ever 
diagnosed 
with asthma  
Ever 
diagnosed 
with 
asthma 
         
MCV Booster 
Mandate 
0.0686
***
 0.0624
***
 -0.00630 -0.0254 0.00565 -0.0215 -0.0482 -0.0746 
(0.0252) (0.0196) (0.0186) (0.0261) (0.0119) (0.0227) (0.0378) (0.0538) 
         
N 30968 30968 31585 31585 31553 31553 31543 31543 
R-squared 0.0435 0.0477 0.0866 0.0881 0.0114 0.0142 0.0187 0.0212 
Mean 0.840 0.840 0.337 0.337 0.0756 0.0756 0.202 0.202 
Linear state trends? N Y N Y N Y N Y 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 HPV dose, 
Age 16-17 
HPV dose, 
Age 16-17 
Initiated the 
HPV series, 
by age 17 
Initiated the 
HPV series, 
by age 17 
Completed 
the HPV 
series, by age 
17 
Completed 
the HPV 
series, by age 
17 
TD-
containing 
vaccine, 
age 16-17 
TD-
containing 
vaccine, 
age 16-17 
         
MCV Booster 
Mandate 
0.0471
***
 0.00948 0.0144 -0.00827 0.0332 0.0553
*
 0.0536
**
 0.0379
**
 
(0.0166) (0.0174) (0.0175) (0.0187) (0.0321) (0.0307) (0.0236) (0.0174) 
         
N 31585 31585 31585 31585 31585 31585 31585 31585 
R-squared 0.0431 0.0466 0.275 0.277 0.213 0.215 0.0590 0.0674 
Mean 0.186 0.186 0.409 0.409 0.268 0.268 0.105 0.105 
Linear state trends? N Y N Y N Y N Y 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  See notes to Table 1 for details on the specification and control variables.  All samples exclude 
Indiana and DC.  
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Table 6: Effects of the Mandate on Google Search Behavior, Google Trends 2005-2016 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Relative 
Google 
search 
popularity 
for 
‘Meningococ
cal’ 
Relative 
Google 
search 
popularity 
for 
‘Meningococ
cal’ 
Relative 
Google 
search 
popularity of 
the 
‘Meningococ
cal vaccine’ 
topic 
Relative 
Google 
search 
popularity of 
the 
‘Meningococ
cal vaccine’ 
topic 
Relative 
Google 
search 
popularity 
for 
‘Meningitis’ 
Relative 
Google 
search 
popularity 
for 
‘Meningitis’ 
Relative 
Google 
search 
popularity 
for 
‘Meningitis 
vaccine’ 
Relative 
Google 
search 
popularity 
for 
‘Meningitis 
vaccine’ 
         
         
MCV booster 
Mandate 
7.949
***
 11.43
***
 12.35
***
 10.29
***
 1.623
*
 2.467
**
 9.565
***
 10.93
***
 
(2.883) (2.504) (4.178) (3.296) (0.821) (1.067) (3.366) (2.714) 
         
Meningococcal rate 4.199 2.031 -0.132 -3.624 6.297
***
 6.454
***
 5.089 3.714 
 (2.849) (2.953) (3.965) (4.178) (1.486) (1.722) (4.212) (4.203) 
         
N 7488 7488 6992 6992 7644 7644 6552 6552 
R-squared 0.323 0.332 0.535 0.561 0.573 0.581 0.332 0.349 
Mean 16.99 16.99 26.78 26.78 21.86 21.86 16.92 16.92 
Linear state trends? N Y N Y N Y N Y 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The outcome variable is a measure of the popularity of a given search term or topic, in which, 
for each state, the month of peak search volume is normalized to 100. Samples exclude Indiana and DC. All models include the state policy controls and state 
demographics as described in the notes to Table 1 as well as fixed effects for each state and for each month-year.  Columns 2, 4, and 6 also include linear state 
trends.  
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3.9. Appendix 
Appendix Figure 1: Trends in Meningococcal Disease Incidence Rate, by Age Group 
 
 
Appendix Figure 2: National Trends in Receipt of Adolescent Vaccines 
 
 
Notes: Data are from NIS-Teen, means are calculated using NIS-Teen provider weights. 
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Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, NIS-Teen 2008-2016 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full sample Pre-ACIP 
Recommendation 
(2008-2010) 
Post-ACIP 
Recommendation 
(2011-2016) 
Individuals in states 
w/ booster mandate 
by 2016 
Individuals in states 
w/o booster 
mandate by 2016 
Dose of MCV4, age 16-17 0.244 0.160 0.288 0.240 0.245 
Dose of Tdap vaccine, age 16-17 0.105 0.169 0.071 0.112 0.104 
Dose of HPV vaccine, age 16-17 0.186 0.157 0.201 0.188 0.185 
Influenza vaccine (past 3 years) 0.337 0.196 0.411 0.312 0.342 
      
Child’s characteristics      
Female  0.486 0.491 0.483 0.485 0.486 
Hispanic 0.195 0.163 0.212 0.130 0.209 
White 0.581 0.620 0.561 0.639 0.569 
Black 0.142 0.147 0.139 0.154 0.139 
Other ethnicity 0.082 0.069 0.088 0.077 0.083 
Preventive care visit, age 16 or 17 0.840 0.817 0.852 0.882 0.831 
      
Mother’s characteristics      
Less than high school 0.126 0.124 0.126 0.117 0.128 
High school 0.255 0.283 0.241 0.281 0.250 
Some college 0.264 0.53 0.270 0.248 0.267 
College degree or above 0.355 0.340 0.363 0.354 0.355 
Married 0.684 0.746 0.651 0.667 0.687 
Age: <35 yrs 0.036 0.027 0.041 0.027 0.038 
Age: 35-44 yrs 0.396 0.409 0.389 0.391 0.398 
Age: 45+ yrs 0.568 0.564 0.569 0.582 0.564 
      
Morbidity Rates per 100,000 pop.      
Meningococcal, population rate 0.216 0.424 0.160 0.310 0.316 
Meningococcal, age 15-24 rate 0.436 0.593 0.207 0.390 0.446 
      
Observations 31,585 10,069 21,516 5,519 26,066 
Notes: All values are weighted means calculated by the authors from NIS-Teen 2008-2016 data, using provided sample weights. For morbidity rates, the sample 
in column (2) is 2001-2010.  Means exclude Indiana and D.C. 
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Appendix Table 2: Heterogeneous Spillover Effects of MCV4 High School Booster Mandates  
 Preventive Care Check-Up  Receipt of HPV Vaccine  Receipt of TD-cont. vaccine 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
 
pre-mandate 
mean 
Check-up, 
Age 16-17 
Check-up, 
Age 16-17  
UTD, pre-
mandate 
mean 
1 dose, 
Age 16-17 
1 dose, 
Age 16-17  
UTD, pre-
mandate 
mean 
1 Dose, 
Age 16-17 
1 Dose, 
Age 16-
17 
Sub-group            
Females 0.858 0.0576
**
 0.0614
**
  0.426   0.0774
**
 0.0141  0.863 0.0513 0.0453 
 (0.0275) (0.0266)   (0.0308) (0.0320)   (0.0400) (0.0358) 
              
Males 0.819   0.0767
*
 0.0653
**
  0.109 0.0165 0.00241  0.841 0.0543
***
 0.0276 
 (0.0435) (0.0280)   (0.0200) (0.0212)   (0.0159) (0.0186) 
            
Mom ed: 
≤HS 
0.806 0.0920
**
 0.0669
*
  0.245 0.0829
***
 0.0108  0.816 0.0845
**
 0.0552
*
 
 (0.0412) (0.0385)   (0.0233) (0.0274)   (0.0325) (0.0314) 
            
Mom ed: 
Any College 
0.858   0.0488 0.0521
**
    0.275 0.0250 0.0181  0.874 0.0345 0.0234 
 (0.0301) (0.0210)   (0.0212) (0.0274)   (0.0232) (0.0142) 
            
Inc: <$40k 0.809 0.0563 0.0368  0.262 0.128
***
 0.103
*
  0.837 0.0856
***
 0.0468
**
 
 (0.0393) (0.0484)   (0.0291) (0.0580)   (0.0231) (0.0223) 
            
Inc: $40-75k 0.833 0.107
**
 0.128
*
  0.227 -0.00114 -0.0344  0.827 0.0700
**
 0.0889
***
 
 (0.0511) (0.0639)   (0.0442) (0.0453)   (0.0309) (0.0307) 
            
Inc: +$75k 0.870 0.0576 0.0749
***
  0.296 0.0217 -0.00671  0.882 0.0268 0.0184 
  (0.0391) (0.0263)   (0.0294) (0.0399)   (0.0306) (0.0327) 
Linear 
trends? 
 N Y   N Y   N Y 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Each estimate is from a separate regression, and is the coefficient on indicator variable for if a 
state has an effective high school MCV4 booster mandate. The outcome variable is as given in the column header. All specifications include year and state fixed 
effects; specifications in the even numbered columns additionally include state-specific linear trends.  
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Appendix Table 3: Google Trends 2005-2016 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Relative 
Google 
search 
popularity 
for ‘HPV’ 
Relative 
Google 
search 
popularity 
for ‘HPV’ 
Relative 
Google 
search 
popularity 
of the ‘HPV 
vaccine’ 
topic 
Relative 
Google 
search 
popularity 
of the ‘HPV 
vaccine’ 
topic 
Relative 
Google 
search 
popularity 
for ‘tdap’ 
Relative 
Google 
search 
popularity 
for ‘tdap’ 
       
       
MCV booster 
Mandate 
0.0273 -1.342 1.571 -0.585 -1.080 1.391 
(1.953) (2.056) (2.948) (2.462) (4.412) (3.261) 
       
Meningococcal 
rate 
3.143
**
 0.519 2.554 0.977 -1.412 -6.917 
(1.427) (1.743) (3.097) (3.149) (3.856) (4.139) 
       
N 7448 7448 7448 7448 7448 7448 
R-squared 0.788 0.803 0.660 0.679 0.778 0.815 
Mean 47.72 47.72 25.55 25.55 30.50 30.50 
Linear state 
trends? 
N Y N Y N Y 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The outcome variable is a measure of the 
popularity of a given search term or topic, in which, for each state, the month of peak search volume is normalized 
to 100.  Sample excludes Indiana and DC. All models include the state policy controls and state demographics as 
described in the notes to Table 1 as well as fixed effects for each state and for each month-year.  Columns 2, 4, and 6 
also include linear state trends.  
 
 
 
 
